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In some weird way, the dead are an audience, always.
Crumpled Paper Boat
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A List of Numbers

Tuesday, 26 December 2017:
15 people executed in case no. 411/2013 Ismailiya Plenary Felonies, 43 days 1 after their death
sentences were upheld by the Supreme Military Court.
Tuesday, 2 January 2018:
5 people executed; four of whom were in the same military case (no. 22/2015 Tanta Military
Felonies), 197 days after their death sentences were upheld.2 The fifth person was in a different,
civil, case.
Tuesday, 9 January 2018:
3 people executed, all in the same military case (no. 93/2011 Ismailiya Military Felonies). Their
death sentences were upheld on 11 April, 2017. They later filed for an appeal to reconsider the
case, which the Supreme Military Court had accepted to look into. Their appeal was scheduled
for 25 February 2018, that is 54 days after they were executed.
Tuesday, 23 January 2018:
1 person executed in case no. 397/2013 Ismailiya Military Felonies.
Tuesday, 30 January 2018:
1 person executed in case no. 99/2014 Ismailiya Military Felonies.
8 March 2018
Five people executed. All were tried in the same case before civil judiciary.
22 March 2018

1

Verdict was upheld on 13 November 2017
Verdict was upheld on 19 June 2017
3
Verdict was upheld on 6 February 2018
4
2 I wanted a proper introduction to the people here and not just the names. In a different place, this would
Verdict was upheld on 19 June 2017
2
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2 people executed, 51 days after their death sentences were upheld by the Supreme Military
Court.3
26 March 2018
Supreme Military Court upholds verdict to execute two people in the same military case.

3

Verdict was upheld on 6 February 2018
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A List of Names4
Christmas of 2017 marked the largest number of executions in Egyptian history.
Ahmed Azmi Hassan Mohammed, Abd al-Rahman Salama Salem, Alaa Kamel Selim, Musaad
Hamdan Salem, Halim Awwad Suleiman, Ibrahim Salem Hammad, Ismail Abdullah Hamdan,
Hassan Salama Gomaa, Dahab Awwad Suleiman, Youssef Ayyad Suleiman, Mohammed Ayesh
Ghannam, Salama Saber Selim, Fouad Salama Gomaa, and brothers Mohammed Salama Talal
and Ahmed Salama Talal.
A week later,
Lotfy Ibrahim Ismail Khalil, Ahmed Abdel Moneim Salama, Ahmed Abdel Hady al-Seheimy
and Sameh Abdallah Youssef.
Another week later,
Mohammed Gamal al-Sayyed Ateyya, Mohammed Misbah Abd al-Haqq al-Sayyed, and
Mohammed Ibrahim al-Baz.
Two weeks later,
Mohammed Ahmed Abu Siree.
Another week later,
Tayseer Audah Suleiman.
Thirty seven days later—perhaps the temporary halt was due to the UN and European Parliament
interventions, at least through press releases and announced correspondences with the Egyptian
government,
Mohammed (last name unannounced), Mohammed (last name unannounced), Khodari (last name
unannounced), Shazuli (last name unannounced), and Bashandi (last name unannounced).
Two weeks later,
4

I wanted a proper introduction to the people here and not just the names. In a different place, this would
have included information about them and the people their execution left behind, such that they
immediately flesh out/back into people who refuse their confinement to a register. As sad as it is, I only
have access to the names of most of them—first names only, even. This has to do with the lack of
publicly available information, as will be discussed further later on.
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Suleiman Muslim Eid Rabie and Rabhi Gomaa Hussein.
Four days later,
The execution of Ahmed Amin Ghazali Amin and Abd al-Basir Abd al-Raouf Abd al-Muwalli
Hassan became dreadfully anticipated. Until the time of writing this list, they have not been
executed. Yet.
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Prologue

The previous lists coincide with the process of writing this dissertation. That is, these are the
names and corresponding dates of execution of human beings, in acts of state murder, throughout
which I was required to submit this work. Taking these names, the execution-Tuesdays,5 and the
numbers seriously is to attest to the seeming impossibility of writing (about) them: how is it
possible to freeze the assembly line? How is it possible to decide to stop hearing about it, and to
instead capture and document certain moments in the seemingly infinite march to the kill
chambers? How can we trace the people that were left behind, in the arid lack of documentation
or public disclosure of information? How does one write murder—the worst kind, the only
legitimate kind, of murder? How can the viscerality, the ugliness, the unbearability, the stench of
blood, the touch of cold of limbs, the cockroaches in the execution chamber, the wait for the
stamp on the document attesting to burial, the amputation of proper burial—how can the nuances
and details be written, be conveyed? How can one, amidst the bodies and their parts, the judges
and their stamps, the visits and their ends, the states and their discourses, make sense of
anything, when everything ceases to abide by reason, rules, logic, and law?
In an attempt to make my own sense, to attest to the mess and ―swear I saw this,6‖ and perhaps
in partial fulfillment of a selfish urge to comprehend, I present the details: the mess, the morbid,
the macabre. Out of pessimistic hope to shatter the sanitized state discourses around the death
penalty in Egypt; out of hopeless optimism in a full-fledged future ‗that is being built on our own
bodies.‘ Perhaps one day someone might decide to look at this—out of curiosity, boredom, or
similarly grim interests—and not believe that we ancestors existed in an era characterized by
unprecedented state-sanctioned-killings. It is mainly you whom I address here, with the details
and other sides of the official story: to share the names, moments, quotes, pictures, and gifts of
your ancestors in red suits, whose necks were broken in different times long before, during, and
after the writing of this sentence.
A certain disclaimer is not to be taken for granted. So just in case you think otherwise, this is not
a happy read, nor an easy write. The details are graphic, and tend to linger beyond the pages.
Like the people and their handwriting; like the documents, the children, and the uncanny red.

5

El Tahawy, 2018, “Tuesday becomes execution day in Egypt.” Available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/opinion/egypt-executions-sisi.html
6
Taussig, 2011
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A Note on Language

The ethnographic encounters are mediated through Arabic, unless otherwise stated. Translations
of the encounters with people and texts are my own. Inspired by Navaro-Yashin (2003; 2007)—
although I‘m not sure if this was intentional—the translated fragments are enclosed within
apostrophes instead of quotation marks. This pays tribute to all that is lost in the process of
listening, translating, and writing, and the impossibility of translation altogether. All
transliterations are made in accordance to the guidelines of the International Journal of Middle
East Studies.
Since this work is an attempt to speak against abstractions and dismissive sanitizations, the death
penalty is hereafter referred to as what it actually is: state killings, legitimate murders, and
through other phrases that do not reduce such acts to ‗deaths.‘ Similarly, and to temporarily put
on hold a never-ending anthropological perplexity, I choose to refer to my ―interlocutors‖ or
―informants‖ as what they really are to this work: narrators and storytellers.
Additionally, I am aware, and very weary, of the fact that ―numbers have come to epitomize the
modern fact, because they have come to seem pre-interpretive or even somehow noninterpretive
at the same time that they have become the bedrock of systematic knowledge‖ (Poovey, 1998,
p.xii). And so with each case number I refer to, I do not intend to maintain that ―numbers
increasingly seem to constitute the most transparent—and thus least ―interested‖ or biased—
form of representation‖ (p.13). Instead, I push through the reductive capacities of turning people
into numbers. Numbers are not at all neutral, and while they may be intended to conceal people
under/behind them—the number of people killed, the number of the cases they are in, and so
on—I argue that there is so much beyond the numbers, and as will follow, argue against the
seeming automation that this particular articulation engenders.
Finally, there is an air of absurdity to changing the names of narrators who were hanged and are
now buried. Instead of assigning them pseudonymic labels, and in line with their families‘
requests to share the very particular stories, letters, and pictures, the real names feature to
buttress their particular stories in an intimate reality. For other considerations, I also point out
that the names in question appear in court documents that are now part of the ‗public‘ archive.

9

Introducing ‘Them’

Tuesday 2 January 2018:
12 human rights organizations condemn ―the unprecedented political use of the death penalty‖
Friday, 26 January 2018:
UN Experts: ―Egypt must halt executions‖ following repeated allegations of unfair trials
Friday 26 January 2018:
Six human rights organizations condemn ―the largest number of executions‖ in the history of the
Egyptian government
Wednesday, 7 February 2018:
European Parliament passes resolution that ―strongly condemns the use of capital punishment,
and calls for a halt to any imminent executions in Egypt‖
10 March 2018:
Launch of local campaign ―Stop the Death Penalty‖
13 March 2018:
UN Experts: ―Calling for the death penalty after unfair procedures is unacceptable‖
27 March 2018
Press release by Amnesty International a day after the Supreme Military Court upheld
death sentences of two civilians, in fear of their ―imminent risk of execution after military trial
and torture‖

To start writing about the death penalty in contemporary Egypt is to start on the backdrop of
injustices. Since this is an ethnography of these particular forms of injustice, it does not at all
echo human rights terminology in normative discourses of the injustices of the death penalty.
Instead, it begins by acknowledging them, and attempts to take them further through exploring
the mechanics of injustices: their ritualization, automaticities, temporalities and banal yet
phantasmatic unwindings. In this sense, this thesis is in significant ways an exploration of deadly
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injustices, as much as it is an artifact of storytelling. In the pages to follow, stories that capture
different moments along the murderous state trajectory to the execution chambers narrate
important facts, messes, disbeliefs, and meaning-making. More broadly, they narrate the
encounters between two figures of ‗them.‘ I use ‗them‘ the way my narrators constantly did: to
refer to a figure of an other, in many cases unknown, rather than identify a particular person.
‗They‘ was how the families referred to the state: they who broke the lock on the blue gate before
storming the house; they who arrested; they who torture; they who know our innocence as a
matter of fact. Simultaneously, this othering discourse is profoundly infused within state
discourses of them terrorists; them who threaten our security; them who deserve to hang.

To start by introducing both of them requires an initial introduction to the arena in which this
linguistic choice of othering is only one manifestation of alterity. We therefore begin with the
Egyptian state‘s creation of the figure of the terrorist, and explore the death penalty as a
subsequent form of lethal crackdown upon such figure. Nevertheless, this crackdown is also
mediated by figures of the state, which provides an entry point to the state-as-figure, as mediated
through what become encounters between two unequal them/figures. What follows is an attempt
to contextualize this war of figures, politically and legally, in answer to the question who are
they? This involves a narration of contemporary political and legislative changes in the realm of
the death penalty, along with its general public endorsement. It is followed by a ritualistic review
of literature, after which the limitations and maneuvers of this ethnography are presented.
Finally, a guideline to the rest of the chapters is put forward.
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A. Situating the Figures: War on Terror7

On 12 August, 2012, former president Mohamed Morsi appointed Abdel Fattah El Sisi
(Egypt‘s current president) as minister of defense. On 3 July 2013, Sisi was involved in a
military coup that toppled Morsi, in response to protests on 30 June 2013—a year after Morsi
was elected. Sisi appeared once more, on 24 July 2013, asking ‗the people‘ for a ―mandate‖ to
combat terrorism.8 The following crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood culminated in the (14
August 2013) Rabaa massacre, in which hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands injured.
The government labeled the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December 2013, after a
deadly bombing at a security directorate in the city of Mansoura, allegedly carried out by the
Brotherhood.9 On 26 March 2014, Sisi announced his retirement from the military in order to run
for presidency. He became Egypt‘s sixth president on 8 June 2014, pledging that the Muslim
Brotherhood ―will not exist10‖ thereafter. In an interview on 12 March 2015, Sisi described the
Muslim Brotherhood as ―the godfather of all terrorist organizations.11‖

What followed was an unrivalled abuse of the death penalty to eradicate members of the
Brotherhood, as Sisi had pledged. This particular construction of the Muslim Brotherhood as
terrorist, as the ultimate terrorist, says something important and dangerous about the military

7

Parts of this paragraph featured in an article by the author in the Kohl Journal issue on incarceration,
surveillance, and policing. Available at http://kohljournal.press/current-issue/
8
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/77314.aspx
9
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-president-says-he-talks-to-netanyahu-alot/2015/03/12/770ef928-c827-11e4-aa1a86135599fb0f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.01adf20a9033
10
http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-27289931/egypt-election-sisi-vows-end-to-muslimbrotherhood
11
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-president-says-he-talks-to-netanyahu-alot/2015/03/12/770ef928-c827-11e4-aa1a86135599fb0f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.01adf20a9033
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state ideology. In Agamben‘s (1993) words, this ―ideology has penetrated so deeply into reality
that the declared reasons (particularly those pertaining to the idea of a new world order) must be
taken strictly literally‖ (p.61). So Sisi‘s word choice is not to be taken only as a form of
paternalistic threat; in fact, and as the rest of this work will show, his vengeful speeches are to be
taken quite literally. But before speaking about the legislative changes Sisi made to fulfill his
promise, it is important to discuss the status of the death penalty within Egyptian society, while
keeping in mind the fact that it had always been there. In other words, despite its currently
unprecedented and very specific use, which this work primarily addresses, we must not forget
that the use of the death penalty is not exclusive to Sisi. Not only was it used throughout the rule
of former presidents, but it also became a very appealing idea to the Egyptian public.

B. Death and No Debate: Society’s Take

Generally speaking, the public is in favor of the death penalty. In Tahrir square, it became
celebrated as a righteous demand by citizens who want ‗the execution of Mubarak in a public
square.‘ As these photographs show, there is a public endorsement, if not celebration, of the
penalty. With it goes the disturbing demand for a public execution, which introduces the death
penalty as a demand for revenge.

13

Robin Wyatt12

Marco Longari, AFP

12

Retrieved from http://www.robinwyatt.org/photography/journal/egypts-ongoing-revolution-images-andinsights-from-tahrir-square/

14

‗The noose is waiting for you Mubarak‘ was normalized as a popular demand, so much that an
actual effigy of the executed Mubarak was hanged for days in the square before he stepped
down:

Ed Ou, New York Times

‗The people want to try the murderer‘ marks the effigy-corpse of Mubarak, and
introduces us to the stark association between the death penalty and ism il shaʿb [the name of the
people]. In fact, bism il shaʿb marked the opening statement of a mock trial of Mubarak in Tahrir
square, in which members of the Lawyers Syndicate mimicked an actual court, sitting on a panel
on stage and having the defendants—men wearing masks of Mubarak and the others—made to
stand in line by a man wearing officer‘s clothes. After reading the charges, the defense lawyer
asked the judge panel to ‗issue judgements bism il shaʿb that express the shaʿb‘s demands‘
amidst audience claps and whistles. To read the verdict, the judge started bism il shaʿb al misri,
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asking the audience—as if they were jurors—whether they found the defendants guilty. An
immediate consensus on part of the yes-shouting audience came before the judge continued,
saying ‗the public court recommends the referral of all the defendants‘ papers to Egypt‘s Mufti.‘
The crowd‘s cheering and celebration evolved into an allahu akbar chant, before they sang the
Egyptian national anthem.13

A similar appeal to ism il shaʿb was made during the 2013 Rabaa massacre, when
security personnel shouted through microphones bism il shaʿb and bism il qānūn [in the name of
the law] throughout ―one of the world's largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent
history,‖ as described by Human Rights Watch (2014). More than anything, this appeal to the
‗people‘ to justify the unbelievably powerful demand for executions—whether in execution
chambers or on the streets—is highly unsettling on so many levels, each of which will be
discussed in detail in the upcoming chapters. For now, my aim is to highlight the fact that the
death penalty is generally acceptable, if not called for by the public. To turn to numbers to
compensate for the absence of official statistics, a 2006 survey by lawyers and human rights
activists asked people about the death penalty. The surveyors found that above 79% of a 357respondent pool voted against the abolition of the penalty (AlFiqi, p.38). To 99% of those in
favor of the penalty, ‗it serves justice and satisfies the public;‘ to almost 97% of the same
position, the penalty ‗is stipulated by Islamic Sharīʿa and ‗is a crime deterrent.‘ (p.40).

The answers above reflect more than the public‘s endorsement of the penalty. They shed
light on an important fact: the public has not had its chance to debate the death penalty. Hence,

13

This public trial is videotaped by AlMasry AlYoum newspaper; the video is available (in Arabic) at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0t_0enicfb0
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the responses—serving justice, encouraged by Sharīʿa, definitely deterrent—reflect much of the
official discourse. As discussed later (in Chapter 1), the involvement of several official
institutions that are in favor of the death penalty, along with the relevant abstractions and
sanitizations in the official discourse around it (in Chapter 2), shape and settle the public
endorsement of the penalty. Perhaps the greatest obstacle is the abstraction of the penalty,
meaning the invisibilization of its details, in relation to the concrete perception of the
embodiment of evil in a physically-elmininatable criminal/person. In these terms, the question of
a debate seems almost absurd; the death penalty is taken for granted.

On 1 February 2012, the Al Ahly fans went to Port Said to watch the match between their
and the Al Masry football teams. With the end of the match in favor of the latter, something
bizarre happened: the doors separating both audiences suddenly opened, and the (winner) Al
Masry audience attacked the Ahly fans. Seventy two young fans were killed. Security stood
aside, watching. They turned off the lights and shut the stadium doors. Many were killed because
of the overcrowding. Security only intervened after the armed thugs disappeared. Meanwhile, Al
Masry crowds marched the city, chanting ‗it was not us.‘ In January 2013, while the trial of Al
Masry audience members was ongoing, Ultras Ahlawy built a noose and marched to Tahrir
Square with the families of the deceased.14

14

http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/297133.aspx
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Al Ahram

While their chants acknowledged the direct responsibility of SCAF Head Hussein
Tantawy, the Ultras celebrated the referral of the papers of 21 defendants to the Mufti in
preparation for their death sentences (Saad, 2013). In fact, the 72 families were relatively at
peace with the sentences that they were described as ‗a bribe to satisfy public opinion‘ (Saad,
2015), in an attempt to close the case away from the Ministry of Interior, despite its obvious
involvement and responsibility.15 In fact, this responsibility, along with the farcicality of the trial,
inspired an initiative to halt the death penalty. Knowing that ‗we are in circumstances of a fragile
justice, we cannot tolerate this use of the death penalty; it is unique, untenable, and irreversible,‘
the ḍed al ʾiʿdām group launched its initiative, ‗5 years without the death penalty. 16‘ With the

15

A few years later, in the Anthropology of Violence class, I was in a group project with someone who
chose to speak to the violence in football. On the last day of classes during the group presentation, we
learned that her father was the officer responsible for securing the audiences —the same person who
(in)directly gave the orders causing the massacre. Little did he know that his own son was among the Al
Ahly fans that he intended to let die.
16
Details available (in Arabic) at
https://www.facebook.com/472007209568200/photos/pb.472007209568200.2207520000.1533734171./639585952810324/?type=3&theater ; TV show episode about the 5-year
moratorium initiative available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-gNFqQg1XQ
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aim to generate a public debate (starting with the Port Said case, given its profoundness to the
public), the group highlighted the fact that ‗the uglier the crime, the more interested the public
opinion, and the lower the court scrutiny or adherence to fair trial standards.‘ In this situation,
‗the public tends to accept wholesale death sentences because they give the illusion of
retribution—like cards to bribe and settle public opinion, while paralyzing its ability to think and
scrutinize the details.‘

The importance of the call for a debate has been further highlighted by several incidents.
They include the hundreds of death sentences two weeks apart in 2014 in the Mattai and ʿAdwa
cases, which will be discussed further in upcoming chapters. They also include the surprising
amendment proposed by Egypt during the 36th Human Rights Council session. During a vote on
enforcing a moratorium on the death penalty in 2017, Egypt proposed amendment 6 (L.41),
which states that ―a moratorium should be a decision after domestic debate.17‖

This official acknowledgement of the importance of a debate is surprisingly positive,
especially amidst the current and unsurpassed use of the death penalty. To carve space for this
debate, however, it is important to point to the contextual difficulties of debating the penalty,
particularly its implication in a deeply-rooted sharīʿa discourse. As for its deterrent capacities,
there is no longer any official disclosure of crime statistics and prison data.18 Furthermore,
addressing the degree of counterproductivity of the penalty is futile, because of an underlying
pretext of counterterrorism. Yet within each area of complexity, there is something to be said
about the silence that lingers after the automated response in favor of the penalty. In other words,
17

Detailed votes available at https://ilga.org/downloads/HRC36_death_penalty_voting_resolution.pdf
Such reports used to be published in the official newspaper until around 2013. Afterwards, interested
lawyers managed to obtain them, unofficially, until 2015. The reports have not been available since.
18
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by looking closer at the terms ‗sharīʿa‘ and ‗counterterrorism,‘ the facades behind which the
official position in support of the death penalty lurk, the naive/automatic association between
support of the death penalty and either sharīʿa or counterterrorism laws appears problematic.

To take sharīʿa seriously when discussing the death penalty is to acknowledge that it
does not enjoin the penalty as widely assumed. Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution provides
that the ―the principles of Islamic sharīʿa are the main source of legislation.19‖ However, there
are three capital punishment crimes in sharīʿa law—as opposed to 100+ in Egyptian legislation.
Even for each of the three crimes, the death penalty is not a mandatory punishment within the
Islamic law. If sharīʿa is indeed the main source of legislation, court cases would also reflect a
degree of caution that arises from sharīʿa‘s fundamental condition of the absence of shubuhāt
[doubt] during a ruling. Such shubuhāt include any conflict in witness accounts, to the extent that
the following two narratives: ‗I saw him stab the victim in the chest using a knife‘ and ‗I saw
him stab the victim in the the abdomen using a penknife‘ would be rejected in court on the basis
of their shubuhā. If the defendant‘s confession is changed afterwards, with even the minutest
difference, it is striked under the same rationale. Furthermore, judges cannot sentence to death on
the basis of circumstantial evidence, as in the following scenario: ‗if someone is caught running
from the victim‘s house holding a knife with blood‘ and ‗as long as he didn‘t confess and was
not seen stabbing the victim, the evidence—in this case the knife with the victim‘s blood that was
in his hand—is circumstantial; the judge cannot consider it because it belongs to shubuhāt‘
(Fahmy, 2018). Out of fear of executing innocent people, these very strict conditions among
others have meant that the death penalty was used very conservatively. In fact, as Fahmy (2018)

19

As translated by Egypt‟s State Information Service. Full constitution available at
http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf
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recounts, ‗a study on a sample of murder cases in the 18th century Sharīʿa courts found that only
5% of these cases contained the death penalty, due to the impossibility of obtaining proof, the
inheritants‘ preferences of taking dīya [blood money],20 or their forgiveness of the murderer‘—
all of which are equally valid options under Sharīʿa law.

As for the counterterrorism justification, there is more to be said as well. This association
between combatting terrorism and using the death penalty was the focus of the 2016 World Day
Against the Death Penalty (WDADP).21 In a joint statement by the UN Special Rapporteurs on
executions, torture, and on human rights while countering terrorism,22 Callamard, Mendez, and
Emmerson pointed to the ideological fallacies of using the death penalty to counter terrorism.
―Resorting to this type of punishment to curb terrorism is illegal as much as it is futile,‖ they
stated, ―because terrorists who are executed may just gain in prestige as may their cause.‖ And so
the death penalty within such context is an ineffective deterrent.

In countries where some form of debate has taken place, the following main points have been
highlighted. The (shrinking) minority in favor of the death penalty, as reflected in the increasing
number of abolitionist countries,23 cite the following reasons to maintain the penalty:

1) Specific Deterrence (also referred to as incapacitation): the convicted murderers are
prevented from killing again, therefore incapacitation maintains more lives.

20

As per the translation of Al Maʿāny Dictionary; available at https://www.almaany.com/en/dict/aren/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9/
21
The annual WDADP is on October 10th.
22
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20659
23
As of March 2018, there are 142 abolitionist (106 for all crimes; 7 for ordinary crimes; 29 in practice)
and 56 retentionist countries, according to Amnesty International. Details available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/6665/2017/en/
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2) General Deterrence: the penalty deters potential murderers from committing potential
crimes.
3) Retribution: the death penalty is a ―just punishment,‖ a punishment that fits the crime
(Cassell, 2004, p.187-198).
People on the other side of the debate have had the following to say:
1) The death penalty is a violation to the most basic right: to life.24
2) No evidence supports the correlation between the death penalty and deterrence.
3) In reality, the death penalty is associated with some degree of arbitrariness, inequity, and
discrimination.
4) It is essentially counterproductive to the moral message it conveys, legitimizing the very
behavior it criminalizes (Hood, 2001, p.331-2).

C. Some Laws Don’t Matter Here

Speaking about the take on the penalty elsewhere, it is also important to consider the legal
frameworks, both in Egypt and internationally, whereby the death penalty is justified and abused.
The death penalty does exist in the international legislation, albeit specifically and solely for ―the
most serious crimes.‖ Premeditated murder is the only condition among the so-called
international community where the requirement of ―most serious crimes‖ are met. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates:25

1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes
in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission
of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
24

This is put forward in paragraph one of Article 6 of the ICCPR mentioned above. It followed that
abolition became a prerequisite to joining the European Union.
25
Article 6.2. Articles available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
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the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried
pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.

out

It is important to investigate the notion of ―most serious crimes.‖ The United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and Arbitrary Executions has defined the
seriousness of such crimes by corresponding to one crime only: premeditated murder. In his
words, the most serious refers to ―cases where it can be shown that there was an intention to kill
which resulted in the loss of life.26‖

Egypt acceded to the covenant on 14 January 1982, and is hence obligated by the article
above to limit the death penalty to premeditated murder. Article 93 of the Egyptian Constitution
provides further justification to abide by the article, stipulating that it is mandatory for the
Egyptian government to abide by international human rights conventions, covenants and treaties
which it has ratified and which therefore have the force of law after their promulgation
(Mahmoud, 2018, p.7).

However, just like the numerous examples throughout this entire work, what the law says is not
what happens. On paper, and as the 1982 signature conveys, the death penalty may be resorted to
only in case of the ‗most serious crimes.‘ However, Egypt‘s legislation contains a staggering
100+ crimes punishable by death,27 including 35 crimes stipulated in the Penal Code, which
include the following crimes: threatening of the security of the state internally and externally,
and inflicting damage on individuals. Another 10 crimes are punishable by death in the anti26

United Nations, General Assembly, Civil and political rights, including the questions of disappearances and
summary executions: Report of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, Philip
Alston. A/HRC/4/20. 29 January 2007. Available at https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/105/00/PDF/G0710500.pdf?OpenElement
27
Detailed list of crimes available at
https://eipr.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/the_death_penalty_in_egyptian_law_final.pdf
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narcotics law. The largest number of crimes appear in the military code, which is used to try
civilians, and punishes at least 41 crimes by death (Mahmoud, 2018, p.7-8). It is not so much that
a person is potentially killable in over 100 premeditated ways. Rather, it seems that the current
Egyptian state requires more than 100 reasons to kill.

On October 27, 2017, Sisi issued a decree by Law No. 136 of 2014 expanding the
jurisdiction of the military courts to include crimes against public establishments and facilities.
This law allowed the trial of any civilian accused of vandalizing public property, or blocking
public roads, before a military court. The military judiciary is subject to the authority of the
Minister of Defense; all judges and prosecutors are military personnel of all ranks, and are
subject to all regulations of discipline and order set out in the military service laws. Based on the
recommendation of the Head of the Military Judiciary Commission, the Minister of Defense
appoints military judges who, by extension, do not enjoy the same degree of independence as
judges in civil courts (Mahmoud, 2018, p.10). The expansion of military jurisdiction came in
parallel with the increase in the number of civilians receiving death sentences from military
courts.

Furthermore, in August 2015, Sisi passed a counter-terrorism law, adding 15 crimes to
the list of crimes punishable by hanging. Amnesty International described this law as ―deeply
flawed,28‖ allowing him to ―take extreme measures that would usually only be invoked during a
state of emergency.‖ The crimes in this law include funding a terrorist group or terrorist act;
manufacturing weapons; damaging a gas, water, or electricity network; or compelling another
person to join or remain in a terrorist group, if they result in death, even unintentionally. The
28

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1222692015ENGLISH.pdf
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pretext of such crimes, as described by Human Rights Watch,29 is ―a definition of terrorism that
is so broadly worded it could encompass civil disobedience.‖

In addition to the counter-terrorism law, there has been a recent change in the litigation
concerning the death penalty. After former Public Prosecutor Hisham Barakat was killed in a car
explosion in 2015, Sisi gave a speech at his funeral, on 30 June 2015, complaining that ―the arm
of justice is chained by the law. We‘re not going to wait for this. We‘re going to amend the law
to allow us to implement justice as soon as possible.30‖ Speaking directly about death sentences,
Sisi pledged to amend the crippling laws ―to implement the law and justice in the fastest possible
time‖ so that ―if the judge orders the death penalty, we will implement the death penalty.‖ Hours
after the killing, Egypt‘s State Information Service blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for
Barakat‘s murder.31 More details on the proceedings of the public prosecutor‘s case will appear
in a later chapter.

The importance of this case to the litigation on the death penalty is in the actualization of
Sisi‘s promises to break free from the hindering law. Before his speech, anyone who received a
death sentence from a criminal court could appeal the case before the court of cassation. The
latter would grant a ruling to either a) uphold the death sentence, or b) re-try the defendants
before another criminal court. If this second criminal court sentenced to death again, the
defendant would have another chance to appeal before the court of cassation. However, the
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https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/19/egypt-counterterrorism-law-erodes-basic-rights
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/egyptian-president-al-sisi-change-law-fasterexecutions-death-penalty
31
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/30/egypt-top-prosecutors-killing-new-risk-rule-law
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promised amendments were made by a presidential decree on 27 April 2017.32 Since then,
anyone who receives a death sentence by a criminal court can appeal the case before the court of
cassation. The addition is that the latter has the final say, without the possibility of another
litigation cycle: the court of cassation can now either a) uphold the death sentence, or b) consider
the case itself, and pass down an irrevocable verdict.

This brings us to the logic of the death penalty as it currently operates. Fahmy (2018)
reminds us that the philosophy of punishment in general is threefold: punishment as
discipline/reform, as deterrence, and as revenge. The first node is by definition inapplicable to
the death penalty. This leaves room for its use as a deterrent and/or an act of revenge. Despite its
overuse, the debate over deterrence is still ongoing. Historically and statistically speaking,
opponents of the death penalty repeat the fact that there is no evidence to prove the positive
correlation between enforcing the death penalty and decreasing crime rates. Similarly, there has
not been any evidence to prove the increase in crime rates in countries that have abolished the
penalty. Speaking of abolition, Amnesty International recorded that ―more than two thirds of the
countries in the world have now abolished the death penalty in law or practice‖ (2018, p.40). As
of 31 December 2017, 106 countries have abolished the penalty for ordinary crimes, 29 have
abolished the penalty in practice, and seven have abolished it for ordinary crimes, thereby
bringing total abolitionists in law or practice to 142 countries. That means that a minority of 56
countries still retain the death penalty (p.40). This leaves us with the death penalty as a form of
revenge, which makes much sense throughout the details narrated in the following pages. In
fact, as I will later argue, the revenge is so much at the core of the punishment‘s use that it opens
up the possibility of thinking of its modus operandi as a form of sacrifice.
32

Decree 11/2017. Available at https://eipr.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/17tb.pdf
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D. Literature on the Death Penalty

Anthropologists said much about the death penalty—elsewhere. A great amount of literature,
classified as anthropological and also as part of the social sciences more generally, focuses on
the penalty in the US. While mostly concerned with the philosophic debate over the penalty
(Pojman & Reiman, 1998; Bedau, 2004), such literature also focuses on specific capital cases to
make the point either for or against (Baumgartner, De Boef & Boydstun, 2008; Miller, 2006;
Usman, 2011). A comparative approach to states and countries with regard to the death penalty is
also available (Anckar, 2004; Hood, 2001; Johnson & Zimring, 2009), although it does not
feature the Middle East in its geographic analysis. Given the contextual differences, and the
particularity of the death penalty in the US, these works only provide the philosophical
undertones of this work, but do not relate to its field material.

What resonate more, and more profoundly, are some of the ethnographies of death row.
For example, Sharp (2005) and Comfort‘s (2009) ethnographic explorations of the effects of the
death penalty on the families of defendants find similar resonances in this work and are put in
conversation with the fieldwork particularly in Chapter 3. This is also where Kohn (2009) and
Bradford‘s (2010) accounts on waiting, along with Blume (2005) and Smith‘s (2008) study about
the phenomenon of voluntary executions, are engaged with. To further explore waiting and time
on death row in general, I also turn to the ethnographies of checkpoints (Hammami, 2001;
Jeganathan, 2004), studies of waiting-in-migration (Bjertrup et al, 2018) and to the theorization
of temporal arrest (Aretxaga, 2003). Furthermore, ethnographic accounts on the language games
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deployed in the construction of criminals and criminality (Williams 2011; Durão & Williams,
2012; Caldeira, 2000; Scarry, 1985) are also interwoven with the fieldwork in Chapter 2, along
with others that focus on the linguistic strategies of dehumanization in courtrooms (Conley,
2013) and in the media (Kudlac, 2007; Steuter & Wills, 2009; Vasiljevic & Viki, 2013).

The literature on bureaucracy supplements the categorizational discourses, and provides
an entry point to the document as an analytical category. Hence, Hull (2012) and Herzfeld (1993)
speak with the fieldwork on bureaucracy and the production of indifference. Meanwhile,
Massumi (1993), Agamben (1993), and Virilio (1993) offer valuable input on the affectual
aspects of discourses and documents. Navaro-Yashin (2007) pushes this further, by providing
insight into the documentary practices and signifiers of make-believe documents. The state
discourses and documents raise interesting questions about absences and silences, abstractions
and euphemisms. In this sense, Pachirat (2012) is integral to the understanding of killing as an
automated, mechanical process. Additionally, such ritualesque presences and absences in both
discourse and document make way for the contribution to the anthropology of the state based on
Navaro-Yashin‘s (2002) ―as if.‖ In Faces of the State, she studies ―the production of the political
in the public life of Turkey in the 1990s,‖ using Zizek‘s (1995) study of fantasy against a
Foucauldian backdrop (p.2-5), to ―sense and follow the movement of public life in Istanbul in
order to grasp the flowing, fleeting, or submerged forces that produce and regenerate the
political‖ (p.16). Finding that cynicism is ―an approach that produces the political by default,‖
she studies it ―as a feeling of political existence in Turkey‖ (p.5). This cynicism, in NavaroYashin‘s work, is at the intersection between existing in relation to the state, while ridiculing
―the state for its corruption, its fakeness, its efficiency, and injustice‖ (p.169). In this light,
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although citizens are aware of ―the farce of state,‖ they continue to act ―as if it were an
institution, a person, something tangible, as if it were a wholesome entity‖ (p.171).

For the purposes of this work, I extend Navaro-Yashin‘s as if in two ways. First, I narrate
state discourses and practices that very much trigger this as if cynicism/affect at the reader‘s end.
So instead of speaking about the emotion, I speak about the scenes and encounters that trigger
cynical affects and as ifs. Secondly, I turn the as if the other way round and locate it in practices
of the state itself. So when the state does everything that will follow, it does so on the premise
that as if its actions, articulations, and encounters will pass without cynicism; that is, without
being received with further as ifs. In this sense, the as if is an affective form of politics that
problematizes and complicates the ‗state‘ as a rational it. Rather, studying the state through the
as if politics destabilizes ‗its‘ perceived rationality, while making room for analysis in terms of
the phantasmatic (Aretxaga, 2001). The realm of the as if, as a point of entry to the phantasmatic,
also helps to identify fantasies of the ‗state.‘ I am interested here in exploring the state as a
figure; that is, the state as/in the employees or actors, who—in moments of encountering death
row detainees and their families, ultimately classified as the figures of the non-state other—
embody the state, hence act on bases that signify their own understanding of the state as an
abstract idea, their requirements as figures of state, and ultimately their fantasies around this
thing called state. To work through this, Das & Poole (2004) along with Sharma & Gupta (2006)
speak to Aretxaga (2001; 2003) and Navaro-Yashin (2002; 2003; 2007).

Since this thesis is organized as a trajectory of bodies of the condemned, literature on the
body is at its core. Needless to say, it is therefore Foucauldian, using notions of biopower,
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mechanisms of discipline and punish, realms of power and society, laziness within the legislative
entities, and ―the proper use of criminals‖

(1971; 1977a; 1977b; 2000; 2003; 2016).

Additionally, Agamben (1993) identifies the body further as a (spatio-temporal) site of
sovereignty. Agamben‘s (1998) homo sacer is very tempting to use to make sense of the bodies
of the condemned, yet the field material contradict something at the core of this figure: its
sacrificability. For Agamben, he is the killable criminal who cannot by any means be sacrificed.
In the contemporary production of killable bodies, however, their most important feature, as will
be explained in more depth in the next chapter, is their status as bodies to be sacrificed, by and
for the state. To speak more relevantly to the body in this context, I build upon Scarry‘s (1985)
work on how the state‘s interference with/in bodies makes worlds and unmakes others. Scarry
(1985) works with the relation between body and pain, which is important in two ways: first, it
illuminates further affects in this grim ethnography. Secondly, it complicates my attempts to
write it, because as Scarry rightly stated, ―physical pain does not simply resist language but
actively destroys it … to witness the moment when pain causes a reversion to the pre-language
of cries and groans is to witness the destruction of language‖ (p.4-5). Throughout the following
pages, language is indeed destroyed and distorted in inevitably failed attempts to convey all this
pain. And since the only way to write it is to locate it elsewhere, I am guilty of the as if myself,
stuck between the impossibility of writing and the necessity of pretentious automaticity in order
to do just that: to write.

Tuning back to the automaticity, a wide range of non-academic sources compensate for the
absence of geographically- and culturally-relevant academic literature. From documentaries to
news pieces, novels to letters, I attempt to get as close as possible to death row wards, whom
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accessing in person for research purposes is an act of impossibility. For similar purposes, I also
integrate publications by human rights organizations, including the UN, Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal
Profession, and the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, in effort to construct this macabre
piece of work.

E. A Macabre Ethnography

This work is an interweave of theory and ethnographic encounters, with emphasis on the latter
whenever the former is silent or perplexed. The ethnography to follow is multisited, both
spatially and temporally. In spatial terms, meetings, conversations, open-ended interviews and
encounters occurred in Egypt (mainly Cairo and Kafr el Sheikh) and the UK (mainly
Cambridge). Temporally speaking, the stories to follow are narrated by family members of
people in different points along similar legal trajectories towards/during/after their execution.
Perhaps due to the unprecedented political use of the penalty, all the families I managed to
contact are implicated in ‗political‘ cases. Some letters written by the (political-labelled)
prisoners also help narrate the stories first-hand. Other conversations engaged previous prisoners,
who remembered certain moments and encounters with fellow prisoners in the adjacent death
row wards. And hence the multisited flashes of memory, narrating death-row details during the
1970s and the troubling moments right before and after Sisi‘s inauguration. These conversations
with previous ward-neighbors highlight stories of ‗criminal,‘ as opposed to ‗political,‘ prisoners.
The fact that there is no law to stipulate this distinction has meant that there is no accurate
definition of how each body is categorized in these terms. However, lawyers, family members,
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and prison staff use ‗political‘ to identify somebody‘s association with cases of political nature—
i.e. belonging either to the Muslim Brotherhood or to leftist activists who, when detained, have a
specifically designated ‗political ward‘. Ordinary or ‗criminal‘ detainees in this sense would be
people involved in anything else, as if anything else is not political.

Given grave security concerns, the yearlong fieldwork was stuck early on, with the
impossibility of organizing prison visits and the futility of reaching out to state (security) figures.
Research approaches to thorny areas, including prisons in general, face an increased level of
added difficulty to the fact that anthropology is already ―so hard in Egypt‖ (Sholkamy, 1999,
p.119).33 So I started what was proposed as a trajectory of the body the other way round: at the
morgue. A few months later, upon moving along the ethnography to the neighboring-wards fieldsection, I came across an opportunity as researcher on the death penalty at the Egyptian Initiative
for Personal Rights‘ (EIPR) Criminal Justice Unit. I worked there for 11 months in total, eight of
which as a full-time employee. Ethnographically, this marked a skyrocketing in the field
material, allowing access to lawyers, family members, documents, laws, alongside local and
international parties interested to work against the death penalty. In parallel, it marked a
heightened anticipation of state crackdown, the start of a non-ending series of execution
nightmares, a painful realization of helplessness, and intermittent frustration with civil society
altogether.
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Sholkamy speaks of the political difficulties of „doing anthropology‟ in Egypt as they relate to the
readership and consumption of texts, not just their (already difficult) production. They include the
centrality of readership, the problematic reluctance/difficulty to share work beyond its academic
framework, alongside the unacceptability of unsettling, critical, or „political‟ ethnographies.
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As part of my work at EIPR, I was the go-to person for families of death row detainees in
search of ‗human rights‘ help. This meant holding frequent meetings for legal assistance,
obtaining court documents, ‗documenting‘ testimonies of human rights violations, drafting press
releases, and filing (UN) urgent appeals in hope of intervention to halt imminent executions. The
benchmark for all this work was what the law states; at no other point was it clearer that ‗the
law‘ as it exists is a farcical formality. On a daily basis, I recorded the daily Mufti referrals and
death sentences handed down in new cases, developments (usually in the form of appeal refusal)
in ongoing death cases, and executions. The numbers were published in monthly-infographs to
keep track of this increasingly macabre reality. To help carve out a space for public discussion, I
organized a couple of movie-screenings followed by discussions around the penalty and its
dramaturgic takes. The last project I worked on was the first annual report on the death penalty,34
using a year-long attunement to death sentence statistics, and a rigorous examination of court
documents to identify patterns of human rights violations in cases where people are sentenced to
death by civil and military judiciary.35

A daunting air of hope and expectations characterized my encounters with the family
members in question. Their hope was twofold; they had far-fetched hope in a sudden, merciful
change of state, and a more grounded hope in the audiences of human rights organizations, to/of
whom I was a mediator. Therefore, everything I drafted, counted, and communicated was laden
with the burdening responsibility of hope, of spreading the word about injustices, of sharing the
stories. And so, I see this work as a continuation, albeit in a different direction, of the
task/necessity to share the stories. This is partially why I use the real names of the people who
34
35

Mahmoud, 2018
Documents were obtained and analyzed by researchers at the Adalah Center for Rights and Freedoms
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have already been state-killed: the thing that matters the most to families, when it comes to
documentation, is to narrate the other sides of the state stories that disfigured the rest of their
lives to as wide an audience as possible. Hence, this project is an attempt to make sure that their
stories do not expire with their killing. A week after his son Lotfy was executed on 2 January
2018, Ibrahim contacted me saying we need to work now, more than ever, on abolishing the
death penalty. I couldn‘t bring myself to ask him what the point was, especially since his son had
already been executed. But it makes sense: the stories to be told, and the act of telling them,
bring hope to the families of the executed. More on this will follow in the chapter on
temporalities.

EIPR was also integral to the decision to visit Nairobi, as part of AUC HUSSLab‘s
Global South Exchange fellowship. As part of the International Network of Civil Liberties
Organizations (INCLO),36 EIPR is a co-member of the Kenya Human Rights Commission
(KHRC).37 Throughout two weeks in April-May 2018, KHRC personnel helped me organize
numerous meetings (in English) with several human rights advocates concerned with the death
penalty, as well as previous death row detainees in Nairobi, to enable a comparative analysis of
the state-murders that will mainly navigate sections of the concluding chapter.

The underlying thread connecting the following chapters was so obvious that I couldn‘t
see it until the very end: after all, it is all about the body. The following chain of chapters are
connected by the body, as they follow the bodies ‗of the condemned‘ in different moments
before, during, and after their execution. It is against the concreteness of these bodies that the
36
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state is studied, thereby identifying who the state figures are. It is also in relation to the bodies
that I ask why, when, how, and what certain bodies fantasize about their association with the
state, and what the performance of such association validates or negates about the state—this
more-than-bodily entity.

It is perhaps relevant here, before delving into the upcoming chapters, to reiterate the
hope of recognizing this work as a counter-state-narrative ethnography. As will emerge
throughout the rest of it, the sanitized discourses around the death penalty are recognized as
distancing and concealing: the mechanisms of power in modern societies that make the
unacceptable acceptable and the extraordinary just the opposite (Pachirat, 2011, p.ix-3). In this
vein, this work is an attempt ―to draw out the disaster that underlies a seeming pretense to
normality‖ (Navaro-Yashin, 2003, p.108). If anything, it hopes to upset the normalization of the
death penalty in a time when the use of such penalty is ―unprecedented in modern Egyptian
history.38‖ And so the pages to come narrate the up-close, vivid encounters that render the
sanitizations insane and the abstractions absurd.

I do so through the narration of scenes, which I have encountered, visualized,
remembered, or listened to. By doing so, I hope to recognize the possibilities of becoming, as
articulated by Stewart (2007): ―Forms of power and meaning become circuits lodged in
singularities. They have to be followed through disparate scenes. They can gather themselves
into what we think of as stories and selves. But they can also remain, or become again, dispersed,
floating, recombining—regardless of what whole or what relay of rushing signs they might find
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themselves in for a while‖ (p.12). With this, I hope to contribute to the work on affect by
narrating the scenic encounters, to allow some room for the ―ambiguities, silences, and
multiplicities in the experience of the work of killing‖ (Pachirat, 2011, p.18). This way,
audiences are invited to co-attempt to make sense of these shocking, perplexing, and at times
disgusting encounters/narrated ―flashes,‖ to use the Benjaminian term, as they hit and run, or hit
and linger. These projections are perhaps my own attempt to push the vividness of violence to a
distance, and to give the nonsensical, seemingly phantasmatic, fantasy-laden encounters a pinch
of reality.

As such, the rest of this work is organized around a trajectory of the bodies. The first
chapter introduces the state-killers, in search of the figures responsible for the executions. This
also entails an unwinding of the processes of the death penalty and allows for the narration of
details thereof, on the backdrop of animal slaughterhouses. The second chapter proposes
understandings of the mechanisms of injustice, by exploring the bureaucratic, documentary,
linguistic and discursive processes that diffuse the responsibility to kill, creating killable bodies
at an ease. Chapter three is then concerned with the temporalities of the killable, by navigating
death as an event, but more importantly a process primarily made of waiting. Strategies to bypass
the wait, which are ultimately enmeshed with the question of body ownership, are then detangled
as the families of death row detainees are also introduced. Moving on to the after-event, chapter
four follows bodies that are denied mortuary rituals into a medical school morgue, where they
are no longer integral bodies. In this space, notions of life and death, constructions of good and
bad, questions of ḥarām and ḥalāl are explored and problematized, in ways that may provide
closure for some while rupturing altogether any sense of peaceful ‗ending‘ for others. The
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concluding chapter then tries to make sense of the reality of all this pain, the impossibility of
writing (about) it, what it means to live despite the most horrid of murders, and how it might be
possible to imagine a future that is not necessarily built on even more bodies.
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Who kills the bodies?

Strangulation? Yes, we still do that one. It‘s called hanging.
— Brackette Williams, 201539

A. A Story of Sovereignty

It is March of 1850. Egypt is a province of the Ottoman empire and Abbas Pasha, grandson of
Mehmet Ali, is the Egyptian wālī [ruler]. The Sultan of Turkey writes to Abbas, requesting him
to apply and strictly adhere to a set of Turkish tanẓīmāt [reforms] that would remove much of the
legal jurisdiction from Abbas, who would then send all pending cases to the Sultan for his
signature. Abbas outright refuses. He writes back, giving two main reasons as to why the reforms
are out of question:

(1) According to the February 1841 decree,40 the wālī should exercise his undisputed
authority over the province in full. Enforcing the reforms will jeopardize all his rights by
subjecting all judicial, administrative, and financial affairs to the Ottoman court, thereby
reducing his status as wālī of Egypt to that of ordinary pashas in ordinary state provinces
or districts.
(2) The reforms are incompatible with the circumstances and needs of this region, as in the
stipulation to halt the execution of murderers and rebels until a decree is issued by the
Sultan. Abbas is ‗of the opinion that the bedouins in the desert, the peasants in Upper
Egypt, and the people of Nubia and Sennar do not care about the orders of a faraway
Sultan. They do not fear his might or whip, but fear the government that punishes them
by execution in the same hour and instant should they do something worth such
punishment‘ (Jam l al-D n, 2006, p.1430-1).
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MacArthur Fellows Speaker Series, full lecture available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=daa0H8n-AM4&t=148s
40
Signed by Sultan Abdul Mecit on 13 February 1841, the decree confirmed Mehmet Ali and his heirs as
the hereditary Ottoman governors of Egypt, to settle the “Eastern crisis” for the time being (Freely, 2009,
p.161)
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And so, potential delays in the execution of ‗murderers and rebels‘—until the relevant
documents are sent back and forth between Abbas and the Sultan—threaten the image of a
sovereign Egyptian government/ruler. A dispute over reforms thus unfolds as a struggle over
sovereignty, with high enough stakes that Abbas turned to the British authorities for interference
(Jam l al-D n, 2006, p.1431).41 With the realization that the death penalty is the ultimate sign of
sovereignty, Agamben (1993) reminds us that ―in ancient societies and political systems ... the
intangible, sacral character … linked the figure of the sovereign to that of the executioner‖
(p.62). In ancient Roman custom, as finds resonances with Abbas‘s motives, ―no one under any
circumstances could come between the consul endowed with imperium and the closest lictor,
who held the sacrificial ax (used to carry out death sentences)‖ (p.61-2). The death penalty as a
form of sacrifice will be discussed later; suffice it here to highlight the profound association
between the death penalty and the status of sovereignty. So in this sovereign struggle, Abbas
won, signing off on the immediate execution of those who, to him, deserve to hang.

The fact that Abbas‘s name was associated with the authority to kill became a tradition in the
subsequent reigns. In 1882, Egypt witnessed what the State Information Service (2015) describes
as the ‗first democratic constitution in all Arab countries.42‘ Inspired by the French Revolution,43
this constitution stated that the ‗person whose existence is independent of the citizens and
people‘ will rule in the name of the nation.44 The subsequent constitutions in 1923 and 1930
41

France supported the Turkish Sultan then; England was in dispute with France, and hence Abbas
utilized this to have England put pressure on the Sultan (Jamāl al-D n, 200 , p.1341
42
History of Egypt‟s constitutions, available at http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/57175?lang=ar
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The Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of 1789
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Hisham Shaaban, 2016, available at
https://www.tahrirnews.com/Posts/printing/378816/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B11882+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%82+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A
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were more precise, stipulating that ‗the verdicts of different courts will be issued and executed
according to the law and in the name of the king.45‘ With the end of the monarchy, the 1956
constitution stated that ‗verdicts are issued and executed ‗bism il umma’ [in the name of the
nation].46 This ‗name of the nation‘ was also the pretext for verdicts for almost two decades to
come; the same article featured in the 195847 and 196448 constitutions. The 1971 constitution
marked an arguably significant change, stipulating that ‗verdicts are issued and executed in the
name of the people. Abstaining from or obstructing their execution by relevant public officials is
punishable by law. In such case, the plaintiff may directly file a criminal lawsuit to the
competent court.49‘ Since then, the ‗name of the people‘ is invoked upon executing verdicts,
including death sentences; the first two words on the front page of any and all court verdicts are:
bism il-shaʿb.

B. The ‘People’ who Kill

In recognition of the symbolic significance of such name, and its grave association with the death
penalty, this chapter seeks to un-abstract, or demystify, the ‗people.‘ In other words, it seeks and
points out to the persons who are responsible for the killings, under the name/blessing of this
45

Articles 31 of both constitutions. All articles of the 1923 constitution available through manshurat.org, at
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://manshurat.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/011004.pdf; all
articles of the 1930 constitution available through manshurat.org, at
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://manshurat.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/016011.pdf
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Article 178. All articles available through manshurat.org, at
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://manshurat.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/011012.pdf
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Article 63. All articles available through manshurat.org, at
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://manshurat.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/011013.pdf
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Article 155. All articles available through manshurat.org, at
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://manshurat.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/011015.pdf
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Article 72. All articles available through manshurat.org, at
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://manshurat.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/011016.pdf
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abstract ‗people.‘ To ask who the ―we‖ who strangulate—in Williams‘s quote above—are is
therefore to realize the moral responsibility of all people,50 the invocation of whom renders
killings possible.

To explore the figures with direct involvement—and stakes—in the bloody work of the death
penalty, I make a somewhat absurd but highly relevant analogy: with an Omaha slaughterhouse.
Inspired by Pachirat‘s (2011) Every Twelve Seconds, I introduce the following figures with an
underlying division of labor that works towards a ―politics of sight,‖ such that concealment and
distance neutralize the work of killing (of both people and cows). In fact, and as will follow, I
argue that the distribution of the responsibility of killing among several state-killers enables and
constitutes such politics of sight in the (metaphoric) slaughterhouse in question, to the extent that
―the work of killing is hidden even from those who participate directly in it‖ (Pachirat, 2011,
p.9).

1. The Grey Mustache

To start by those direct participants, let us explore figure one: ʿashmāwy the executioner.
ʿAshm wy is not a direct translation of the word executioner; apparently, it is a heritage passed
on to all current executioners—by chance. ‗There was no such thing as ʿashmāwy in the death
penalty,‘ as Hussein El Fiqi ‗ʿashm wy51‘ explains in one of his many news appearances, ‗until
the year 1922. One of the executioners then was called Ahmed El ʿAshm wy … when [the

50

See Saad (2014) for more details about this shared moral responsibility of killings. Available (in Arabic)
at http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=27042014&id=7c51d3f4-f1f0-4abd-ba1c3b52abd0d70f
51
Retired in 2007, he claims to have trained 10 ʿashmāwys-to-be until 2011
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warden] received a request for execution by the prisons authority, he would call for this ʿam
Ahmed, but there were so many Ahmeds. To avoid confusion, the warden said to call for
ʿashmāwy, and the name became associated with executioners ever since… as soon as [someone]
enters this line of work, he becomes ʿashmāwy.52‘

Like the slaughterhouse kill floor workers, these ʿashmāwys are responsible for the
killings that take place in the execution chambers, called ṭablīāt.53 By law, all ṭablīāt must be
inside prisons or ‗other hidden places,54‘ thereby working towards the necessary components of
the politics of sight: distance and concealment (Pachirat, 2011, p.9). Although official statistics
are absent, there exist at least seven ṭablīāt across Cairo: in the al-istiʾnāf, līmān tora, borg alʿarab, minyā, damanhūr, ṭanta, and wādi-al-natrūn prisons.55 The actual number might be much
higher, with the construction of 19 new prisons in Egypt since 2011.56 Whatever the number is,
each ṭablīā is a hanging site; execution of civilians is by hanging, as stipulated by law. 57
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Interview segment, aired on MBC Masr 2 on 15 October 2016. Available at
http://www.mbc.net/ar/programs/sabahak-masri/articles/%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%80--%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A--.html
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Al Maʿāny Dictionary defines ṭablīā as „a low, round table where bread is baked or eaten.‟ From the root
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Article 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Available (in Arabic) through manshurat.org, at
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According to a 2016 eport by the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), 16 were built
during the reign of Adli Mansour and Sisi, two under Mohamed Morsi, and one under the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces. ANHRI report web link (access blocked from Egypt): http://anhri.net/thereis-room-for-everyone-egypts-prisons-before-after-the-25-of-january-revolution/?lang=en; report coverage
available on aswatmasriya.com, at http://www.aswatmasriya.com/en/news/details/17661
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Article 13 of the Penal Code. Available (in Arabic) through manshurat,org, at
https://manshurat.org/node/23881. Article 106 of the Military Code states that the execution of military
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Whenever the time comes, a ʿashmāwy is called for [by the warden] to set the kill floor: prepare
the noose, receive the live body, put the bag over the head, put the noose around the neck, pull
the lever to open the floor beneath, wait, slit the main veins near the ankles, wait a bit longer, cut
the noose, and carry the now dead body onto a slab to be moved away.

Other people have roles that intersect with ʿashmāwy‘s mechanical terms of reference. In
fact, the presence of other people at the execution site is mandatory, and exclusive to state
personnel. Under Article 474 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ‗the execution must be in the
presence of an attorney general, the prison warden, the prison doctor or another doctor appointed
by the public prosecution; no one else is allowed to attend the execution except by special
permission … and the defense [lawyer] must always be allowed to attend.‘ Yet all the lawyers I
have spoken to so far have not received such notice or invite before the execution ceremony;
instead, and just like the family members, all have been informed after the people were killed. In
the realm of law, under Article 472 of the same code, family members are allowed ‗to meet [the
person sentenced to death] before the execution, as long as it takes place away from the
execution chamber.‘ Official correspondences from prison authorities to arrange pre-execution
visits do not happen. In fact, families are notified after the killings, if they are at all notified. In
addition to the abovementioned figures, a ‗man of religion‘ is also usually present, in accordance
with Article 472 of the same code, ‗in case the religion of the convict obligates him to confess or
perform other religious duties before death.‘

personnel is by firing squad, available (in Arabic) at
http://ar.jurispedia.org/index.php/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8
%A3%D8%AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%
D9%8A%D8%A9_(eg)/%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D
9%86%D9%88%D9%86. It is important to note that civilians sentenced to death by military courts were
hanged.
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It is important to explore the roles of these four other state representatives in this
ritualized performance of execution. The ritual-esque performance unfolds by the
warden/prosecutor‘s recitation of the charges and verdict, before asking the about-to-be-killed
about any last words, to record them in an execution report. This is the preacher/mulaqqin‘ s cue
to intervene, usually by instructing the person to cite the shahāda, which the prosecutor then
writes down. ʿAshmāwy then begins the kill, after which the medical doctor records the time of
death.58 Then, the report is filled in and signed by both the doctor and warden, with the cause of
death listed as suffocation asphyxia.

I would like to suggest that the presence of these state-killers, with this particular role
play, gives the execution a theatrical air that makes it less real. Here, I introduce NavaroYashin‘s (2002) ―as if politics,‖ to understand a pretensical participation in something ultimately
nonsensical. Yes, the execution of criminal others seems like a magical uprooting of danger that
makes perfect sense.59 The vividness of the event, however—the panting, the sweat, the panic,
the shahāda, the human face, the bodily twitches, the urine, the faeces, the no-longer heartbeats,
the wetness of blood, the suddenly disproportionate neck, the bulging eyeballs, the bleeding
nostrils, the warmness of a human corpse—must trigger all sorts of defense mechanisms. After
all, all these state witnesses are at the end of the (week)day government employees, with homes,
mothers, and probably wives and kids to go back to everyday, and after every execution
ceremony. In other words, they are supposed to lead normal lives, which such acts of witnessing
would very normally disfigure. In this sense, witnessing, and the Agambenian impossibility
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This “time of death” shall be problematized in an upcoming section in Chapter Three: When do they
(not) die?
59
To be discussed further in the next chapter: How do they become killable?

44

thereof altogether (Agamben, 1999),60 is enmeshed with the ―as if‖ zoning into and out of the
execution chamber. The presence of a four to six all-male state ‗representatives‘/witness-killers
also potentially facilitates this suspension of the reality of killing a human being, 61 especially
with the outspoken performativity of different defense mechanisms.

Such defense mechanisms, as reported by different witnesses and participants, include
jokes. The following is an excerpt from a previous (male) prisoner, who had been detained in a
death row ward and reported some of the details he witnessed during 2015: ‗ The officers stand
around the corpse, with the prison doctor, who is also an officer, chatting and smoking cigarettes
and jostling around the dead body. They may even chant at the hanged person and exchange
jokes about his body.62‘ This exchange of jokes, within an ―as if‖ framework, quite normally
makes the execution laden with pretense; it becomes distant and unreal. In another attempt to
adapt to the surreality of the situation, Hussein ʿAshmāwy tells the story of a woman who was
executed for killing her husband, also in 2015. ‗She was so beautiful,‘ he says, ‗but I had to
executer her. The [execution] committee chair joked: isn‘t it ḥarām to execute this [beauty]? So I
said: then get the one at home instead [of this beautiful woman] … [even] the woman laughed.63‘
Again, the ―as if‖ is clearly at play, this time with the added ―as if‖ flattery of an about-to-hang
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Agamben‟s (1999 study of Auschwitz implies that it is impossible for anyone other than the
Müselmänner, in this case the executed, to bear witness
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In the case of women-convicts, the state audiences are also all males
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Full testimony available in writing at
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Interview by Mohamed El Sawy, 25 May 2015. Available at
http://www.masrawy.com/News/News_Cases/details/2015/5/25/587332/%D8%AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D
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beautiful woman—as if people who ‗deserve‘ to hang should have facial features that support the
imaginaries about them.64

The (joking) ʿAshmāwy, like all the other (joking) state-witness/killers, are ultimately
‗just doing their jobs.‘ In the same 2015 interview, he explained how ‗doing his job‘ meant
killing a man he knew was innocent, and whose innocence—and its affects—‗the committee
couldn‘t stand, so they left us alone [and waited outside] after he exclaimed: ya rab laqad ẓulimt
fil duniā [O Lord, I have been wronged in this world]. At such moments, the affect of the
encounter is arguably too intense for the ―as if‖ to function properly, if at all. But why continue
the killing, then? Why execute an innocent man, and how is it possible for ʿashmāwy to trust the
preceding state-actors that got this man to the execution chamber? How is it possible to dismiss
the responsibility of killing under a pretext of ‗doing my job‘?

Such ‗doing my job‘ has banal resonances, even with post-execution monetary incentives
once ‗a job‘ is done. During the 1990s, ʿashmāwy was paid 20 pounds after every execution
performance. Now, this wage has risen to 100 pounds per rās [head], as Hussein ʿashmāwy
mundanely said. Very much like the kill floor workers, it is easier to say head than human, for
the fact that euphemism is integral to all aspects of the killing processes. It is ―the same reason
we say pork and beef instead of pig and cow‖ (Roach, 2004, p.12)—as if the head isn‘t human
after all. The particular use of rās is also interesting, given its common association with cattle in
colloquial Egyptian language.

64

More on this in the following chapter: How do they become killable?
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It is important for this rās to remain in contact with the body. I explain this importance by
touching upon organ transplant literature, through the sanctity of the bodies that are considered
―God‘s property‖ (Hamdy, 2012, p.141). As Sherine Hamdy (2012) illustrates in the Egyptian
context, kidney transplant patients and their family members echoed objections to transplant
altogether on the basis that they ―cannot donate that which ―belongs to God‖‖ (p.1). In a similar
fashion, transplant doctors ―talked about the body belonging to God as a commonsensical basis,‖
(p.2) although transplant operations were at the core of their work. This has to do with the notion
of ‗complete‘ versus ‗incomplete‘ bodies (p.16), in a wider framework of treating bodies with
dignity (p.2) in life and death. The juxtaposition of ‗incomplete‘ bodies with proper dignifying
treatment is very much apparent in the cornea transplants, which date back to the 1960s (p.4).
When a man died in the Ain Shams Teaching Hospital in 1966, his son claimed the body at the
hospital morgue, to find cotton pieces in the sockets where his father‘s eyes used to be.
Apparently, this was only one of many such instances of cornea theft, and the complaint
avalanched into a decision to close the cornea banks at Ain Shams and Al Kasr Al Aini hospitals
(p.83). However, this continues to happen 56 years later; the most prominent recent case was that
of a man who had died at Al Kasr Al Aini following a heart surgery in August 2018. The eye
theft was captured in a ―gruesome‖ video of the eye-less body which the family used to file a
lawsuit, accusing the hospital of deliberately murdering him ― in order to take his eyes.65‖

There is something more, however, than an organ-transplant-based analysis in terms of
removing structures and leaving bodies incomplete. Decapitation moves the discussion away
from dignifying the dead and more towards their dehumanization altogether. Images of separated
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heads are not that unusual in Egypt; the difference is, the decapitated bodies are slaughtered
animals in sacrificial eid rituals. As such, the possibility of an on-spot beheading during a horrid
execution ritual is reminiscent of that scene: of a gurgling, bleeding, glass-eyed animal.66

And so in order for this human rās to remain intact to the body, certain calculations are to
be made prior to the execution. The prisoner should be weighed so that the length of the rope be
determined: if it is too short, the process may take as long as 45 minutes, if too long, the person
could be decapitated. The rope must also be stretched and boiled to prevent coiling, and the knot
waxed such that friction is at its lowest levels, to ensure as quick a death as possible. If anything
goes wrong or is miscalculated, ―the face becomes engorged, the tongue protrudes, the eyes pop,
the body defecates, and violent movements of the limbs occur.67‖

This is what happened to Heba Selim, as narrated by a friend of hers who witnessed her
execution through the bars on the nearby execution chamber. The (political) importance of Heba,
who was executed in the 1970s, stems from her status as an Egyptian spy for Israelis, as well as a
political bargaining chip and a friend of Jehan Sadat, Egypt‘s first lady at the time. After she was
sentenced to death, and out of fear in her committing suicide—thereby claiming the power to
kill, which the state has bestowed upon itself in a Foucauldian sense—Heba‘s food was prepared
by a cook and delivered to her solitary cell on a daily basis by a sufragy [caterer]. The then
Qanater prison warden narrates how Heba was certain that she will receive a presidential pardon,
telling him that ‗there are forces in the west and not only Israel that will make Egypt let [her]
go.‘ She was right about the forces. The same officer states what he described as ‗a fact we must
66

More on the other, more usual, moments of dehumanization will follow in the next chapter.
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record for [the sake of] history:‘ Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin asked for Heba‘s
release as a ‗sign of good faith‘ in a meeting with Sadat, who responded that Heba had already
been executed but the media hadn‘t been informed yet. Right after this meeting, Sadat issued a
presidential order for the immediate execution of Heba.

Not wanting to ‗jeopardize her life‘ by conveying the news of her imminent execution,
the Qanater prison warden told Heba that she will be transported to Cairo for the consideration of
her appeal, when she was in fact on her way to the al-istiʾnāf prison—the nearest prison with an
execution chamber.68 Heba‘s was the first execution that her friend had ever witnessed. She
described, in several conversations, how different Heba looked afterwards: her neck became
about a meter longer and ‗was like jelly,‘ and her eyes were bulging to an extent that haunted her
in her sleep long after the kill.

If the execution of such an important figure/bargaining chip obviously did not follow
standard procedure, then it is probably the case that the mandatory calculations for a swift killing
are not ordinarily made. This is apparent in la Larme du Bourreau, a 2013 French documentary
on executions in Egypt. Instead of speaking of these calculations, (the same) ʿashmāwy attributes
possible decapitation to the ‗fragility of a man‘s neck.‘ The only discomfort in that case, to him,
‗is the blood. The body is then left until dry before taking it to the morgue.‘ And so it is as if the
decapitation is potential mishap, instead of a torturous result of the dismissal of procedures.
68
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ʿAshmāwy also speaks about the execution of women, ‗preferring [her] to sit on her knees so that
the process of falling is easier and unharmful, and the execution is carried out by two ropes for a
comfortable death‘ (Abdulamir, 2013). This supposed comfort is arguably for the stateaudiences, and not at all the about-to-be-executed. It is the comfort of not seeing blood, rather
than a desire to make the process as less painful as possible for the person to be killed. Even in
case of bloody decapitation, the spectators do not get to see the head; all heads are covered with
a black hood before the ṭablīā is opened.

As for the rope-related mess, it is important to reflect on a particular execution in Kuwait.
It was 2005, the year when Ayoub Shah, a Pakistani sentenced to death on drug-trafficking
charges, was scheduled for hanging. His execution was by no means comfortable, not even for
the state-spectators: his body fell down through the ṭablīā, his separated head remained attached
to the rope. Blood was everywhere. The Head of the Criminal Enforcement and External
Communications Office at the Ministry of Justice ordered the formation of an investigation
committee to justify this ‗mistake.‘ An officer then stated that Shah‘s execution was the first time
‗an Egyptian-made rope was used … execution ropes were previously bought through the British
authorities, but after the British government abolished the death penalty, the factory shut
down.69‘

As recently narrated,70 and as the testimonies continue, decapitation is not rare in
Egyptian prisons (using Egyptian-made ropes). While some people lose their heads falling down,
others face an anything-but-swift murder. A forensic medicine professor told me it takes some
69
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Al Sharhan, 2006. Available at https://alqabas.com/29589/
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time between five and 20 minutes to officially ‗die‘—in case the person isn‘t decapitated in a
much shorter timespan. Twenty minutes also featured in the 2015 testimony by Hazem El Masry,
a previous prisoner who was kept in the death row ward for ‗correction purposes. 71‘ To draw out
the disaster underlying, and spanning, these twenty-or-so minutes of murder, EIPR initiated a
―25-minute forum‖ to promote public discussions of the death penalty, and problematize its
dramatic takes, inspired by Johnny Cash‘s ―25 minutes to go.72‖

More on the temporal aspect of the death penalty will follow later.73 For the time being, we
return to the Pachiratian figures of state murder. Pachirat‘s (2011) slaughterhouse had only four
workers with direct involvement to the acts of killing live cows, as opposed to 750 other
employees without ―even a line of sight to the killing‖ (p.62; Elder, 2013, p.105). Similarly,
more figures have indirect contact and involvement with the death penalty than ʿashmāwy the
executioner on his ṭablīā kill floor. Building upon his ‗just following orders,‘ we move on to the
figures that gave those orders, pronouncing them in the name of even more abstract figures.

2. The Black Robe
‗Tell me, judge, how can you sleep,
When you sentence an innocent to death?74‘

71

Several testimonies from previous prisoners narrate threatening to transfer them to the death row ward
to discipline them, especially in prisons with no solitary confinement in the other wards. If this is the case,
the prisoner is transferred to a (solitary) cell on the death row ward, to keep him/her away from the
prisoners in their own wards
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It is 17 December 2017. Wives, brothers, parents, friends, and journalists stand outside the
Military Court in Alexandria. Way outside. It is judgment day for the 14 people whose papers
had been referred to the Grand Mufti on the previous session. Their families aren‘t allowed in the
courtroom; in fact, the street is blocked early on by a military tank. Praying, they wait for phone
calls that convey the news, any news. Phones ring; women faint. A child looks at a fallen woman
and cries. The chants start, and the question above, directed at the judge, gains momentum.
Suddenly, tear gas canisters fly over the loud crowd, which then disperses. As that happens, the
‗security‘ forces chase after them with sticks, beating the ones who couldn‘t run any faster.
Three men are arrested on spot and taken away, to disappear for at least 24 hours, before their
families locate them in police custody.

The scene above is from case number 108/2016 Military Felonies, in which 45 people
were arrested and charged with committing 27 separate crime incidents between 2014 and 2015,
including the bombing of several public sites in Alexandria and the murder of Corporal Daifallah
Ibrahim Yunis. Other charges included, of course, joining and assisting a ‗prohibited‘
organization formed in violation of law.

Although unpeculiar, this case is multilayered. Defense lawyers narrated what used to
happen before 17 December, in a courtroom that only they—and not the families—were allowed
into. Regarding the bombing charge, the prosecution claimed the defendants were caught on
camera, yet the camera footage played in court did not capture any of them. The same footage,
which supposedly showed the bank sites that were bombed, only displayed shattering glass,
without the identification of bank signs or streets. When the lawyers filed requests for the judge
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panel to inspect these sites (and later compare with the footage), their requests were refused.
Also, seven of the 45 defendants were in prison at the time of the bombings they were later
charged with.

As for the murder of Corporate Daifallah, the defense lawyer narrates that the corporate
was driving a police car in late 2014, when unidentified people shot at the car from its left side;
that is, near the driver‘s seat. The people sentenced to death in this case were supposedly in that
crowd. Yet the forensic report, that was presented several times to the judges, stated that
Corporate Daifallah received a bullet from the right side. The bullet casing itself was later found
beneath the seat next to (and to the right of) the driver‘s seat—where Corporate Daifallah‘s
partner was sitting. Instead of entertaining the possibility that his partner might have fired back
on the crowd, accidentally shooting Daifallah in the process, the judges sentenced these other
defendants to death. To add to the complexity, two of the three judges in the panel had earlier
sentenced a previous set of people to death on this exact charge: the murder of Corporate
Daifallah.75

Under these pretexts, the mandatory ‗unanimity of the entire court members76‘ before
handing down a death sentence does not seem as trustworthy as it is presumed to be. In fact, such
unanimity is faulty, flawed, and does not rest upon the certainty that it pretends to convey.
Instead, as Foucault (1994) described, the judge panel passes down a death sentence ―with an
almost sleepy gesture‖ (p.429). There isn‘t anything similar to either the deeply grounded,
profound philosophical arguments, or the seriousness with which the gravity of a human life is
75
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appreciated a la Twelve Angry Men. In other words, there aren‘t (three) different opinions that
would jeopardize the legally-required consensus on issuing kill orders. The Foucauldian (1994)
interpretation of legal indolence is more realistic in the framework in question. Too lazy to make
the trip to the bombing scenes, too indifferent to be bothered by which side the bullet was shot
from, too arrogant to admit that some of the people with kill orders were in the state‘s custody.
Such nonchalance, especially in ‗political‘ cases, is entangled with other affectual sentiments.
Rather than passive indifference, laziness in these situations is very active, with an almost
militant intention not to do anything. As a defendant in another political case later chronicled,
judges were on Facebook as the defense lawyers were presenting the case. So yes, Foucault‘s
analysis of laziness is very much the case here; however, it does not only stem from dismissive
nonchalance, but is an active decision that rests on, and is reinforced by, the public affects
around ‗political‘ defendants: the interplay of fear and hatred. In short, Daifallah‘s murder story
and the way the militantly-lazy judge panel handled it reflect much about the judges‘ perceived
allegiance to the ‗state.‘ Instead of a presumed judicial independence, there is in fact a collapse
of separation of power, whereby the judicial apparatus functions in the service of the executive.

Egypt‘s death sentences in 2014 speak very much to this state allegiance, and the judges‘
perceptions of themselves and their states. It is precisely one judge—Saeed Youssef—in Minya
who generated unprecedented international media attention and human rights shock. In a
―mockery of justice,‖ as described by Amnesty International, Youssef referred the papers of 528
people to the Mufti on 24 March 2014, after one 30-minute court session on 22 March. On 28
April, Youssef sentenced 37 of them to death, including the minor Hatem Zaghloul, thereby
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exposing ―how arbitrary and selective Egypt‘s criminal justice system has become 77‖—
something which 18 local human rights organizations condemned.78 The same judge orchestrated
a similarly short court session on 25 March—so short it was described as a ―lightning trial‖ by
Human Rights Watch79—that defense lawyers boycotted in objection to the absence of due
process. Indifferent, Youssef proceeded by referring another staggering 683 defendants to
Egypt‘s Mufti. In a similar fashion, he sentenced 183 of them to death on 21 June. Furthermore,
none of the defendants in either case were brought to court, which had ―utterly destroyed its
credibility … issuing death sentences … on an industrial scale,‖ said Amnesty International,
indicating that ―there is no justice in this country anymore.80‖

As for Judge Youssef, he became infuriated at the state,81 unable to understand how
security guards weren‘t dispatched at his front door, despite all the efforts he went through for
the sake of the state.82 Within this worldview, the complete disregard of law—a judge not doing
his job—is not only explicable but favored for the sake of a state at war. Like Sisi said a few
years later, the law was, to Youssef, an obstacle. And his efforts to eradicate the state‘s enemies
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(perceived as the Muslim Brotherhood) were not only unrewarded, but unrecognized by the very
same state.

In this sense, judges take sides in the ‗war on terror,83‘ as if the terror in this equation is
one-sided. With the misconceived association of death sentences with (any form of) deterrence,
judges consciously sentence defendants to death in the aftermath of ‗terrorist‘ attacks. Such was
one of the verdicts of Nagy Shehata, whose abundant kill orders gained him the popular
nickname qaḍi al ʾiʿdamat [the death sentences judge]. On 10 September 2017, Shehata referred
the papers of 11 defendants in the ‗Giza cell‘ case84 to the Mufti, after they were charged with
forming an organization in violation of the law, preventing the state‘s institutions from operation,
sabotaging a police car, the theft of police weaponry, and the attempted murder of Giza security
forces.85 Shocked at the legal impossibility—and yet high proximity—of receiving a death
sentence for a crime they didn‘t commit, the defendants in the case were comforted when
Shehata assured them, ‗I won‘t make you wear red.‘ The brother of one of the defendants
narrated the sudden hope he felt as he heard this sentence; after all, the judge can choose not to
hand down a death sentence even in case the Mufti sees otherwise. Two days before the
scheduled verdict, on 20 October 2017, a militant attack/ambush in the Western desert reaped
most police casualties in Egypt‘s near history, leaving at least 54 dead. 86 Two days later, on 22
October 2017, Shehata sentenced all 11 defendants to death. Their appeal is still being ‗looked

83
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into‘ by the Court of Cassation, which nonetheless approved the inclusion of their names on
terrorist lists in April 2018.87

In a 2015 court session, Amr Fouad, one of the Giza cell defendants addressed Shehata
saying, ‗I have heard well of you since Mubarak‘s time, that you don‘t fear anyone. But I‘ve also
heard that verdicts are politicized, and that whoever stands before you receives a harsh judgment,
so treat us fairly for God‘s sake,‘ to which Shehata responded, ‗the court hasn‘t charged you, and
don‘t mention the God thing or I‘ll lock you up for a year.88‘ He later sentenced him to life in
prison. And he also made it to the terrorist lists.

But Fouad was right. The legal system had an aura of prestige and confidence during (at
least some of) Mubarak‘s time. Lawyers in Minya, Alexandria, and Cairo confirm this, and are
nostalgic to the time when the Court of Cassation used to annul death sentences as soon as they
were received. In fact, defendants in such cases didn‘t even have to submit an appeal; the appeal
process would be automatically triggered by the issuing of a death sentence. This reflected the
great extent to which judges were conservative about handing down death sentences, and even
more conservative about upholding them. And so the Court of Cassation prior to Sisi‘s April
amendments, and more so until 2011, annulled most death sentences. Moreover, and given the
long judicial time before a verdict was issued by the cassation (to probably mitigate the death
sentences), executions were relatively scant. More accurately, executions during the 1980s were
horribly wide, but the rate dropped throughout the rest of Mubarak‘s time. Following the
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staggering 213 executions between 1981 and 1990, 35 people were executed between 1991 and
2000, Amnesty recorded. As from subsequent Amnesty Refworld reports, two people were
executed in 2000;89 one was executed in 2008;90 two people were executed in 2009;91 and five
were executed in 2010.92 The relatively conservative position of the Court of Cassation during
the 2000s—whereby most death sentences were revoked and defendants retried—is over. The
change of logic—whereby the exact opposite happens—makes it important to consider the public
shift in the image of the judiciary, whether civil, or, to a much larger extent, military. This has to
do with the unprecedented number of death sentences both handed down and upheld, the grave
human rights violations and the judicial choices to disregard them, the judges‘ bloops within
courtrooms, and, perhaps more importantly, their documentation and broadcast.

Besides Nagy Shehata, Hassan Farid is similarly notorious for his abundant death
sentences. As lawyers narrate, however, the main difference between both judges has to do with
each one‘s ‗court charade.‘ While Shehata is said to not care much about performativity within
the courtroom, Farid appears (as if) sympathetic to defendants: granting them permission to
speak, pretending to be shocked upon hearing about their torture stories, at times even telling
them they have been wronged, yet, at the end of the day, handing out their death sentences.

Farid was the main judge in a case that caught much public opinion: the murder of former
Public Prosecutor Hisham Barakat on 29 June 2015. Almost a year later, 67 people were accused
of the murder, with 51 arrests made. The first criminal court session started on 14 June 2016—
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two years and three days before the time of writing this section—and lasted until the day of
Farid‘s verdict on 22 July 2017. One particular court session, on 16 August 2016, is interesting
because it was caught on camera. In line with Farid‘s reputation, the broadcasted video
segment93 shows several defendants were indeed given the microphone to speak, and they
narrated torture stories as well. The peculiarity, however, was in Farid‘s responses. Mahmoud El
Ahmady, 21, said he was tortured for 12 days in the Lazoghli headquarters; he told Farid, ‗I can
identify one of the officers who tortured me; he is standing in this courtroom, but I am afraid of
what might happen to me when I return to prison if I do.‘ Nonchalantly, Farid said ‗next,‘ to pass
on the microphone to the next defendant, as if what they say matters. Enter Abul Qasem Ahmed,
23, who went into the details of his torture, ‗For 15 days, I was electrocuted, hung by the door
for hours, and handcuffed even during sleep.‘ Another ‗next‘ by Farid, before Abu Bakr Sayed
takes the stage, this time offering to show Farid the torture marks and scars on his body; Farid
quickly interrupted, ‗no, you won‘t show me anything. Next.‘ The final defendant speaks quietly,
explaining how the beatings to his head were so severe that he still has optical and auditory
hallucinations in his cell. The (by now bored) Farid jokes, ‗ma gāyez rakbak ʿafrīt [well, maybe
you‘re possessed].‘ And before he could stop him, the man lifted up the edge of his prison pants
and showed Farid the torture scars on his leg. No comment; as if Farid didn‘t see them.94
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The scene above is not an exception; the only exception is the fact that it was videotaped
and later broadcast. On an increasing basis, court sessions are being closed to the public.
Terrorism-related cases are held in the Police Academy, where only the defense lawyers (and not
the families) are allowed. At times, the lawyers have difficulty entering the courtrooms, or, as
happened late 2017, are allowed to enter but without their bags and belongings. Furthermore,
Sisi brought back state security emergency courts that, since October, are to consider cases that
breach ―security and economic laws.‖ With such vague definitions, the courts have jurisdiction
over cases associated with the already vague ‗terrorism,‘ which spans assemblies and protests.95

With ‗the people‘ increasingly—and deliberately—pushed beyond the courtroom,
broadcast segments like the one above are crucial to observe what court sessions entail. To our
dismay, however, a decree was issued by the Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC), headed by
Counselor Magdy AbulEla, to ‗prevent and prohibit the broadcast of court sessions, whether live
broadcast or through any (audio)-visual means, and limit the coverage to written news only.‘ In
an interview,96 an anonymized source explained this decree on the basis of ‗the acute crisis
among the judiciary‘ that Judge Farid caused on 17 June 2017, when he announced the referral
of 30 defendants in the former public prosecutor case to the Mufti. 97 In the broadcast segment,98
Farid reads excerpts of the Quran and Hadith, with massive linguistic and grammatical mistakes,
which the judge to his right is also seen trying to correct at times.
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According to the interviewee, this scene generated much debate on judicial platforms, to
the extent that Farid‘s son intervened to defend his father, attributing the errors of articulation to
a surgery he underwent in 2015. ‗The doctors advised him to rest,‘ he justified, ‗but [my father]
insisted to go back to work.‘ This paternally sacrificial ―as if‖ will be discussed further later. As
for the debate, an official request was made on 26 July 2017 to the SJC, demanding the halt of
courtroom broadcast ‗in preservation of the prestige and personality of judges, and in prevention
of their distortion in front of the public, so that these conflicts among the sons of one profession
aren‘t repeated again.‘

The perceived prestige of the judiciary was also threatened by judges other than Farid. In
another scandal, the chief of a criminal court in Zaqazik was arrested on 16 August, 2017, for his
receipt of a EGP 300,000 bribe from previous parliamentarians.99 Apparently, this was just the
first payment of a larger amount agreed upon to mitigate a death sentence in one of the criminal
cases considered by the judge to life instead, as the convicted murderer happened to have been
one of the parliamentarian‘s security guard.

All these scenes complicate the question posed by the angry families in shock outside the
military court in Alexandria: how can judges comfortably go to bed, knowing—like ʿashmāwy—
that they order the murders of the potentially innocent? I argue that the division of labor, as used
by Pachirat (2011), allows for the diffusion of the responsibility of killing. In this sense, just like
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ʿashmāwy dismissed such responsibility to them judges, the judges bring in the Mufti into the
decision-making, projecting the responsibility onto the Mufti and his sharīʿa.

3. The White Turban

The Mufti‘s white turban has been affiliated with the court system since the late 19th century. At
that time, the sharīʿa court system was in place, with the mandatory presence of state-employed
muftis as consultants for courts, whose opinions, or fatwas, were considered binding. These
ordinary muftis were overseen by the (Hanafi) Mufti of Cairo, who was consulted by the
president of the Cairo court. The figure of the mufti was so integral to the legal system that an
1880 law stipulated the Mufti‘s presence in the committee that appointed judges. By 1881, the
Mufti of Cairo became known as Mufti al Diyār al Misrīa [the Mufti of the Egyptian
(Home)Lands]. When Dār al Iftāʾ was later formed (on 21 November 1895), the office of the
state Mufti was attached to the Ministry of Justice, and he became ―invested with the impersonal
authority of the state‖ (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997, p.104). By 1897, muftis were appointed as
members on judge panels: provincial muftis on the provincial courts‘ three-judge panels; the
Mufti of the Egyptian (Home)Lands on the Supreme Court‘s five-judge panel. Yet the
consultation of muftis seemed optional, with no stipulated obligation to consult them at any
stage. With the introduction of national courts, however, the 1883 Code of Criminal Procedure
gave the mufti an obligatory task: to confirm that death sentences did not go against Islamic
principles (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997, pp.100-106).
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It is the same code that sets forth the Mufti‘s role in sentencing to death until this day.
Article 381 states that a criminal court ‗must, before issuing this [death] sentence, refer the case
papers to the Mufti for his opinion. If his opinion does not reach the court within 10 days after
his receipt of the papers, the court issues its verdict. If there is no Mufti, or if he is absent or
unable [to do so], the Minister of Justice issues a decree enabling someone else instead‘ This
new, modified version of the code does not mention a fact that was articulated in the earlier
version of the same code: that if the Mufti does not respond to the court, it means he approves of
the death sentence—and not, for instance, that he did not have enough time to go through at
times thousands of pages of court documents (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997, p.106). If the Mufti‘s
opinion does not reach the criminal court within 10 days, the court just goes ahead with the
verdict.

Despite unsuccessful attempts to meet Shawki Allam, the current Mufti al Diyār, I was
able to meet with Sheikh Anas in the Fatwa section of Dār al Iftāʾ. Suspicious about my
presence (and questions about the thorny topic), Sheikh Anas gradually became agitated over the
span of 10 minutes, before finally telling me that ‗there are people waiting outside.‘ My
questions were fact-based: what is qaṣāṣ? What crimes are punishable by death in sharīʿa law?
Are counterterrorism charges mandatorily punishable by death? How do you see the Mufti‘s
role? Who takes the papers to the Mufti? What exactly do these papers contain? Does the Mufti
request further documents to look at? What if the 10-day window isn‘t enough? Is the Mufti
entitled to question defendants? Has the Mufti ever refused to sign? Before I got through the list,
however, I was (politely) requested to leave. Luckily, my intrusion (playing stupid at the ‗people
waiting outside‘ moment) gained me some insight. Apparently, Sheikh Anas was affiliated with
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Dār al Iftāʾat the time Ali Gomaa was Mufti, before Shawki Allam was inaugurated in March
2013.

Before he became agitated, Sheikh Anas explained that it is not actually the Mufti
himself who looks at the papers, but a committee made of 5-6 judges appointed by the Ministry
of Justice. Like the 3-judges panel, Anas stressed the comfort in the number 5-6 in an imaginary
of the Twelve Angry Men discussions: all five judges concur, not one is of a different opinion.
Nevertheless, the ideal discussion chamber (a la Twelve Angry Men) remains a fragment of the
imaginary in the mess that is the legal system in Egypt. I would like to argue that a certain
bystander effect, coupled with a degree of boredom of state employees who just ‗want to go
home,‘ contributes to the illusion of real consensus. The bystander effect could be understood in
terms of Shapin and Schaffer‘s (1985) ―member‘s account,‖ in which the status of a member of a
certain group is maintained so long as he does not question the group‘s modus operandi. In other
words, ―the member who poses awkward questions about ―what everybody knows‖ in the shared
culture runs a real risk of being dealt with as a troublemaker or an idiot‖ (p.6). Within such
framework, everybody knows that the Muslim Brotherhood is a ‗terrorist‘ organization; former
Mufti

Ali

Gomaa

announced

that

the

Brotherhood

members

are

‗khawarij

[kharijites/dissidents],100 the most evil of creations … blessed is he who kills them; blessed are
those they kill—the Egyptian police and army [members].101‘ Sheikh Anas also legitimized the
use of the death penalty ‗to curb a certain phenomenon that negatively affects youth,‘ when I
wondered why ‗political‘ crimes are not among the crimes punishable by death in sharīʿa law.
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As such, the taken-for-grantedness of the communal ―as if‖ among the judge panels,
whether at court or at Dār al Iftāʾ, enables and is constituted by an unshakable trust in the
necessity of handing down death sentences. Sheikh Anas even went so far as to assure me that
‗there is no such thing as judicial bias, especially in such cases‘—referring to the famous Nagy
Shehatas and Hassan Farids of the state. ‗It is not possible for a judge who knows [and fears]
God to have a degree of doubt and yet proceed with sentencing to death.‘ In that sense, the
Mufti‘s role is not to investigate the case once more—for he already has trust in the former
judges and the solidarity of their numbers—but, in the words of Sheikh Anas, ‗zeyāda fil waraʿ’
[in further fear of the Lord].102 Unfortunately, I do not believe this is the case, given the very
short time span to consider cases, and the official bias in favor of the state‘s use of the death
penalty—whether articulated in person by the former Mufti, or as manifest in the appointment of
judges (as if) to consider cases in the name of the Mufti.

The figure of the Mufti with regard to the death penalty is thus a facade, as if the entire
Islamic institution, the Islamic madhahib and Islamic law support the state‘s unprecedented use
of the penalty. To the public, the Mufti‘s signature is an almost symbolic blessing of the orders
to kill, with the perceived waraʿ of a Mufti who must have investigated the cases again and
again, making sure there is nothing to call for a shroud of doubt. Nevertheless, the Mufti‘s
signature remains a formality, with Sheikh Anas‘s mistaken confirmation that ‗the Mufti usually
signs the papers [in approval of the death sentences] because executions are rarely carried out.‘
This is a grave indication of either the Mufti‘s ignorance of the unprecedented, and at times
illegal, execution of people sentenced to death, or his indifference to the magnitude of each and
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every life his pen signs, crossing out. In a TV interview with the current Mufti, he himself stated
that ‗in 95% of the cases or more, we agree with the judge‘s opinion; in a very small percentage,
(stutters) we don‘t say we refuse, but we say the issue is left to the justice of the court … because
I have not known [or seen] the details, the facial expressions. I don‘t summon the witnesses or
the defendant or the plaintiff. I received papers, and so if the court is comfortable about what it
has … then it is left to the court and its justice.103‘ The Mufti thus repeats Sheikh Anas‘s trust in
the judges, their yaqīn that the culprit deserves the death penalty.

The courts‘ decisions to refer papers to the Mufti have become synonymous with
sentencing to death. The 1883 Code of Criminal Procedure included the Mufti as a formality; an
exchange of papers that happens ―after the verdict but before publication‖ (Skovgaard-Petersen,
1997, p.105). It is not so different nowadays. In fact, defendants in several cases were moved to
the death row ward and put in red clothes after returning from court on the day of their referral to
the Mufti. This happened with the three defendants in the Damanhour bombing case, which is
based on an incident involving a small-scale explosion that happened as two men on a
motorcycle were passing by the Damanhour bus stop on 27 July, 2015. Apparently, they carried
explosives that detonated as they crossed the stop taking both of their lives. There wasn‘t
anything significant at the bus stop, yet a case was opened five months later, charging four
defendants with the intent to detonate the (empty) bus stop in connection to the two men on the
motorcycle. They were moved to the death row ward until—to everyone‘s surprise—they were
sentenced to life instead on the following court session.
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Aired on 16 October 2017, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mWVeO_FInc
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Such moments of state confusion say much about the perceived inevitability of receiving a
death sentence once the Mufti is consulted. In other words, correspondence with the Mufti is just
a formality; the court‘s decision to refer papers to the Mufti translates to its (upcoming) death
sentences. It is interesting to consider the game of responsibility-dodgeball at play, wherein each
state killer projects the responsibility to kill upon the figures of them other state actors. At the
everyday level, everyone seems to be ‗just doing their jobs,‘ yet with an air of laziness (in a
Foucauldian sense) that facilitates the seemingly rational thing to do in alignment with a state at
war: to kill them terrorists. After the Mufti, the criminal court judges, and the court of cassation
judges had had their toll, they project the responsibility to kill upon him whose power transcends
the might of the law: the ultimate sovereign.

4. The Mickey Ears104

As the current ultimate sovereign, Sisi is the only person whose signature could mitigate an
already upheld death sentence. After the Court of Cassation upheld the death sentences of the
―Mansoura 6‖ defendants following their accusation of premeditated murder, this became widely
circulated. ‗Whenever a death sentence is final,‘ states Article 470 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, ‗the minister of justice must immediately submit the case files to the president of the
republic. The sentence is executed if a pardon or mitigation is not issued within 14 days.‘ In the
Mansoura 6 case—which also happened to be the first recent case in which the Court of
Cassation upholds death sentences of young people charged with ‗terrorism‘ crimes—media
campaigns went viral, international human rights bodies contacted Sisi, all hoping for the last
104

In October 2015, 22-year old Amr Nohan was sentenced to three years in prison before a military
court, for having drawn Mickey Mouse ears on a picture of Sisi; details (and artwork) available at
https://www.noonpost.org/content/17757

67

resort: a signature of pardon. The problem, however, was that the correspondences between the
minister and the presidency were secret. Nobody knew when the 14-day period ends, because
nobody knew when it started. A little over a year has passed now, and no pardon has featured in
the news. With the ongoing waves of execution, and with Sisi‘s discourse on the correct ways of
countering terrorism, the media campaigns have slowly stopped trending; the human rights
bodies are trying to keep up with the assembly line.

Surprisingly, Sisi has a precedent of pardon. On 22 January 2017, and for reasons
unknown, the Official Gazette included decree number 50 for the year 2017: mitigating the death
sentence of Mohamed Hussein to life instead. Hussein‘s death sentence was previously upheld
after he was charged with the premeditated murder of a child. This remains an enigmatic act,
very peculiar to the modus operandi of the Sisi rule. It might make sense that the mitigated man
was charged in an ordinary criminal crime, as opposed to the execution outbursts in political
crimes. But why not mitigate more ordinary criminals, then? Why Hussein in particular?

I do not have answers. I can only speak to the other, more familiar stroke of Sisi‘s pen: to
sign on the execution of a certain number of people following ‗terrorist‘ attacks. Maybe a signed
document, maybe a phone call—the prisons authority receives an ‗order‘ from the presidency to
begin performing the execution of people (not names, but figures). Those who have not already
died in their cells are eligible for such state killing performances, and, as daunting as it seems,
the possibility of a non-random choice must be entertained, based on the worries and strategies
undertaken by some of the family of death row detainees: they worried that if the guards do not
at all benefit from their loved ones‘ stay on death row, they would be easy to dispose of. To
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avoid this, they always brought an extra share of food specifically for the staff, in hope of
delaying the execution or halting it altogether.

To contemplate the importance of the death penalty for the ultimate sovereign, I would like
to engage with some literature on sacrifice, which has apparently troubled Durkheim. In his
correspondances with Mauss, he asked him ―to uncover an original penal sacrifice.‖ Thus Mauss
and Hubert‘s ―Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice,‖ in which they complained that ―the
notion of penal sacrifice confused religious and juridical phenomena‖ (Ptacek, 2011, p.32).
Although very much granted, I propose a notion of sacrifice away from religion: a sacrifice by
and for the state, in which the only manifestation of religion is in the state‘s declared reasons as
to why executing certain bodies are necessary (as if the role of the Mufti and the Islamic
elements in execution rituals). This is perhaps more obvious in the current context under pretexts
of ‗war on terrorism,‘ which dissociates the notion of sacrifice from religious connotations. So
away from Ptacek (2011), Taylor (2015), and Valentine (2001), who engage with executions in
terms of religious sacrifice, I start with Madeira‘s (2006) The Execution as Sacrifice and use
Marvin & Ingle‘s (1996) ―Blood Sacrifice and the Nation‖ to theorize contemporary executions
in terms of war-required sacrifice. Marvin & Ingle (1996) argue that war is in essence ritual
sacrifice, and that ―organizing and disposing [bodies] is the fundamental task of all societies‖
(p.771). The underlying bases of these bodily categorizations are discussed in detail in the
upcoming chapter; for now, it is important to remember that ―society depends on the death of
this sacrificial group [i.e. the figure of the other] at the hands of the group itself … because
violence poses the greatest threat to the group from within as well as without. It is never
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eradicated‖ (p.771).105 Perhaps this is why the figure of the terrorist/Other is necessary for the
guaranteed, continued existence of a sovereign state at ‗legitimate‘ war with this terrorist. In
other words, Sisi surely cannot kill everybody, because if he does that he will have no one else
left to kill. And since it is the ultimate enactment, or performance, of sovereignty, the death
penalty in this context appears necessary as a state-centered ritualistic sacrifice. In Madeira‘s
(2006) words, ―the State kills the citizen who kills the State‖ (p.186).

5. The Red Suit

The final figure in the realm of the death penalty is arguably the executee himself, who has in
some ways killed the state. To blame the condemned for their condemnation has Rousseauian
connotations: it is a projected desire for the criminal ―to endorse his own conviction,‖ a proper
use of criminals by the state to propagate its so-called deterrence effect (Foucault, 2000, pp.42930). In this case, the criminal embodies his own destiny, longing for the guillotine to cleanse his
soul. When executions were publicly performed in England, the condemned would be expected
to peacefully approach the scaffold and provide some form of closure for the execution-ritual:
―judge and condemn themselves‖ (Foucault, 1977, p.38). In a theatrical event, they would ideally
confess their guilt, plead for forgiveness and God‘s mercy, and accept a degraded social identity
with the sole aim of setting an example for the spectators (Smith, 1996, p.241). To the
conformist-executee, this embodiment/internalization of the dominant discourse around him
allows for a symbolic post-mortem reward: this last minute repent and return to the normative
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The main difference in this line of thought is Marvin & Ingle‟s figure of analysis: the soldier. In this
sense, his sacrifice must be willingly done. In this work, however, since the figure is fundamentally
different, this condition does not apply, although it is interesting to consider the comparative capacities
between both cases.
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order is remembered through ―a rehabilitation of their characters in the collective conscience‖
(p.244).

The ―as if‖ longing for the death penalty is in fact longing of a different sort. In the words
of Albert Camus (1993), ―if by some extraordinary chance the blade failed, they would just start
over. So the thing that bothered me most was that the condemned man had to hope the machine
would work the first time. That was the whole secret of good organization. In other words, the
condemned man was forced into a kind of moral collaboration. It was in his interest that
everything go off without a hitch‖ (p.111).

And so we are left with a state of them, in which each indolent figure projects the
responsibility of killing upon all the others, who must have been certain before sentencing people
to death. In a bystander effect phenomenon, every person who is just doing his job suddenly
assumes everyone else is really doing theirs. If all the figures above are asked the blunt: do you
kill?, an automatic response would deny such accountability. Yet everyone in the process, as in
Pachirat‘s (2011) slaughterhouse, do kill. For it would have been impossible for the meat—
whether human or not—to reach the kill floor, had it not been for the kill-participants whose
politics of sight remove them, at least superficially, from the direct act of killing.

As such, the human slaughterhouse operates because of the involvement of all these state
figures, who dismiss the responsibility of murder so much to the extent of accusing the people
(whom they placed) in red of wanting to be executed. Within this framework, an answer to the
initial question [who kills the bodies?] is arguably everyone involved in the process leading up to
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the kill floor. Inspired by Arendt‘s (1970) ―rule by Nobody‖ (p.237), I suggest an understanding
of the complicity of the above actors in terms of a state of everybody; no one can claim sole
responsibility over state murders because everyone is responsible. The fact that there are many
state actor/murderers, which Pachirat (2011) calls division of labor, could also be understood in
terms of Aretxaga‘s (2003) ―excess of statehood practices‖ to ensure the diffusion of such
responsibility (p.396).
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How do they become killable?
The Documentary and Discursive Anatomy of Injustices

In further exploration of the mechanisms by which the responsibility to kill is dissolved, and in
quest of the creation of the killable, this chapter addresses the bureaucratic and documentary
state practices along with its discursive articulations and silences. After starting with bureaucracy
as a mode of governance, the first part is concerned with the document as an analytical category
and an ornament of ―make-believe,‖ as used by Navaro-Yashin (2007). Certain documents and
documentary signifiers are then navigated with the help of Das (2004) and Sharma & Gupta
(2006) to understand their embodiment of the state and its illegibility. The creation of the killable
is then further explored in the second part of the chapter, engaging Foucault (1997) and Scarry
(1985) to unwind rituals of confession, Caldeira (2000) and Douglas (1966) to speak to the
embodiment of evil, and discussing the linguistic construction of criminals with Conley (2013),
Conquergood (2002), Bourdieu (1985) and Williams (2011), while talking to Mbembe (2003)
and Graeber (2015) about states and superheroes.

A. The Document

One must be alive in government notebooks to be living. Unless government
officials say that you are alive, you may go on forever screaming that you are
alive, only to console yourself. [But] just because the notebook writes ―dead,‖ can
someone be counted ―dead‖?
— From Aziz Nesin‘s Novel, Yaşar Ne Yaşar Ne Yaşamaz106
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The title translates to Yaşar neither Lives nor Dies. The excerpt translation is made by Navaro-Yashin
(2003, p.113).
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In light of Nesin‘s (1977) question, this section explores the symbolic significance of state
documents concerned with the death penalty, in attempt to challenge what the documents really
convey. That is, to point out the inconsistencies within these documents, and to the mundane,
routine, yet highly significant documentary rituals that render the inconsistencies absent—in
legitimization of documents‘ ―make-believe‖ reality, as used by Navaro-Yashin (2007) to denote
the pretensical nature of state documents that bear the official state seal. To do so, I start with
bureaucracy as an institutional practice, before presenting four types of documents to clarify the
make-believe mechanisms within the realm of the death penalty: post-execution medical reports,
a forensic medicine report, a statement by the educational administration, and an excerpt from
court proceedings, all related to defendants in death row cases. These mechanisms, as I will
argue, aid the diffusion of the responsibility to kill, and their automaticity fuels the make-believe
dehumanization of people who are sentenced to death: instead of the mess as it really is, the
documents presented appeal to rationality and mechanization, yet their inconsistencies raise
questions and doubts about these ―as if‖ rational frameworks.

Hull (2012) remembers a conversation in Pakistan with Ahmed, whose house in a
changing city infrastructure is the opening story to Government of Paper. As he pulled a file of
unofficial replicas of papers concerning his house, Ahmed enthusiastically narrated his house ―as
a series of episodes of document acquisition‖ (p.2). The relevance of this story to the topic in
question is the retelling of an event through a series of documents, and remembrance through the
trail made by paper signposts. Similarly, the death penalty as process can be traced as episodes,
or stages, of paper-making: the arrest telegraph, the maḥadir taḥqīq (investigation
records/proceedings) and maḥadir jalasāt (court records/proceedings), the referral of papers to
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the Mufti, the court verdict, the appeal submission, and the court of cassation verdict, before the
post-execution report and burial approval. Within such paper-signpost framework, the processes
of killing unravel as processes of waiting for the next document on the part of the killable and
their families. Therefore, the dates that matter to the families become those that identify the
issuance of some form of paperwork in the process. This is perhaps why pages of my fieldnotebooks contain lists of dates with corresponding copies of paperwork that family members
recited during meetings.

The timeline of papers therefore also becomes a trace of remembrance; the time spent
waiting since the previous papers is the time spent on death row, away from the family. In our
first meeting, the wife of Mohamed Youssef, later sentenced to death in the Abu El Matameer
case,107 was keen on my recording of the dates that mattered. She recited the paper-centric dates
that highlight her husband‘s journey to the death row ward, along with the different dates
concerning five other people whose families were in the same meeting. Arrests without
warrants—in this case, official paperwork—followed by the number and dates of telegraphs
submitted to the (them) government officials, followed by the investigation and court
proceedings, the Mufti referral, and the criminal court sentence. Hajj Khaled, father of Mohamed
who was sentenced to death in the same case, used to refer to her as el moḥāmīa bitaʿitna [our
lawyer], given how outspoken she was and how sharp her memory was in terms of paperwork
and dates.
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Eight people, three of whom are in custody, were sentenced to death on 17 July 2017 following
charges of shooting at the Janaklees Abu El Matameer police station along with other „political‟ charges.
The Court of Cassation has not yet scheduled a hearing to issue its verdict in the case. More case details
are available at https://eipr.org/en/press/2017/11/cries-help-death-row-ward-al-abaadiya-prison-due-poorconditions-eipr-holds-prison
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In this light, what follows is a conceptual exploration of bureaucracy as a mechanism of
responsibility evasion, and normalization in terms of the production of killable bodies. Next, I
consider the document as an analytical category, in which sovereignty is enmeshed within webs
of affective encounters with/of the Egyptian state. Analysis of specific documents and
documentary practices then elaborate the actual messiness of court document-rituals, in
continuation of the unwinding of the ―as if.‖

1. Paper Regimes

To explore the paperwork, we start with Arendt‘s (1970) state ―of Nobody‖ (p.237). In her
description of violence, Arendt (1970) identifies bureaucracy as the most tyrannical, and most
recent form of domination. It is, as she describes, ―the rule on an intricate system of bureaus in
which no men, neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held responsible‖
(p.237). Furthermore, as Graeber (2018) analyzes in his Bullshit Jobs, ―all bureaucracies work on
this principle: once you introduce formal measures of success, ―reality‖—for the organization—
becomes that which exists on paper, and the human reality that lies behind it is a secondary
consideration at best‖ (p.61). Building upon this perception of reality as made on and in paper, I
put forward the claim that bureaucracy does indeed contribute to the evasion/diffusion of the
responsibility to kill in at least two ways: first, writing things down bring a sense of automation
to the process, which simultaneously reduces humans into things that end up in the reality of the
pages of paper; second, the exchange of paper containing things creates this sense of automated
reality, and bestows a degree of banality through which there is further diffusion of responsibility
among those who kill.
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The prerequisite for such evasion is the reduction of people to papers. Quite literally,
criminal courts send the ―papers‖ to Egypt‘s Mufti,108 who then usually signs and returns the
―papers‖ back. In fact, the papers are potentially more important than the people themselves in
these interactions between killing entities.109 Similar to the increasingly secretive court sessions,
the paper interactions between courts and Dār al Iftā have recently become secretive. Until 2012,
Dār al Iftā published an annual report on its website to summarize its correspondences with
different courts throughout the year, including the number of ‗papers‘ the Mufti was required to
bless and what his response was. After 2012, the publication of these reports stopped, and all
previous reports are no longer accessible. News sources, however, maintain that the last public
report documented how Ali Gomaa, a former Mufti, refused to sign on the killing of defendants
in 12 different cases. Unfortunately, there is no further information on these cases, or the
premises or conditions on which the Mufti refuses a case in the first place. Did the decision to
remove all annual reports from the public domain result from the Mufti‘s refusal to sign in these
12 cases? Does that mean that the Mufti had signed all cases in the years before, that 2012 was a
precedent? What indications would this refusal to sign convey to the public about the
mechanisms at work among the killer-state-institution?

Although the absence of publicly

available reports extends what Aretxaga (2003) calls a ―shroud of secrecy‖ (p.400) to the
institutional interactions, court verdicts mention the Mufti‘s response in their reasoning for the
sentences.
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In Arabic إحالة األوراق لمفتي الجمهورية
Similarly, numbers given to prisoners are much more important than their actual names, which then
cease to matter altogether. In line with Goffman‟s (19 1 “On the Characteristics of Total Institutions,” the
reduction of people to papers and numbers are processes of self-mortification, which, in this context,
adds to the ease by which people become killable
109
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Within legal institutions, bureaucracy takes centerstage. Borrowing Hull‘s (2012) description
of Pakistan, it is safe to say that Egypt is similarly ―a regime of paper documents‖ (p.1). As such,
encounters with the state are traceable through such paper documents, which in the process
reveal much about the contemporary Egyptian state. Through what Sharma and Gupta (2006)
term the ―apparently banal practices of bureaucracies,‖ the state‘s bureaucratic procedures
substantiate it in everyday encounters. And so these mundane procedural rituals bring into focus
the ―micropolitics of state work, how state authority and government operate in people‘s daily
lives, and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and reimagined by the
population110‖ (p.11). Mbembe (2006) also provides interesting insight into the state‘s
micropolitics, showing how the state first and foremost creates ―through its administrative and
bureaucratic practices, a world of meanings all of its own,‖ before aiming to institutionalize this
world of meanings, ―and to make that world fully real, turning it into a part of people‘s common
sense‖ (p.381-2). Interestingly, Corrigan & Sayer (1985) find that ―what became nameable as
‗the machinery of government‘ is moralized not simply by overt and separate justification, but
centrally in the combination of mundane routines (which tend to drop below visibility in many
accounts) and the magnificent rituals … of state‖ (p.10). Alongside its banal aspects, Das (2004)
explores the document as a conveyer of the rationality of state. In her ―The Signature of the
State,‖ Das (2004) identifies how bureaucratic logic imposes notions of irrationality and panic
among/upon the public, thereby enabling the state to construct itself as a fully rational entity
(p.245). While Egypt definitely fits in the literature on bureaucracy, and while much of Das‘s
work inspires this chapter, it is precisely this that I argue against on the basis of the documents to
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While the term population suggests a state-society divide, this divide is tangential to the point and
scope of this work. Interestingly, however, bureaucratic state practices are considered to blur this
distinction by some scholars (like Brown, 2006, p.200) and to reinforce them according to others (Hull,
2012, p.22).
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follow. Instead of a rational construction of state mediated by its documents, what follows is a
problematization of this seeming rationality. Whether the state is actually rational, or whether it
constructs itself as a rational entity is another question. What I am interested in here is the
paradox of mess embodied within official state documents. To unwind this, I navigate case
documents and state documentary practices as elements of what Navaro-Yashin (2007) calls the
realm of ―make-believe‖ (p.88). Navaro-Yashin‘s (2007) notion differs from Das‘s (2004)
exploration of rationality, which is primarily constructed in terms of an irrational society-other.
Using the document as an analytical category, I explore this difference by which the same entity
that appeals to bureaucracy as a practice of rationalization actually produces artifacts that speak
against this rationality altogether, thereby materializing the ―as if‖ pretense to logic, rules, and
order.

2. Paper Documents

In this light, the document as an analytical category finds Foucauldian inspiration. By
document, I mean the materialization of certain emblematic rituals whereby a piece of paper no
longer becomes just that. In other words, the document becomes a signifier of the state—it gains
symbolic weight, albeit with the material effect of communicating the sovereign status of the
state, and the by-the-book encounters within the state‘s legal frameworks. For Foucault (1972),
the role of the document has historically shifted. No longer ―an inert material through which it
tries to reconstitute … the events of which only the trace remains,‖ the document in current
historiography is transformed into a monument (p.7-8). So instead of attesting to history-asmemory, the document is now important in and of itself. For research purposes, and as will
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follow, the document is indeed not an inert object. However, it is a materiality of an encounter,
and perhaps more of a memorial than a monument. In this regard, although influenced by
Foucault, the investigation of the documents to follow does not follow (and is not that much
concerned with) his new way of making history.111 More so, in line with Kafka (2009), it is an
attempt to pause and look at documents, not just through them (p.341).

―Once they are part of the normal bureaucratic operation/recording,‖ Das (2004) wrote,
―documents become proof of the legality of operations, thereby appearing normal‖ (p.240,
emphasis added). Building upon this seeming normality (and legality) of official documents,
along with the mundaneness of bureaucratic practices in general, I would like to reaffirm the
importance of documents in the creation of the make-believe. To explore the normalizing
practices of/on documents, I introduce the pre- and post-execution medical reports of the four
people who have been killed on 2 January 2018, after they were sentenced to death in the Kafr El
Sheikh stadium bombing case.112
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Although it would be very interesting, maybe as an upcoming project, to conduct an archaeology of the
state as a series of documentary practices and encounters.
112
After a bomb killed three military school students on 15 April 2015, seven defendants (four of whom
are in custody) are sentenced to death on 2 March 2016 by a military court for their alleged involvement.
The Supreme Military Court upheld their death sentences on 19 July 2017, and they were killed on 2
January 2018.
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According to the reports, all four men gained between five and seven kilos (seven, five,
five, and six respectively) throughout their stay on death row. This suggested increase in appetite
is almost laughable, if it were not for the gravity of the context in consideration, and goes against
each of their family‘s observations and concerns following each visit on a monthly basis: they
were losing weight. In fact, as Lotfy‘s mom and sister repeated on several occasions, the
youngest man killed—who gained the most weight as in the medical report—had been losing so
much weight that it became hard to recognize him. Aside from this inexplicable weight gain, the
report also states how each of the four defendants spent four to five minutes (exactly four
minutes, four and 16 seconds, four and 30 seconds, and exactly five respectively) with ‗palpable
heartbeats following hanging.‘ Since the men were not of equal height or weight, the reports‘
similarity raises much suspicion on the actual recording of how long it took each of their hearts
to stop beating. In a similarly automated manner, all of them are recorded to have had an
‗average‘ health upon entering prison, and they were also ‗average‘ directly before their
execution. With no quantitative indicators about what this averageness in a march towards the
noose is supposed to convey, the content of these reports raise question marks about their
credibility. So too is the supposedly harmonious shahāda they all recited as last words, without
any furious statements—or any statements at all—addressed to the state-spectators supervising
their kill.

In fact, these reports convey a bureaucratic sense of formality more than a credible
documentation of execution scenes. Having to go through the formality of filling in blanks on
eight pages, I would like to venture and suggest that the prison employee with this daunting task
did what we see all the other government employees do in any other institution: he just filled the
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blanks. There was no proper weighing, nothing else to write in the ‗how is he directly before
execution‘ slot than ‗average,‘ no stopwatch, and nothing other than the shahāda captured in
writing. If there had been a relative degree of documentary precision, the employee would have
bothered to write the law article that punishes by death in the ‗verdict and code of criminal
procedure article‘ slot. He would have also made the effort to write down their separate charges,
instead of pasting ‗premeditated murder‘ on each of the reports. With the tiniest effort, the statespectators would have known that only Lotfy is charged with premeditated murder. After all, the
prison warden supposedly recites all the charges before the killing for everyone to hear—or does
he?113

3. Three Signatures and a Bird Stamp

To further navigate the documents above, I would like to move to the state signifiers of
legitimacy/authority. Each of the four reports ends with the signature of two physicians: a
forensic medicine doctor, and the prison doctor. Between their signatures, the prison warden also
signs, ‗accrediting‘ the reports and their contents. Since he possesses the eagle stamp to signify
the state‘s signature, he stamps all four documents positioning the stamp above his name every
time. While this repetitive positioning is symbolically quite telling (in terms of his perceived
proximity to, and embodiment of, the state), it is interesting to probe the signatures themselves,
particularly the significance of the state‘s eagle stamp.
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Questions about the requirements, automaticity, and whether or not the job is done raise further
broader questions that include: why such sloppiness? How is it rationalized? Who is the document‟s
audience? Is there an actual audience? If not, then what is the point of the formalities altogether?
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Understood as a mechanism of representation, the state seal is key to representing ‗the state.‘
As Sharma and Gupta (2006) affirm, the state‘s representational practices in general, and its seal
in particular, lend ―to the state a veneer of consistency, systematicity, centralized control, and
wholeness, and by thus eliding the messiness, contradictions, and tensions that states congeal‖
(p.19). This is of course connected to the broader perceptions and imaginaries of ―what the state
is, what it is supposed to do, where its boundaries lie, and what their place is in relation to state
institutions‖ (p.18). In this regard, the existence of the eagle stamp appeals to its capacity to
produce the state‘s acceptance (of the execution reports), and in turn legitimize, bless, and
declare the statist authority over certain bodies. With their status as ‗official,‘ the eagle-stamped
documents are considered references for legitimacy and authenticity. As Navaro-Yashin (2007)
illustrates, ―these documents are highly loaded symbolically because, at each instance of their
use and exchange, they do not only represent specific identities and transactions, but also declare
the legitimacy‖ of the state (p.87). Hence, the eagle stamp is what Das (2004) refers to as ―the
signature of the state‖ (p.225). In her words, the signature operates as the ―spectral presence‖ of
the state, as ―materialized in documents‖ (p.250-1). The document, in this sense, is an
embodiment of authority, first and foremost through the signature, but also through its removal
of mess. Appropriating John Law‘s (2004) ―distorted into clarity,‖ (p.2) documents in this
context function to distort into cleanliness. Thereby, the document removes the excess of mess,
providing instead a clean, orderly presentation of a rational state enacting its legal right to kill.
This process of distortion thus entails the invisibilizing of pain, just like ―the fact of injuring
tends to be absent from strategic and political descriptions of war‖ (Scarry, 1985, p.12).
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4. Refusing Documentation

As such, some state documents are selectively refused. The examples that make sense the most,
and are thus most legible, are when the state actors refuse the documentation (and stamping) of
papers that go against the state‘s (make-believe rational) ideology. Among the examples are
numerous instances where people later sentenced to death had previously requested forensic
medicine examination, in order to document the torture marks on their bodies. In most cases, the
prosecutors refused, and the court judges disregarded the requests as well, leaving the torture
marks only on the bodies of the condemned, away from the official recognition of the state.114
Some time after her husband was ‗taken‘ and disappeared, Nesma received a phone call with
instructions to bring food and clothes to a state security holding site in Damanhour, with the
promise to meet her husband there. She obeyed the instructions, handed in the food and clothes,
but did not get a glimpse of her husband. Instead, she was given the shirt and trousers he wore
before his disappearance, and wondered why they were soaked in water. A few months
afterwards, when she finally met him, he told her that her presence that night was part of his
torture: the officers made him see that she was there, while pretending she was in custody, and
threatening to rape her if he does not comply. Before she met him, however, she learned through
family members of other people taken with her husband that the water on his clothes was an—
unsuccessful—attempt to get rid of the blood stains from the torture. ‗They [the family] told me
they [the state] had buried his underwear because, unlike the clothes, it did not just have blood
on it. It had pieces of his flesh.‘ The extent of Khaled‘s torture, nonetheless, went
unacknowledged by a state that refused its documentation.
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For a detailed list of court responses to forensic medicine examination requests, see Mahmoud (2018,
p.26-33).
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In addition to the missing forensic reports, many conversations inside courtrooms are
deliberately undocumented for similar purposes. Such were parts of the statements by the officer
whose ‗secret security source‘ ascertained Lotfy had detonated the bomb killing the Kafr El
Sheikh stadium students (as his post-execution report declares). According to Lotfy‘s father and
lawyer, the officer responded to the question whether he could identify Lotfy‘s involvement
saying, ‗the person on the camera is unidentifiable; the picture is not clear; I cannot say for sure
that the person is Lotfy.‘ Although repeated over 10 times throughout several court sessions, the
officer‘s responses were nowhere to be found in the court proceedings. The same thing happened
in another case before Nagy Shehata (the death sentences judge). During one court session in the
Giza cell case,115 an officer was brought to the witness stand. When the defense lawyer asked
him where exactly was Mohamed Waguih—later sentenced to death—arrested, the officer
replied, ‗his place of residence.‘ The defense lawyer then insisted that this response be written
down, telling Shehata that the identified place of arrest in the arrest warrant is different. This
inconsistency of the place of arrest would then generate doubts about the formal arrest warrant,
including the time of arrest.116 These spatio-temporal inconsistencies and the injustices they
signify render the police as ―the site where the contiguity if not constitutive exchange between
violence and law that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is visible in all its nakedness‖
(Agamben, 1993, p.61). At this point (of nakedness), Shehata looked at the court stenographer,
signalling him not to write this response down. He then looked at the officer who caused this
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On 22 October 2017, 11 people (7 of whom are in custody) were sentenced to death on charges of the
attempted murder of two officers during a (failed) attempt to storm the Giza police station in 2015. Other
charges, of course, included forming a group in violation of the law, providing it with arms and aid. The
case timeline is available (in Arabic) at https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/2640564
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As in the 2017 report on the death penalty in Egypt, there is a pattern of arrests made prior to the
issuance of arrest warrants (Mahmoud, 2018).
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situation, admonishing ‗matrakez shwaya’ [stay focused]. Of course, this too went
undocumented. And in response to all subsequent questions, the officer repeated one phrase: I
don‘t remember.

5. An Eagle that Says Otherwise: The Illegibility of Documentation

These moments of refusal of documentation speak to its importance, reflecting some degree of
caution on behalf of the state when it comes to rendering certain statements, and certain
documents, official. This makes sense within a framework of rational, consistent state. As I will
propose, however, this is not the entire story here. Some documents that would implicate the
state in ‗illegal‘ acts are also signed and stamped, thereby gaining similar ‗official‘ status, and
reflecting the state‘s ―illegibility‖ (Das, 2004, p.234). Although synonymous with unreadability
and incomprehensiveness, illegibility pushes a bit further ―as a trope and practice of the state—
thus destabilizing the entrenched idea that the state is somehow ―about‖ its legibility, rationality,
or orderliness‖ (Stevenson, 2007, p.143). To draw upon Das‘s (2004) analysis, I explore the
Egyptian state‘s illegibility at other instances, and in other documents, when the materiality of
the state signature causes a paradoxical illegibility.
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When Mervat first told me her husband‘s torture was documented, I didn‘t exactly
believe it. In the pattern of forensic examination refusal, her husband Gameel would have been
lucky to be formally examined; the forensic report would most probably then be ambivalent
about the torture, referring to the difficulty of its determination at most. Or this is what I thought.
When we next met, the report Mervat showed me was shockingly unusual. After describing the
dimensions of bruises and healing marks on his body, the report‘s opinion is that Gameel‘s
injuries ‗may have been caused by a stick.‘ While approved to dismiss the claim that he was
electrocuted, the report nevertheless finds ‗there is nothing to prevent the possibility that [a semihealed injury] may have been caused by an electrocution device.‘ And so Gameel‘s astounding
forensic report contains the terms stick and electrocution device, and the eagle stamp, which thus
credibilizes the incriminating report contents. As astonishing as this is, the fact remains that the
report had no effect throughout the case proceedings. Gameel Khamis was later sentenced to
death, with no investigation whatsoever in the documented possibility of torture.

Several similar situations of illegibility exist in contradictory official documents. Due to
the shortage of space, only two more examples will follow, both of which are in the Kafr El
Sheikh case. The first has to do with Fakeeh Radwan, a teacher who was sentenced to death in
absentia.117 Mr. Fakeeh was added to the list of defendants responsible for the stadium explosion,
which happened around noon on 14 April 2015. In the following document, issued by the Kafr El
Sheikh education administration afterwards, the science teacher is potentially exonerable:
surprisingly enough, the administration attests to the fact that Mr. Fakeeh ‗was at school on

117

Latin for “while absent,” in absentia denotes the fact that a defendant (Fakeeh, in this case) has not
been arrested, and thus received a verdict in his/her absence. Should they then be arrested, the verdict
(whatever it is) is liable to appeal, yet still may be enforced as is.

96

Wednesday, 15 April, 2015. He did all his school work and did not leave the school on that day.‘
The statement is signed by the school principal and the educational manager, and carries both the
educational administration and official state stamps. Like Gameel‘s document, however, the
stamps on Fakeeh‘s document did not grant an evasion of the death penalty.
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In addition to the neglect of official documents during case proceedings, other documents
with literally life-or-death stakes are similarly neglected post-trial. This is what happened with
the last and final document, which the defense lawyers found after the Supreme Military Court
upheld the death sentences of the four Kafr El Sheikh men whose execution reports marked the
opening documents of this chapter. The upcoming document is an excerpt from an ongoing case,
notoriously referred to as the wilāyat al ṣaʿīd [Upper Egypt [terrorist] rule] case. It is a fragment
of a statement/confession by one of the wilāyat al ṣaʿīd defendants, one that raises doubts about
the involvement of the Kafr El Sheikh men in the stadium bombing—which is solely based on
the latter‘s ‗confessions.‘ In the document to follow, the wilāyat al ṣaʿīd defendant explains his
affiliation with someone called Medhat, who had wanted to recruit him and his friend Ashraf for
‗terrorist‘ purposes. In a conversation with this Medhat, he recites how ‗Medhat told Ashraf that
he had carried out the Kafr El Sheikh stadium operation that targeted the military school
students.‘ He then goes on about his knowledge of Medhat‘s death (by police) and his other
conversations before the state‘s eagle stamp on the page distracts the reader.

When the Kafr El Sheikh defense lawyer came across this document, he became hopeful,
because, in his words, these ‗newly-discovered facts will prove the innocence of the [Kafr El
Sheikh] detainees.‘ On behalf of the four, the lawyer sent an urgent appeal to the military public
prosecutor, requesting a reconsideration of the case to take into account the wilāyat al ṣaʿīd
evidence. Citing four main articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure,118 the lawyer requested
the immediate halt of their imminent execution until the case is reconsidered based on the newlydisclosed evidence. This is yet another state-acknowledged, legitimate document, at least
118
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warranting a moment of doubt on behalf of the Kafr El Sheikh judges. But it did not. The appeal
was refused within a week after its submission, without any explanation. Returning to Das
(2004), these types of documents lie at the (metaphorical) margins of the state—the place of its
illegibility. ―The illegibility of the rules, and the human actions that embody these rules,‖ Das
writes, ―appear to be part of the way that rules are implemented‖ (p.238). The (undocumented)
rules in the context of a state in a war on terrorism decide which documents matter and which
ones don‘t. And at the intersection of law and regulation, Das (2004) continues, lie ―the politics
of the body‖ (p.239). And so when law is evoked precisely when it is absent, when the legal and
the illegal are so blurred together in state documentary practices, the politics of the body are
deadliest (Das, 2004, p.231-4).

100

101

In an affective analysis, it is interesting to suggest the disruptive capacities of the
documents that don‘t seem to matter. Following Navaro-Yashin (2007), documents are
potentially ―make-believe papers;‖ in this context, they make-believe the ―as if‖ rationality,
legitimacy, tidiness, and what Weber calls the ―prestige of domination‖ (Brown, 2006, p.200) of
the Egyptian state. And so documents that are shown above suddenly interrupt this appeal to
authority, justice, and legitimacy. In doing so, they disrupt the flow of mainstream documents
that ―make an appearance as emblems of statecraft‖ (Navaro-Yashin, 2007, p.85). Instead, the
documents in question are symbolically and significantly disturbing to the normative conception
of the state, including the own discourses to fortify its ―make-believe‖ certainty—at least in the
realm of law.

In yet another framework, documentary practices are considered remnants of a historical
process (of institutionalization, documentation, etc.) that used to make sense. Now, however,
governance through documentation is perhaps a remnant without logic. In this capacity, the
disturbances and disorders of the judicial system, as provided by the documents presented above,
―are neither accidents not obstacles nor limits of the judicial apparatus. They are not even
disturbance, but operational mechanisms‖ (Foucault, 1997, p.436).

Perhaps the complete statist disregard of these counter-state-documents is then not an
absence of documental affective energies, but a reactive nonchalance. In light of Herzfeld‘s
(1993) The Social Production of Indifference, I return to the evasion of responsibility. Through
the understanding that bureaucracy creates indifference, ―there is always someone else to blame,
someone else who is responsible, usually a person in higher position‖ (Gefou-Madianou, 1997,
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p.138). In this sense, bureaucracies ―actually mystify accountability,‖ thus generating this utter
indifference (Stewart, 1996, p.677). The latest document presented so far is telling in this regard.
Through circular indifference, the verdict to kill four people (and possibly three others, if they
are ever arrested) passed, with the signature of the Mufti, the criminal court judges, the supreme
military court judges, and the state in its eagle face.

B. The Discursive Creation of Emblematic Monsters

As kids, we‘re taught that there‘s good and evil. The good guys are the heroes
that save the day and the bad guys are the criminals behind bars. But that‘s just
not reality. Being a convict doesn‘t mean that you‘re bad. When you visit a
prison, you learn that the so-called criminals are just people who‘ve been
through hell. And until now, our justice system has dealt with these people by
putting them through even more hell.
—Annalise Keating, How to Get Away with Murder

In further pursuit of answers to the how of killable bodies, I turn to the state‘s discourse, which
for purposes of this work includes the relevant articulations, abstractions, and silences. As will
follow, most of the discursive efforts have to do with the creation of emblematic monsters, which
in and of themselves say much about the state. The racist constituents of the discourse are also
analyzed, in addition to the medicalized silences.

1. The Cult119

In his ―The Proper Use of Criminals,‖ Foucault (1997) provides an interesting answer to the
question: why are death sentences so easily handed down? The ‗machine,‘ as he describes the
119

Parts of this section featured in an article by the author in the Kohl Journal (2018) issue on
incarceration, surveillance, and policing. Available at http://kohljournal.press/states-of-wait/
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legal system, should generally be extremely careful when deciding whether, and why, certain
lives are at stake. However, what we see instead, as is unprecedentedly obvious in contemporary
Egypt, is the influx of death sentences with such an ease and a ―barely awake gesture‖ (p.433).
According to Foucault (1997), and in line with Herzfeld (1993), the reason is both ―simple and
monstrous:‖ state-killers are lazy. In the words of Foucault, what is characteristic about the legal
system is ―the laziness of the investigators, the judges, the lawyers, of the whole legal apparatus‖
(p.429).

The crux of this laziness, Foucault elaborates, is ―the cult of the confession‖ (p.430). This
confession cult is particularly interesting. Despite their laziness, police members and prosecutors
exert quite a lot of physical effort in their extraction of confessions. ―It is toward the confession
that all the proceedings lead, from the first interrogation to the final hearing‖ (Foucault, 1997,
p.430). Why is a confession this important? Why must the defendant be tortured, to the extent
that there are identifiable patterns of torture in order to articulate a ‗confession120‘? And why is
such confession so sacred that its existence is enough to cover for the actions of the entire legal
system, even of why and how it was made, and the fact that it is later recanted?

A Foucauldian answer is in the ―economy‖ of laziness that makes the confession
possible. Once the confession is made, people are content, as if some form of fundamental truth
had been revealed. Because of this cultic statement, the investigators get to be rewarded for their
hard work (extracting confessions); the lawyers get to build a case around the confessions; the
judges then refer the defendants back to their statements; the Mufti receives confessions in
writing; and the media can showcase criminals who have acknowledged their guilt. It is settled.
120

Patterns elaborated in the Human Rights Watch (2017 report, “We do Unreasonable Things Here.”
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How could it be possible to doubt a confession? That said, ―the confession is a locus of gentle
complicity for all the functionaries of penal justice‖ (Foucault, 1997, p.430).

Another interesting interpretation is found in the work of Scarry, particularly her (1985)
The Body in Pain. In her analysis of torture per se, she focuses on the different worlds,
determined by the presence and absence of pain, in which the torturer and the tortured exist. In
her words:

The torturer's questions—asked, shouted, insisted upon, pleaded for—
objectify the fact that he has a world, announce in their feigned
urgency the critical importance of that world, a world whose asserted
magnitude is confirmed by the cruelty it is able to motivate and
justify. Part of what makes his world so huge is its continual
juxtaposition with the small and shredded world objectified in the
prisoner's answers, answers that articulate and comment on the
disintegration of all objects to which he might have been bonded in
loyalty or love or good sense or long familiarity. It is only the
prisoner's steadily shrinking ground that wins for the torturer his
swelling sense of territory. The question and the answer are a
pro-longed comparative display, an unfurling of world maps (p.36).

As such, ―pain and interrogation inevitably occur together in part because the torturer and the
prisoner each experience them as opposites‖ (p.29). And so whereas the content of the
confession is not that much important, the fact that there is a confession is necessary. And so is
the pain.

The confession of people later sentenced to death is not only needed for the stateaudiences, but is often times necessary for a much greater one. The investigators and their
collaborators go to further lengths, even after their torture practices, to broadcast these
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‗confessions‘ to the public.121 An example is the case in which people accused of assassinating
the former Public Prosecutor Hisham Barakat. Before the official arrest warrants were made, the
Ministry of Interior published a video122 showing four people—all of whom were sentenced to
death a few months later along with 24 others—claiming to have somehow participated in the
murder.123 Mahmoud El Ahmady later said in court: ‗The things they wanted me to say were
written on three pages of paper. They made me memorize and recite them before a camera. At
the time the torture marks were still visible on my face, so they covered them with makeup first‘
(Mahmoud, 2018, p.35). The fact that his statement was registered in official court papers, which
bore the state seal, was not important. The fact that mattered was that he had confessed; better
yet, it was before camera. The police succeeded in extracting a confession, and their makeup
artist was an asset to the team.

But sometimes, many times in the current context, the extracted confession and the
established facts are irreconcilable. Bringing back the Kafr El Sheikh case, Lotfy was arrested
without a warrant and detained for over 75 days. Case documents contain his confession as
having detonated the stadium bomb using an adjusted motorcycle remote control. In a letter
describing this horrid period of arrest, he writes about officers tying his hands to a pole above his
head and maintaining them by a stick behind his neck, removing his pants and tying his feet
together using his belt, electrocuting his testicles, and beating him more (and more frequently)
whenever he asks why he is being tortured. Time after time he said, ‗I didn‘t do anything,‘ but
the torture continued until he couldn‘t take it anymore. ‗Tell me what you want me to sign and I
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See Mahmoud (2018) for a list of broadcast confessions showing people later sentenced to death
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zbyvpg4S7BE
123
This also raises doubts about the credibility of the arrest warrant, and the fact that it was (supposedly)
issued before the arrests were actually made.
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will,‘ his letter spoke. At this point, the officer said, ‗no, you must talk first,‘ so he started
remembering his day at work—which had nothing to do with the bombing. The beatings
continued, at an exaggerated rate; ‗scream as loud as you want, no one will help you.‘ Again,
after threats of raping his mother, sister, and (at-the-time) fiance, Lotfy said, ‗I will say whatever
you want me to.‘ He was given pieces of paper detailing the remote control detonation and while
it was never aired, a video segment was recorded at the crime scene, with Lotfy reciting the
confession before camera. It was potentially never aired because of what happened next. When
the crime scene results were out, lab reports stated that it wouldn‘t have been possible to use a
motorcycle remote control; instead, the detonation was made by a mobile phone. So while the
contradictory documents sat in the lap of the military courts, as documents, they would have
been problematic if broadcast to the public.124

The last sentences of his letter interestingly capture something about the officers.
Whenever Lotfy declared he would ‗confess‘ to anything in signing, the officer in charge asked
him to tell the truth. And when he did, the degree of torture amplified. In this pattern, the
imposition of truth on the make-believe confessions reveals much around both the laziness and
the ―as if.‖ The make-believe confession must resonate with an element of fundamental truth; the
culprit must swear to its veracity. Any other (real) versions of the truth warrant further
electrocution and beating. And so the military prosecution‘s ‗truth‘ was imposed for 75+ days
upon a 21-year old, whose endorsement of the remote control scenario was disturbed by the
other, truer, mobile-phone version of the truth. Once more, just like the inconsistencies among
documents, the confessional inconsistencies generated much indifference.
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Other inconsistencies between the confession and the reports are available at
https://eipr.org/en/blog/amira-mahmoud/2017/10/executing-bucket-monsters
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At such moments, Foucault (1997, p.431) reminds us, the state options include either
breaking down the confession and thoroughly reexamining it, or choosing the most relevant
‗fact‘ that would cement the confession further. While the second is obviously more sensical
within the current context, I would like to evoke Navaro-Yashin‘s (2002) ―as if‖ to suggest a
third line of behavior here, whereby the state-killers disregard the confusion and dismiss the
responsibility to investigate. In line with Herzfeld (1993), an ―as if‖ state is also too nonchalant
to even sort through the facts and establish a solid story.

In any case, the figure of a confessed criminal substitutes an obscure crime to the public.
In line with Foucault (1997), all that remains is to construct around this confession a criminal
personality; then, the crime should easily make sense as a necessary consequence. As such,
crimes that had already happened will be dropped, because criminals—and not crimes—are
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needed: by the media and public opinion; by the judges and the Mufti. It is such criminal ―who
will be hated … and for whom the penalty and oblivion will be demanded … There is, in flesh
and blood, alive, incontestable, the criminal. His face, his expressions, his toughness, his smile,
his panics—all that which ―doesn‘t mislead‖‖ (Foucault, 1997, p.432-3). Interestingly, the same
facial gestures (the face, the expressions) were highlighted by the Mufti in justification for his
doubtless trust in the judges‘ verdicts, since they have seen the criminals‘ facial expressions and
thus cannot be misled.125

In line with Scarry (1985), I would like to further explore the necessity of this confession cult
in terms of pain generation. In her analysis, the almost obsessive deployment of the officer‘s
agency ―assists the conversion of absolute pain into the fiction of absolute power‖ (p.27). Thus
torture is required as a prerequisite for the confession, whose sole and ultimate aim is therefore
its existence as a political construct. Beyond the infliction of pain, torture functions to objectify
its attributes and, more importantly, translate ―those attributes into the insignia of the regime‖
(p.19). As such, real human pain becomes translated through torture into the regime‘s
phantasma, or ―fiction of power‖ (p.18). In other words, ―the objectified pain is denied as pain
and read as power‖ (p.28). This also makes sense in terms of Aretxaga‘s (2001) use of the
―phantasmatic,‖ a term she devised using ―a psychoanalytic notion of fantasy against the
backdrop of a Foucauldian theory of power‖ (p.1). In the pain-free worlds of torturers, moments
whereby ―the attributes of pain can be severed from the pain itself and conferred on a political
construct‖ (Scarry, 1985, p.14) are at the interplay of the phantasmatic, which seems to pervade
125

In a TV segment aired on 16 October 2017, the Mufti justifies his refusal to sign the papers, yet his
support of the court‟s death sentences, saying I have not known [or seen] the details, the facial
expressions. I don‟t summon the witnesses or the defendant or the plaintiff.‟ Available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mWVeO_FInc
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―this seemingly rational technology of control‖ (Aretxaga, 2001, p.1). And in the abstraction of
pain from the body and onto higher claims of discipline and punish, the confession-extraction
room simultaneously becomes the ―phantasmatic realm of military terror‖ (p.10). Thereby,
torture indeed becomes ―a grotesque piece of compensatory drama‖ (Scarry, 1985, p.28).

2. The Evil Threat

To therefore look back at the body is to additionally open up the question of embodiment of
evil. This section addresses such embodiment by examining the discourses and practices that
identify certain people as vessels of evil, too monstrous to trigger any form of sympathy or
intervention in their construction towards the execution chambers. Instead of sympathy, the
expectation is a desire to get rid of them altogether. This has many resonances in Teresa
Caldeira‘s (2000) City of Walls, her ethnography of crimes and criminal constructions in Brazil.
She finds that ―the category of criminal is a radical simplification to evil incarnate, and its
construction fits exactly Mary Douglas's description (1966) of the treatment of matter out of
place‖ (p.77-8). Additionally, there are preconceptions concerning the impossibility of ridding
the person of the evil they contain; ―people also think that prisoners are hard to resocialize both
because it is difficult to eradicate evil once it has infected someone and because in prisons they
are left unoccupied‖ (p.99). This existence of evil is in fact the basis of arguing for the death
penalty in Sao Paolo, where citizens ―say that death is the only effective way of extinguishing
the evil‖ (p.99). Needless to say, this is very much akin to the public perceptions on the penalty
in Egypt as well. Therefore, there is similar general support for this eradication of evil, primarily
based on intricate affects of fear and alterity. Instead of calling upon the enactment of human
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rights, ―the population‖—in both Cairo and Sao Paolo ―has asked for tougher punishments and
more violent police‖ (p.345). Only such police force could rid the population of ――beasts‖
dominated by evil, ―villains,‖ ―bastards,‖‖ who ―are also frequently set in opposition to ―the
people,‖ as evil is opposed to good‖ (p.349). This form of symbolic labor aims at pushing the
criminal as far as possible from oneself, which becomes equated within a spectrum of simplistic
categories as good (p.77).

After sentencing the controversial Muslim figure Wagdi Ghoneim and two more to
death,126 a Cairo criminal court explained its verdict on the basis that Ghoneim ‗must be
uprooted from society in protection of others.‘ It further continued, ‗among the criminals are
those that crime finds root in; their souls are soothed by crime … they deserve execution to
uproot them from members of society in their protection … they are highly dangerous criminals,
to whom rehabilitation is not hoped/possible … [they must be executed] to cleanse society and
protect the country, the people, religions, and property.127‘ As Conley (2013) describes in her
courtroom ethnography ―Living with the Decision that Someone will Die,‖ the stereotypical
villain figure is evoked in courtrooms to ‗make peace‘ with sentencing to death (p.43). In his
―Lethal Theatre: Performance, Punishment, and the Death Penalty,‖ Conquergood (2002)
concurs. Because a judge will never opt to kill a human being, he explains, the prosecutor‘s
fundamental task is ―to turn the accused into an effigy‖ (p.352). Put differently, ―the condemned
must first be stripped of all human complexity and reduced to human waste, the worst of the
worst. These waste parts are then crafted onto prefabricated figures: stereotypes of the violent
126

He is a controversial figure because of his association with Hamas; in 2005 he was banned for 10
years from the US on such backdrop; in 2009 he was placed on the UK list of individuals banned “for
stirring up hatred.” Nevertheless, he has an audience. He even has his own Wikipedia page
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wagdy_Abd_el-Hamied_Mohamed_Ghoneim).
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Available (in Arabic) at https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/2097283
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criminal, cold blooded killer, animal, beast, brute, predator, fiend, monster‖ (p.353). In this
sense, these effigies symbolize more than the accused: they signify, and warn against, all the
anti-social, anti-normative forces/impurities that threaten law and order.

As such, the criminal is not only constructed as an emblematic evil, but as a threat to
society. In Foucault‘s (2016) words, the person is constructed as a ―criminal-social enemy‖—a
prerequisite to the justification of the death penalty on the basis of crimes as attacks on ‗society‘
(p.82-3). In these terms, death sentences are an ―as if‖ claim on part of the legal system: ―we
punish, but this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a cure,‖ Foucault (1977, p.22)
explained. Thus, executions supposedly anchor (make) belief in the criminal justice system,
dramatizing in an especially vivid way that ‗something is being done,‘ that the system is in
control, that order has been restored (Conquergood, 2002, p.352).

Within this ultimate claim to the protection of social order, disorder present in the judicial
system is justifiable. In his ―Lemon and Milk,‖ Foucault (1997) explains how disturbances (of
law) within the judiciary are not the exception but the rule (to borrow Schmitt‘s terminology).
―Our judicial system, Foucault (1997) writes, ―is supposed to have no other role than apply the
law. But if you look at the apparatus in motion … you notice that the violence done to the law
obeys the principle of protection of order … it is for the sake of order that decision is made to
prosecute or not … for the sake of order that the police are given free rein, for the sake of order
that those who aren‘t perfectly ―desirable‖ are expelled‖ (p.437-8). It is also for the sake of this
appeal to (make-believe) order that Sisi‘s speech conveying the hindrance caused by law and his
respective override of the ‗law‘ altogether makes sense.
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Speaking of an ordered system, we bring Pierre Bourdieu (1985) and Mary Douglas
(1966) to the conversation. In harmony with Bourdieu‘s (1985) identification of the ‗alienated,‘
and Douglas‘s (1966) articulation of ‗dirt,‘ Foucault further described a criminal as ―the monster,
outside of society,‖ whereby this monster-framing is a prerequisite to the ritual of discipline
(Shapiro, 2002, p.23-4). ―Criminals began to be represented as threats to society, rather than
threats to the monarch‖ (p.11); a tradition that is also reflected in the change of constitutional
articulation to identify the execution of verdicts in the name of the ‗people‘
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. Again in

correspondence with Douglas (1966) is Foucault‘s analysis of the logic of punishment: it is not
to teach criminals a lesson; rather, the criminal him/herself is used to set an example for whoever
posits a threat to the existing social order (Shapiro, 2002, p.13-5). In other words, and similar to
Douglas‘s discourse on witches (1966, p.103), the criminal functions as a moral example. As
Caldeira (2000) also reminds us, ―the category of the criminal generalizes and simplifies. It poses
clear-cut distinctions between that which belongs and that which does not. The basis for its
distinctions is the opposition of evil and good; clearly, crime and the criminal are on the side of
evil‖ (p.77).

If we entertain the structural interpretation of society as ―a series of forms contrasted with
surrounding non-form‖ (Douglas, 1966, p.99), the monsters reside in (the margins of) the nonstructure in order to maintain the tidy, orderly form. Hence, the death penalty seems like ―a
warning to bring their rebellious feeling into line with their correct situation‖ (p.103). It also
serves to distance inhabitants of the non-form from the structure, while clarifying and
strengthening it against distant others whose mere existence seems threatening (p.108). Under
128
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abstract pretexts of nation-protection and nationality, the ―categorization of ‗others‘ within as
well as without‖ becomes normalized and automated (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p.4-5). As such,
the official propagation of ―images of criminal savages that do not deserve public compassion‖
dehumanizes the condemned so much as to expel them from what Vasiljevic & Viki (2013) call
the moral arena (p.134). As Sharp (2005) describes, ―we also do not want to be like the offender,
who is seen as possessing some degree of ―otherness,‖ to be somehow less than fully human,
particularly with murder. When we see the offender as ―other,‖ it becomes far easier to sentence
that offender to death. Prosecutors and legislators who refer to certain offenders as animals or
subhuman further this sense of separation‖ (p.xi). And since the discourse around them adopts
animal imagery, it thereby reduces and equates human actions with sub-human behavior;
fabricating ―an enemy-Other who is dehumanized, de-individualized, and ultimately expendable‖
(Steuter & Wills, 2009, p.7).

In Agambenian reasoning, the process of enemy construction is as old as World War One,
when ―the enemy has come to be excluded from civil humanity and declared a criminal from the
first; at that point it becomes legitimate to annihilate the enemy through a ―police operation‖ that
is not in any way subject to the rule of law‖ (1991, p.63). In the bypass of this rule of law, ―there
arises … a new conception of security as materialized war, as organized insecurity or
molecularized, distributed, programmed catastrophe‖ (Virilio, 1993, p.219).
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3. Catastrophic Racist Selections: The Capitalist, the Hero, and the Sheikh

To explore the catastrophe, I start with Foucault‘s (2003) notion of racism. A racist state is one
that practices ―the break between what must live and what must die‖ (p.254). If we think of
Douglas‘s (1966) structure in terms of the state ideology, dirty monsters are then those that do
not ascribe to it. More precisely, it is them who are associated with what the state believes is its
counter-ideology: the Muslim Brotherhood. By evoking the war on terror, subscribers to the
latter aren‘t only monsters, but terrorists as well. This classification is killable in and of itself. In
her Classifying to Kill, Brackette Williams (2011) explores the social role of classification within
U.S. death penalty frameworks. Her ethnographic study of forty classification systems shows
how classification was ultimately ―all about picking people to kill them‖ (Durão, Bastos &
Williams, 2012, p.191). Who, then, becomes picked for the kill? Bourdieu‘s (1985) answer is
simple: those classifiable (to kill) are those who lack economic, cultural, social, and symbolic
capital. More importantly, they lack the power to name. It is this power that renders classification
possible, and is at the liberty of (powerful) people with capital. The importance of this capacity
to name is thus affiliated with ―the production of common sense‖ (p.729-40).

Although no such studies were conducted in Egypt, many studies conducted elsewhere
provide a direct correlation between the lack of socio-economic capital and the execution
chambers. On the 15th WDADP, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
published the 2017 report ―Death Penalty and Poverty: A Deadly Mix.129‖ To demonstrate the
striking association between poverty and the death penalty, FIDH found that 95% of death row
129
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inmates in the U.S. in 2007 were from ―disadvantaged economic backgrounds.‖ Similarly, 74%
of inmates in India‘s death row wards are economically vulnerable (p.1). A sub-study in Nigeria
also concluded that ―questions of guilt and innocence are almost irrelevant in Nigeria‘s criminal
justice system. It is all about if you can afford to pay to keep yourself out of the system‖ (p.2).

The Nigerian finding is reminiscent of several stories I heard in Minya. A week after the
Mattai police station was stormed on 14 August 2013, a new head of investigations was
appointed at Minya. On his first day at work, the new head investigator added a staggering 130
defendants to the case—in an ―as if‖ credibility of investigations within a case that he ―as if‖
studied entirely. Defense lawyers later gave insights into his way of work. He compiled a list of
names of anyone associated with the Muslim Brotherhood by asking around the bawābs. Then,
he called for them to visit his office. Those who went alone were told they wouldn‘t be added to
the case as long as they provide a certain sum of money, according to some lawyers in the case.
This implied amount was exaggerated, given the high stakes in this particular case where 528
people were sentenced to death a few years earlier. When lawyers went with others they were
told it was a mistake, that they were not called for—only to find themselves officially
subpoenaed as suspects by the court afterwards. ‗Someone paid 300,000 pounds to get his name
off the list. But the basha kept calling for him every week, demanding more money, until he
spent all his savings in a failed attempt to stay away from the case.‘ In the spirit of the confession
cult, the Minya court mainly based its verdict, and its 12 death sentences, on this basha‘s
‗investigations.‘
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On affording to evade the execution chamber, it is important to consider the case of
Hisham Talaat Mostafa, especially amidst the lack of any socio-economic statistics/indicators.
Mostafa is an Egyptian businessman who owns ―the leading community real estate developer in
Egypt, with a land bank of 50 million square meters,‖ as his company (in his name) describes. 130
In 2008, he was accused and found guilty of inciting the murder of Lebanese singer Suzanne
Tamim, by paying police officer Mohsen El Sokkari two million pounds to kill her in Dubai. The
case gained so much publicity in the Egyptian media, because of the scandalous affiliation of the
perpetrator with the ‗upper class‘—translated into the question that circulated in the media: How
could he? What was more striking is that the execution sentence was not carried out—as
captured by another question: How could they? In fact, instead of a death sentence, ―joint efforts
between the ministries of interior in Egypt and Dubai‖ ensured commuting Mostafa‘s sentence to
15 years in prison.131 That was in 2012. In June 2017, Mostafa received a presidential pardon,
leaving prison on the same day.132 About a month later, he met with Sahar Nasr, current minister
of investment and international cooperation, to discuss future investment plans alongside other
businessmen like Al Waleed Ibn Talal. By the end of this meeting, an 800-million dollar
investment plan was agreed upon.133 The state‘s interference with the case is definitely not a
coincidence; neither is the investment scale. A survey conducted two years before Tamimi‘s
murder asked 300+ participants whether rich, resourceful people can evade the death penalty.
Two hundred and forty four respondents answered ‗yes.‘ Their justifications were: because they
can tamper with evidence (111 votes), because they can afford the best lawyers (78 votes),
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because they can pay the plaintiff (140 votes), and because of all of the above (141 votes)
(AlFiqi, 2006, p.44). A similar pattern is found in Caldeira‘s (2000) ethnography in Sao Paolo,
where ―most people believe that ―justice is a joke‖; they believe that both the police and the
judiciary favor the upper classes and rarely dispense justice to the working classes‖ (p.345). In
other words, both in Cairo and Sao Paolo, ―justice becomes a privilege of the rich‖ (p.345).

In addition to the unjust, unprivileged selection, the racist functions of the state mean that
an association with the Muslim Brotherhood, no matter how remote, renders bodies killable.
Under the classificatory system by which they are expelled as monster-terrorists, any such bodies
must die. And under the claim that ―society must be defended‖ (Foucault, 2003, p.156), the state
appears (as if) laden with positive attributes: savior, protector, and hero. By hero, I invoke a quite
literal understanding of Mbembe‘s (2003) definition of the logic of classical heroism: ―to execute
others while keeping one‘s own death at a distance‖ (p.37).

To understand the racist manifestations of a state-as-hero, we turn to its articulations and
abstractions, in light of Graeber‘s (2015) ―On Batman and the Problem of Constituent Power,‖
where he analyzes the notion of state. In Graeber‘s (2015) analysis, the state is made of three
historically independent elements: ―sovereignty, bureaucracy, and (heroic) politics‖ (p.207). The
discourse on combating terrorism reflects an underlying premise of a ―masculine state in crisis,‖
as used by Conway (2008). In other words, people who ascribe to other/―terrorist‖ ideologies at
the expense of believing in the state‘s profoundly destabilize the state‘s racist binaries upon
which claims of nationalism and unity rest. And so the state‘s multi-propaganda strategies are a)
to employ a discourse of heroism, masculinity, and nationalism when commemorating soldier-
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victims of ―terrorist‖ attacks; b) to immediately respond to such attacks by executing its selfgiven right to kill; and c) to stigmatize political death row defendants as outsider/others who do
not belong in the (unified) pathway to the future–calling instead for their extinction on the
premise of a safer, better, ―future anterior‖ rationale (Povinelli, 2008). To explore the state‘s
―politics of the superhero genre‖ (2015, p.210) as used by Graeber and as resonates with
Conway, two examples follow to demonstrate the heroically racist capacities of producing
killable bodies.A 2015 press release by the Ministry of Interior following the tragic murder of a
police officer in Beni Suef described him as ‗the hero martyr, who was martyred in redemption
of the nation and in protection of its stability,‘ while the ministry asserted ‗its continued efforts
to pursue and arrest the cowardly terrorist elements that attempt to affect stability and obstruct
the march towards progress and development‘ (emphasis added).134 Such language choices are
in line with Conway‘s (2008) analysis of state in crisis, thereby reflecting itself as a masculine,
heterosexual entity, while maintaining the cowardice of terrorist/others—identified as
‗elements‘—who relentlessly aspire to go against the state‘s plan to better the ‗nation.‘

Another example is found in one pre-verdict speech by Judge Hassan Farid. In November
2017, right before sentencing seven people to death in the Isis-Libya case,135 he said, ‗the bats of
darkness and the earth‘s spoilers seek to spread terror all over the world …. through shedding
blood and terrifying the safe, which implies khissa [lowness/villainy] …. And dehumanizes them
in a miserable attempt to derail the march towards development in Egypt‘s war on terrorism …
These terrorist attacks increase the people‘s strength and unity, and Egypt won‘t kneel except for
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Allah, for it has an army of bridges and powerful police, and a robust fortress of her/its sons
living in a unified nation.136‘ Once again, the same mechanisms are deployed to construct the
‗terrorist‘ bodies as dehumanized creatures, outside the social order and unfit to belong to a
‗unified nation.‘

If it is possible to extend the racism lens to a religious framework, the construction of a
religiously subhuman monster is also important. That would mean that this construction is highly
bolstered by an appeal to divine support in the war on terror. In this sense, the monster-others are
doubly expelled (from society and religion) in this world and the next. In the words of former
Mufti Ali Gomaa, speaking to military and police audiences about the Muslim Brotherhood in
early 2014:137

Shoot them in the heart … Blessed are those who kill them, and those who
are killed by them ... We must cleanse our Egypt from these riffraff …
They shame us … They stink. This is how God has created them. They are
hypocrites and seceders … Stand your ground. God is with you, and the
Prophet Muhammad is with you, and the believers are with you … Numerous
visions have attested that the Prophet is with you. May God destroy
them, may God destroy them, may God destroy them. Amen.

4. Abstracting the Kill: On Humans and Tomatoes

As the racist articulations convey, there are no graphic implications concerning the death
penalty. That is, references to the ‗uprooting‘ or ‗getting rid of‘ the monster-others appear swift
and sanitized, without vivid descriptions of the processes or details. In fact, the very term
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denoting the death penalty/capital punishment has no references whatsoever to death or capitis.
More akin to nothingness, void, and ex nihilo, the phrase ʾiʿdām is as make-believe as it gets.
This form of abstraction does not only aid the diffusion of responsibility to kill. In fact, the term
ʾiʿdām is colloquially used to denote the termination of non-human stuff. Whether the ʾiʿdām of
three tons of biscuits in Alexandria,138 two tons of rotten Rumi cheese in Minya,139 an entire
shipment of tomatoes in Safaga,140 or fireworks in Gamaliya,141 the absence of any murder
signifiers in the term ʾiʿdām has sanitized the term so much that thinking of the murder it entails
is slightly as absurd as conceptualizing the murder of tomatoes.
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When do they (not) die? Whose are they?
On After-Kills, Temporalities, and Matters of Belonging

Whenever death can be designated as ―soon‖ the dying has already begun.
— Scarry, The Body in Pain, (1985, p.31)

This chapter presents a genealogy of the most recent acts of state murder from December 2017 to
March 2018, partly to provide straightforward answers to the when of death; that is, to explore
death as an event. Yet it also begins with the premise of death as process, which opens up the
exploration of waiting as a mechanism of state killing. As such, the chapter goes back and forth
in time to understand what it means to wait on death row. Since time does not make sense in this
scenario in terms of clock handles, I engage with Aretxaga‘s (2003) ―arrest of temporality‖ to
speak to the infinitude of momentary state encounters. The prisoners‘ entanglement with, and
unsettlement of, such encounters is then unraveled as an entry point to the making of dawsha, as
used by Salama (2018) to denote a disorder word, ―embedded in wider dynamics of dominance
that has the capacity to produce possibilities of rupture and resistance‖ (p.16). Building upon this
category of dawsha, I extend its use as a distresser of biopower. In other words, disrupting the
wait, by choosing to live or deciding to die, is a form of dawsha-making that strikes at the core of
what the death penalty is: state control over bodies—to let live and make die. Choices to live are
then navigated using Fikry‘s (2018) notion of proliferation, which she used to speak ―about an
extended temporality but also a widening spatiality of taking up more space, stretching one‘s
skin‖ (p.20). In this light, families of death row detainees are introduced, since not only do they
co-wait, but they are intrinsic to the fight over the bodies of the condemned, and they are also
integral to the choices and mechanisms of living/living on. Inspired by Comfort‘s (2008)
exploration of ―the Tube‖ in which families wait for the visits, the equivalents in Egyptian
prisons are then navigated as a liminal space—not just as a site where time is arrested, but also as
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an arena where tensions over body ownership between the state and the families are at their
highest.

A. Death as Event

Unlike parts of the US where the exact time of execution is known (at times five years
ahead142), executions in Egypt are unscheduled. But this does not exactly mean that they happen
randomly. Researchers and civil society members have traced a pattern that reveals a
chronological association between terrorist events and executions, at least in the unprecedented
wave of executions starting in December. On 24 November 2017, an attack on a mosque in Sinai
killed at least 305 people during the Friday prayer. In response to what was described as ―the
bloodiest attack in Egypt‘s modern history,‖ Sisi ―promised the ―utmost force‖ against those
responsible for the attack,‖ whom authorities identified as Islamic State militants.143 Alongside
air strikes and raids, the state conducted ―the largest number of executions in its history,‖ as
described by six local human rights group, by executing 15 people in the ―Officer Tracking Cell‖
case on 26 December 2017.144 The first-instance military court had sentenced the 15 to death in
2015, and the Supreme Military Court of Appeals upheld the sentences on 13 November 2017;
that is, 43 days before the execution. Given the relatively long time gap between the appellate
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court verdict and the actual execution, the 43 days signified a change in the logic of executions.
Also, this was the second time throughout the past three years that people were executed in cases
before military courts.145 The first case was ―Arab Sharkas,‖ in which six people were executed
on 17 May 2015 on charges of ―planning terrorist operations, shooting at security forces,
attacking military facilities and naval ships and being members of Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis.146‖
Interestingly, this execution followed two similar patterns: first, the death sentences were upheld
by the Supreme Military Court in March 2015, about two months before the execution; second,
the execution might have been the state‘s response to what happened earlier. On 16 May 2015,
the day before the Arab Sharkas executions, former president Mohamed Morsi was sentenced to
death among 100 others accused of escaping prison during 2011 and conspiring with Hamas.
People affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood immediately ―warned that the world should brace
itself for a backlash,147‖ and hours later, three judges were shot dead in Sinai.148 As such, the
Arab Sharkas executions on the day after were highly likely to have been, and were actually
analyzed as, an act of state revenge.149

Fast forwarding to December 2017, the execution of 15 people marked the beginning of a
series of execution-Tuesdays, alternating with ‗terrorist‘ events. Two days after the 15 men were
killed, the military commander of B r al ʿAbd in Sinai (where the November mosque shootings
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had previously taken place) was killed in an attack by gunmen. Another attack on the same day
killed an armed forces conscript in central Sinai.150 A day later, on 29 December 2017, an attack
on the Mar Mina Church in Helwan killed eight civilians and a policeman.151 Four days later, on
2 January 2018, the four men sentenced to death in the Kafr El Sheikh stadium bombing case
were executed. This marked the third military case in which civilians were executed. The
following Tuesday, 9 January 2018, marked the execution of three other people, also in a
military case. These three had filed for an appeal to reconsider their case, which was scheduled
for 25 February 2018—54 days after their execution.152 Nobody was executed the Tuesday after
(as far as I am aware), and one person in yet another military case was executed on Tuesday 23
January 2018.153 By Friday 26 January, UN human rights experts issued a statement calling on
the Egyptian government to halt executions, reminding them of a similar earlier statement on the
same matter following the Mansoura 6 death sentences in June 2017.154 With complete disregard
to the statement, another person in yet another military case was executed on Tuesday 30
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January.155 On 7 February, the European Parliament passed a resolution that ―strongly condemns
the use of capital punishment, and calls for a halt to any imminent executions in Egypt, 156‖ only
to be immediately ―strongly rejected‖ by the Egyptian Parliament. 157 However, February passed
without any executions that we know of, perhaps in response to the pressures of the EU
resolution. The execution cycle continued nevertheless, although not on a weekly basis. On
Thursday 8 March, five people who were tried before civil courts were executed. 158 Whereas
March 10th marked the launch of the local campaign ―Stop the Death Penalty,159‖ news reports
maintain that someone was executed three days later, on Tuesday 13 March.160 And on Thursday
22 March, two people were executed in a military case, 51 days after their death sentences were
upheld.161 By that, the number of dead bodies leaving execution chambers around Egypt reached
a staggering 42 human bodies within a 3-month period. And the executions continue in such a
way that makes keeping track an act of impossibility.

The Tuesday execution pattern is peculiarly puzzling. With the exception of two Thursdays,
all the executions happened on Tuesdays. It might be because of some logistics I do not know of
155
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inside prisons, because there is no legal indication as to when people should be executed. In fact,
the only legal stipulation is to when executions should not happen: ‗on official holidays or
holidays related to the convict‘s religion,‘ in accordance with Article 475 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Article 476 of the same code suspends the execution of pregnant women for
two months after delivery; this was later modified to two years post delivery. It also states that ‗if
the person sentenced to death becomes insane, his execution is suspended, and he is placed in the
prisoners‘ section in a mental health facility until he is cleared, based on the orders of the public
prosecution.162‘

B. Death as Process

The legal article above is particularly interesting, because it starts on the basis that the insanity
came after the verdict—after all, a state wouldn‘t punish a mentally challenged convict to death.
Article 62 of the Egyptian Penal Code states that, ‗there is no punishment for he who has lost his
sense or choice in his work at the time of the act: either because of madness or a fault of mind, or
a coma induced by any drugs that he was either forced to take or was unaware of. 163‘ So, why

162

Available (in Arabic) through manshurat.org, at https://manshurat.org/node/14419
Available (in Arabic) through manshurat.org, at https://manshurat.org/node/23881. Interestingly,
however, several law figures including a lawyer at the Court of Cassation publicly stated that „Only 2% of
those diagnosed with mental illness are criminally responsible, while the rest of the psychiatric patients,
even if proven to be ill, are punished like ordinary individuals, in an interview available at
http://www.dotmsr.com/news/196/895225/%D9%87%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%8F%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%89%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%81%D9%82%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86. While interesting for a future project, for
purposes of this work I intend to explore the possibilities of such „insanity‟ that follows the death
sentences of „mentally well‟ people.
163
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would someone scheduled for execution become insane? This is where I introduce waiting as a
form of killing. As Camus (1961) wrote in his Reflections on the Guillotine, ―as a general rule, a
man is undone by waiting for capital punishment well before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on
him, the first being worse than the second‖ (p.156). This gravity of suffering—of dying—
throughout the wait was echoed from an Egyptian death row ward, where the voice of someone
identified as Osama featured in the 2013 documentary la Larme du Bourreau. ‗The hardest
moment in the world is for you to await death,‘ he told the filmmakers (Abdulamir, 2013).

This excruciating capacity of waiting is not at all a novel discovery, neither is it unique to
the study of death row wait-ers. Although ultimately nothing is comparable to death row, waiting
has been central to sociological and even scientific-appealing research within the field of
migration and refugee studies. In their ―A Life in Waiting,‖ for example, Bjertrup et al (2018)
report that ―between 73% and 100% of the refugees [in Greece] suffered from anxiety disorder‖
after the Macedonia border—their gateway to central Europe—was closed in 2016. And hence
their ―psychological distress and social suffering‖ caused by the wait in camps characterized by
―the passivity of life … the disruption of key social networks and absence of interactions with
the surrounding … society‖ (p.53).

The circumstances of this life in wait strike a chord with the conditions of life on death
row, among the primary consequences of which are the prevention of outside interactions and the
rupture of familial relationships. As for the passivity of life, suffice it to present the following
SOS letter from the Damanhour prison death row ward.
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The scan is a bit unclear because the original letter was written on tissue paper. In this
SOS, Mohamed Khaled, Mohamed Youssef, and Gameel Khamis, all sentenced to death in the
Abu El Matameer police station shooting case, describe the inhumane conditions they
permanently reside in. It describes the texture of the wait. ‗To all human rights organizations and
all free people everywhere,‘ they write, ‗we hold you responsible in front of God, the nation, and
history for what is happening to us.‘ They list ‗poor treatment, unfit for humans,‘ along with ‗the
diseases we suffer from, like stomach diseases, hemorrhoids, and eye, respiratory system, and
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skin diseases. We live in a place akin to a cemetery; three people live in this 1.5m by 2.5m room
without a bathroom except for a urination bucket, and no ventilation or lighting even during the
day. It has all kinds of crawling and flying disease-carrying insects. We live in this place for 23
hours and 45 minutes each day, and leave for only 15 minutes to wash the bucket and get the
taʿīn [prison food] that is neither enough nor good enough for an animal let alone a human.‘
Before their signatures, they address the letter once again ‗to all animal—excuse us—human
rights organizations.‘ And so while this is in principle comparable to the refugee camps, the
profundity of agony in the seemingly infinite wait is arguably much more severe: in the ward,
one cannot count the days based on the alterations of light and dark, because there isn‘t any.

The torturous capacity/function of waiting bring us to the pains thereof, throughout an
infinite stretch of time. Hence, I would like to explore the ‗wait‘ on the kinship grid of death and
pain, a form of torture that echoes what Scarry (1985) calls ―a mock execution‖ (p.31). Through
the wait, and especially in the circumstances described above, waiting becomes a torturous
process ―which not only converts but announces the conversion of every conceivable aspect of
the event and the environment into an agent of pain‖ (p.27-8). In Scarry‘s words:

Of course, no particular form of torture is required to make visible the
kinship between pain and death, both of which are radical and absolute,
found only at the boundaries they themselves create … pain is the
equivalent in felt-experience of what is unfeelable in death. Each only
happens because of the body. In each, the contents of con-sciousness are
destroyed. The two are the most intense forms of negation, the purest
expressions of the anti-human, of annihilation, of total aversiveness,
though one is an absence and the other a felt presence, one occurring in
the cessation of sentience, the other expressing itself in grotesque
overload. Re-gardless, then, of the context in which it occurs, physical
pain always mimes death and the infliction of physical pain is always a
mock execution (p.31).
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And so every moment spent in the cell is an eternity of torture; an eternity comprised ―of
the uncountable number of seconds that make up the period of torture‖ (p.34). Kathleen Stewart
(2007) once wrote, ―for some, the everyday is a process of going on until something happens,
and then back to the going on‖ (p.15). I would like to explore this something that happens before
and after people go back to the eternity of waiting in terms of what Aretxaga (2003) calls an
―arrest of temporality‖ (p.399). That is, the ―repetition of illegibility and uncertainty about the
outcome of the encounter‖ with the state, which renders the momentary experience of the
encounter almost infinite. To capture this temporal arrest, we turn to the courtrooms on verdict
days, when prisoners wait for several hours before the judges appear and the temporal arrest is
aggravated, just as they are about to be (possibly) sentenced to death. This scene, the final
criminal court hearing, also allows for the exploration of an oscillation between the temporalities
of people on both ends of this temporal arrest: the prisoners, who continue to wait, and the
judges, representing/embodying the state which decides, at its own convenience, how long to
keep them waiting. This is in ways similar to Hammami‘s (2001) temporal analysis of
checkpoints in Palestine. In her ―Waiting for Godot at Qalandya,‖ Hammami shows how
queuing is ―constituted by differential control over time itself,‖ since ―for those operating the
checkpoints … time is not coeval‖ (p.14). I do not wish to draw an analogy between Israeli
soldiers and Egyptian judges beyond the similarity of this temporal alterity as caused by the oneway control over time as such. Hence, the time of those waiting—in the courtroom and
checkpoint—is both infinite and cheap, whereas the judges‘ time is finite and valuable. The
latter‘s time ―will be added up and translated into the accomplishment of national duty‖ (p.14).
As such, for bodies that don‘t matter, time certainly doesn‘t; on the other hand, by the very acts
of judges ―locating themselves in their necessary and useful ―jobs,‖ they simultaneously locate
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themselves outside‖ of the prisoners‘ time (p.15). Perhaps this is why delays in convening court
sessions have become normalized under the justifications such as ‗the judges are having
breakfast,‘ as a defense lawyer told me on the day of the Mattai case verdict announcement,
when the prisoners awaited the judges to appear for over four hours. From the judges‘ temporal
stance, however, a four-hour breakfast is not a transgression on the prisoners‘ time, simply
because of the inferiority of their time-world.

On this day in particular, 7 August 2017, the day of the Mattai case verdict
announcement, there were some temporal interplays to disrupt the arrest, and ultimately refuse to
wait for the judges and their supposedly invaluable time. The four-hour wait in the unbearable
Minya August heat, along with the infinite arrest of temporality, had caused the bodily collapse
of a prisoner inside the ‗cage,‘ where over 140 people were waiting. He fainted, with no room to
actually fall, so the unconscious standing man was easily moved over to the cage gate. He was
only noticed when some of the others began to shout in order to alert/instruct the guards to get
him out. He was stunningly pale, obviously dehydrated, and suddenly irrelevant, because the
judges marched in the courtroom. Everyone was quiet, partly to hear the judge speaking, and
partly because there was no microphone to amplify what the judge was saying. The judge rushed
through some legal article numbers, and then read 12 full names before announcing their
sentence two minutes later, bil ʾiʿdām shanqan ḥatta al mawt [execution by hanging until they
die]. His unsuccessful attempt to proceed with the verdict was interrupted by shouts that cut
through the silent metal wires of the cage. Immediately, ḥasbuna allahu wa niʿmal wakīl [Allah
suffices us, for He is the best disposer of affairs]164 riveted towards the judges. It kept repeating
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As per the Arabic-English translation of Al maʿāni Dictionary. Available at
https://www.almaany.com/en/dict/ar-en/%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7/
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for one minute and 20 seconds, before people started singing (an unidentifiable Islamic
song/chant). This lasted for yet another minute, and was replaced by yasqot kol qaḍāʾalʿaskar,
yasqot kol kelāb alʿaskar [down with all the military judges, down with all the military dogs]
before chanting yasqot yasqot ḥokm alʿaskar [down with the military regime] for another minute
and a half. The voice of a man, whom I was later told was sentenced to death along with his two
brothers, pierced through the chants, ḥakamt ʿalena bil ʾiʿdām ya ẓālem [you sentenced us to
death you unjust]. He kept repeating it until his voice faded, and this is when—at 7 minutes into
the start of the session—the judge continued with the names.

These explosions of chants disrupt the judges‘ temporal privilege. Suddenly, it is the
judges who have to wait. The same thing happened a few minutes after the judge continued
reading the verdict. When he got to the part where 119 others were to be ‗punished by life in
prison,‘ the cries of a man punctured the temporal arrest and avalanched into further chants. For
an entire minute, ya ẓālem [you unjust] and yasqot yasqot ḥokm alʿaskar [down with the military
regime] made the judge quiet. When the voices faded down, a lawyer took the opportunity to
shout khalūna nesmaʿ[let us hear], before the judge continued with the verdict and hurried out of
the room about five minutes later.

These kinds of temporal disruptions could be interestingly interpreted in terms of making
dawsha. I use dawsha as used by Salama (2018), as a disorder word, a category ―embedded in
wider dynamics of dominance that has the capacity to produce possibilities of rupture and
resistance‖ (p.16). The ruptures in this sense are temporal as illustrated by the scene above,
where dawsha-making is very much literal (i.e. as the production of sounds out of place) but also
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an active, powerful, political disturbance of the wait. By piercing through the courtroom and
shouting at the judge—something completely out of place given the (as if) quiet expectations of
prisoners during a verdict reading and the (as if) prestigious position of the judge—the prisoners
vocate their existence beyond/outside their confinement to the cage, and to the wait. Hence,
dawsha-making becomes a spatio-temporal refusal of being located in an inferior, irrelevant
temporality.

C. Bodies in (Self) Control: Owning the Out

This symbolic disruption of order and orderly expectations could also be expanded upon to
analyze the exercise of autonomy over the body. Making dawsha, in this sense, amounts to
disrupting the state-label of the bodies that don‘t matter. Instead, dawsha-making by choosing to
live or deciding to die does not only interrupt the state‘s control over certain bodies, but it also
defies the purpose of the death penalty altogether, the wait included.

In 2005, the phrase ―death row syndrome‖ was added to US terminology. While attempts
to medicalize it as an actual syndrome are still underway, it has been acknowledged in legal
terms. The syndrome amounts to the torturous capacities of waiting, and its direct effects on
body and soul. In recognition of this atrociousness, prisoners who are sentenced to death by
criminal courts can decide not to wait throughout another round of appeals. Instead, and rather
than commit suicide, they can waive their rights to appeal and ―essentially volunteer‖ for a faster
execution (Blume, 2005; Smith, 2007, p.238).
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In 2011, in this part of the globe, relatives Mohamed Misbah and Mohamed Gamal went
on a fishing trip. Upon their return to their house in Gamasa, they found a woman and a man
who had apparently been using it since they left. They kicked them out immediately, only to
wake up the following morning to find themselves arrested on charges of rape and theft.
Apparently, the man who had been kicked out was well-connected, and so he had driven to the
police station the day before and filed a report accusing three men of raping the woman and
stealing the car (that he drove to the station). Misbah and Gamal were tortured beyond
imagination; three years later, in a prison visit by members of the No to Military Trial for
Civilians group, the scars were still visible on Gamal‘s body. Since the charges accused three
men of the acts, part of their torture was for them to identify this third perpetrator. Given the
absurdity of the entire situation, and the extent of the torture inflicted upon them, they gave the
name of a man whom they were not on good terms with. And so Mohamed El Baz was added to
the case. He was not tortured that much, as the story goes, since the officers knew he had not
really done anything. This did not stop the military judges, however, from sentencing all three
men to death on 10 April 2011, after one trial session convened in the absence of defense
lawyers, and without any forensic examination of the alleged rape victim.

The three men waited for six years until the verdict was upheld on 11 April 2017. The
families had translated the continued postponement of the Supreme Military Court‘s verdict as
potentially good news; it gave them hope that these judges were at least doubtful; otherwise, why
would it take them so long to confirm the death sentences? Despite/because of this hope, the wait
was amplified. In the refusal to wait, and in assertion of his control over his own body and fate,
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Misbah decided to kill himself a few years after the initial verdict.165 (Un)fortunately, he failed to
do so. One can only imagine the subsequent torture that was inflicted upon him following such
dawsha, for his attempt to take away the state‘s say in his body. After all, his suicide attempt
came after he was raped in the torture episodes, which makes his decision to die all the more
powerful—as claiming his body as his, thereby jeopardizing the implications of state-owned
killable bodies that don‘t matter, and completely doing away with the state-enforced cycle of
waiting.166

Building upon even more hope, the defense lawyers filed for an appeal of reconsideration
after the verdict was upheld. The same Supreme Military Court surprisingly scheduled a petition
hearing on 25 February 2018,167 which gave the men and their families a date to look forward to;
that is, they would definitely live until February 25th. They had something to count to. This is
why they almost went mad on 9 January 2018, when the Kafr El Bateekh mayor sent someone to
tell Misbah‘s mother that her son and the others had been executed. His father had already died
throughout the wait, and so it was the cancer-patient-mother—whom the state kept juggling until
midnight—who had to receive the bodies. She went to police stations, back to the mayor, and to
the W di al Natrūn prison to look for the bodies. Although it made sense that they at least be at
the prison because it has an execution chamber, nobody knew where the bodies were. Around
noon on January 9th, the mother was told they were at the Salam hospital in Cairo, which made
no sense at all since the Salam Hospitals in Cairo are all private entities. And so she spent the
165

With the narrator of this story at tears at this point, I was unable to push this line further, so I do not
know how he did it.
166
It is very, very uncomfortable to try and theorize a suicide attempt on death row. It is pretentious to
even speak about it, wrapping it in frameworks and using it to make a point. Just like so many other
segments, this story captures the absurdity of academic requirements and the as if of writing.
167
Surprisingly because the appeals are almost always rejected at first glance. This was the only case
that we (at EIPR) know of whose petition was actually scheduled to look into.
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day looking for the bodies, until she was told to find them at the El Sadat City Hospital, on the
road between Cairo and Alexandria.

This body search may seem irrelevant to the point, but it is important to ponder upon to
understand why bodies are so important to the family members. Part of it is the materiality of the
body, of course, but it is also so much more than that: a final worldly encounter, a proper
embrace, a decent burial. Another integral aspect is that the body-as-corpse gives the families
something(s) to keep them going. In the Arab Sharkas post-mortem goodbyes, the families
couldn‘t help not taking pictures of the executed men‘s faces. Whereas the traumatic picture
showed me bloody noses, dropped jaws, and bulging eyes, they rejoiced in what it showed them:
smiles and wishūsh minawara [illuminated/enlightened faces]. ‗Who smiles when they die?‘ one
of Abdelrahman‘s (the youngest person executed) sisters asked me, implying martyrdom; ‗I can
only wonder what he saw [about his afterlife-position] to bring about such a smile!‘

To understand the significance of this act of seeing smiles is to explore the possibilities of
life before, during, and after executions. In this realm, it would mean that people do not only die
when executed, and that the physicality of their corpse-deaths does not mean they are not very
much alive. Before we get to that, the after-death and the families, let‘s start by the minute
maneuvers around the wait which entail assertions of being alive.

D. To Unwait, to Pro-life-rate
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A similar claim to the body as personal belonging, yet on the opposite side of the spectrum, is the
decision to live. This is multifaceted; it includes living as non-waiting, meaning escaping the
wait by syncing into distracting temporalities. It also includes the possibilities of living on
beyond the execution chamber, through the proliferations of life and the extensions of the
persons beyond their bodies. These choices provide an entry point into the modus operandi of
‗Islamists‘ in political cases, to whom suicide is kufr [blasphemy]. To these men and their
families, suicide is out of question. As this section shows, however, this does not mean that they
do not exercise autonomy over their own bodies.

The distracting temporalities are apparent on a daily basis, partly in response to the stateset daily schedule on death row. As the SOS letter clarified, detainees are stuck in the cells for
23.45 hours a day. That means they get a 15-minute opportunity to use the bathroom, around
noon. In order to regulate the bathroom use, and to wait for something instead of just wait, they
fast. This way, they decrease the food intake, thereby not having to excrete in the buckets as
much as possible, and spend the day waiting for the maghrib prayer iftār. The day itself is also
counted in terms of prayer cycles; that is, prayer times set the rhythm for having to spend a day
on death row in ways that are independent of the state.

In another form of wait-diversion, the distraction is not necessarily religious. The
following story, from the 1970s, is about a family consisting of a husband, who worked in Saudi
Arabia, and the wife and two children, teenage boy and girl, who stayed at home in Cairo. The
money that the husband sent home enabled the wife to buy a taxi and hire a driver in order to
generate more money. Except the wife fell for the taxi driver. When the girl found out, the driver
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started a relationship with her, too, to keep her quiet and more importantly jealous of her
mother‘s relationship with him. When the son found out, though, it was a problem. In fear that he
would tell the overseas-husband, the driver convinced the mother to get rid of the son. They
drove to Muqattam, where he pushed him off the cliff; afterwards, they chopped his head and
limbs off (for his body was too heavy to carry) and distributed his body parts in different sites.
The mother then reported her son‘s disappearance and hung his printed picture around the
district, as if searching for him. A few months later, her husband returned home, in the aftermath
of the son‘s disappearance. The driver, who casually opened the house door to find the husband
inside, did not know about his return until then. For the husband, the fact that the driver had the
key to the house was suspicious. Meanwhile, the girl got an almost exclusive relationship with
the driver, since her mother was now too busy with the husband. The mother‘s jealousy, the
driver‘s manipulation, and everything in between dropped some sleeping pills in the husband‘s
food, in preparation for his murder. Take two of the son‘s disappearance all over again. This
time, however, they forgot his head in the trunk of the taxi. It was discovered by the neighbors,
who complained of a rotten smell in the car for days to follow.

The three were arrested for the murder of both husband and son, and the daughter was the
first to speak. Given that she was still a minor then, she did not receive a death sentence; her
mother and the driver-lover however were both sentenced to death. Aisha, who narrated this
story, was intrigued by the mother‘s behavior on death row. ‗Before they are executed, people
usually repent and pray and get closer to God, whom they will meet at any moment now,‘ she
expressed. With this woman, however, things were different. ‗She didn‘t care about anything;
she lived normally and put on makeup and nail polish,‘ Aisha remembered, ‗she would make
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hair-dos and borrow eyeliners and lipsticks from the saggānāt [female officers].‘ I was a bit
surprised by the involvement of these saggānāt, until Aisha continued, ‗they don‘t want them
[detainees] to get depressed out of fear of suicide. They really want to spend their shifts without
any problems (or dawsha).‘

Beyond these wait-sidetracking mechanisms, choices to live also include the simple,
literal refusal of dying. The following story is also from the 1970s, when a woman found out her
husband had taken a second wife in secret. Long story short, she castrated their son in front of
him in revenge. The boy died, and the husband testified as witness to the killing, in hope of
sentencing her to death. To his dismay, the wife was given an insight on how to escape the
sentence. To live, the woman pretended to be crazy; she would even make the prison officers tea
in cooking pots so that her act is not only on during court. As such, she was not sentenced to
death, but to 15 years of life. With no more reason to pretend, the woman started making tricot
clothes and blankets and selling them in prison. Why not make a living? She had already
bypassed the death penalty.

Since not everyone is that fortunate, it is also integral to explore the possibilities of life
after the death sentence, and even after the execution. So the following segments pertaining to
the choices of living emanate from Fikry‘s (2018) concept of proliferation. In her Rooftop
Recipes for Relating, she used the term to denote intimacies along multispecies lines in exploring
its potentialities on rooftops (p.20). For the purposes of this work, I use the concept (in this very
different context) in a similar vein, in that proliferation is ―about an extended temporality but
also a widening spatiality of taking up more space, stretching one‘s skin‖ (p.20). Stretching skin
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in this case would mean living beyond the body, by extension within a wider system of
relationships of life. A prominent example is in the last meal choice of Victor Feguer, a US death
row detainee who was accused of kidnap and murder. In 1963, before he was hanged, Victor‘s
last meal request was ―a single olive with the pit in it,168‖ in hope that an olive tree would grow
from the pit, out of his body.169

A conceptually similar pattern that is in almost all ‗political‘ death row cases is letterwriting. I here deploy the act of writing letters as a choice to live, and live on, in correlation with
proliferative attempts and in connection to Terry Eagleton. ―The letter is part of the body which
is detached,‖ he wrote, ―torn from the very depths of the subject‖ (Boon, 2015, p.51). In this
sense, letters ―can be understood as body parts, sites of simultaneous wounding and revelation‖
(Boon, 2015, p.51). They can also be understood, temporally, as sites of presences and absences;
as traces of remembrance and hope. A similar enfleshment of absence, or stretch of skin, is also
in the making of gifts. Colored foam plates with cartoon figures, tissue-paper flower bouquets,
and carved soap bars are among the numerous gifts that Lotfy made at different stages of his
imprisonment. Each of the closet-full gifts signified something: a birthday, an anniversary, a
presence, a refusal to wait/die.
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Part of the Last Meals Project, which aims to visualize the meal requests; available at
http://lastmealsproject.com/. Quote directly from interview with founder, published on 18 February 2014,
available at https://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/12-pictures-of-death-row-prisoners-last-meals
169
In my naive expectations, I had initially wanted to mirror this Last Meals Project in Egypt, only to find
out at the onset of this research that there is no such thing as last meal requests here.
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These are some examples of the gifts that were made. The process of gift-making as the
extension of skin is also found in Tamara Kohn‘s (2009) ―Waiting on Death Row.‖ In this essay,
she explored waiting towards death not as a passivity, but ―one of active making of selves‖
(p.218). In her ethnography of/with two death row inmates in California, she discusses the
possibilities of ―being-in-waiting‖ that these two men enacted through their ―(letters, poems, and
essays) as well as crafted skills (drawings, paintings, hand-crafted toys)‖ (p.219). Although the
making of gifts and its proliferative capacities are similar, contextual specificities differ. It is not
so much that there is a measurable change of selves reflected in the gifts, as Kohn argues, but a
grounded affirmation of injustice, and, along with it, the unwavering certainty of an upcoming
divine alleviation of it. That comes with a similarly certain claim that the body belongs to God.
To look back at Lotfy‘s last gift, the foam plate carries a poem that reads, ‗I swear to God
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Almighty all adversities will end, and the captive will be released; this is a book in the sky that
says, my God has a way out of infliction.‘

This assertion that ‗the body belongs to God170‘was also made in the aftermath of the
execution of Lotfy and his co-inmates. When they were buried, each of their tombstones testified
to their status as shahīd [martyr]. For the families, this was unquestionably integral: they were
unjustly murdered; they are our martyrs. This became problematic when unidentified people
wiped the label shahīd off the tombstones. To the families, this was almost an act of kufr and not
just an unforgivable transgression; they immediately wrote it back. This symbolic struggle is
important on several fronts. First, it speaks to the necessity of engraving, of assigning, the status
of martyrdom, and of their existence as such even after their killings. Hence, it presents the
tombstone as a site of proliferation and also as some kind of promise of divine revenge.
Simultaneously, however, it also problematizes the sole belonging of the bodies to God; instead,
the families appear as members of this struggle over the body; yes, God will avenge them, but
they are still ‗our‘ martyrs, and we have to make sure the world sees them this way, even if it
means rewriting shahīd for years to come.

Speaking of the years to come, here is one final method of proliferating throughout
generations. Before he was arrested, Lotfy used to jokingly call his pregnant brother‘s wife ya
om el zeft [you mother of a scroundel]. A few months after his arrest, when she found out it was
a baby boy, he wanted her to name him after him. Interestingly, their mother (the baby‘s
grandmother) disapproved. She did not give a reason when I asked her, and so Lotfy‘s sister
answered that ‗she doesn‘t want him [the baby boy] to be harassed by people who don‘t know
170

Inspired by Hamdy‟s (2012 Our bodies belong to God
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us.‘ Yet Lotfy‘s insistence on this form of proliferation didn‘t end there. In fact, he then told
them to name the boy Bar ʾ, in hope of barāʾa [innocence]. And so, in some weird ways, Lotfy
lives on/in/through 3-year old Bar ʾ, who—at 3-years old—can recognize Sisi‘s face on
television and point to him sayingʿammu [uncle], in realization that he is responsible for taking
away the uncle he never met.

E. On Families, Fleas, and Hope-waits

Susan Sharp (2005) righteously began her book Hidden Victims saying, ―those facing a death
sentence do not exist in a vacuum. They are someone‘s brother or sister, mother or father,
daughter or son, relative or friend‖ (p.xi). Hence, to speak about the wait on death row is also to
speak about the families‘ wait; for they wait too, wait more, and wait more badly. Remember
Mohamed Misbah, the detainee who chose to die? Shortly after he was sentenced to death in
2011, his mother said, ‗if my son dies every minute a day, I die a hundred thousand times a
minute.‘171

Temporally speaking, the families seem stuck in the wait, between remembrance and
hope. This juxtaposition, between hopeful waiting and remembrance, offers a simultaneity that
encapsulates and illuminates an important aspect of the complex temporal stuckedness of the
families. They become the innocent that are being punished through this stuckedness (Sharp,
2005, p.viii). Except the punishment never stops, even and especially following executions. In
some ways, they then stop to hope, but only for something tangible: the next hug, the next letter,
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In a video of her speaking about the case, available at

https://www.facebook.com/AJA.Egypt/videos/572729653110070/
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the next visit. Yet they continue to hope for something that is located in another temporal world:
the afterlife. This spatio-temporal setting is where/when they get to avenge the wrongful murders
of their condemned loved ones, where/when they get to reunite forever, and where/when they
cease to remember all the pain they went through.

Pain, in this sense, is another affective stretch of skin. The afterlife is then the
where/when there is no more pain. To bring Scarry (1985) to the discussion, this holding on the
afterlife is perhaps an effect of the collapse of this world of pain that the families and their to-beexecuted loved ones share. ―It is the intense pain that destroys a person's self and world,‖ Scarry
writes, ―a destruction experienced spatially as either the con-traction of the universe down to the
immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the entire universe‖ (p.35). Since
pain—inflicted through torture, through waits, through injustices—nullifies ―the claims of the
world‖ (p.33), its existence is potentially made sense of only through the utopian existence in
another world where pain is nullified.

With this in mind, what follows is an exploration of the pains of waiting, remembrance,
and hope, in an attempt to endeavor through the families‘ complex temporalities and to speak to
the fact that the bodies belong to them, too. After all, as Mona Seif once said about imprisoned
loved ones,172 ‗their absence is not calculated in days; their absence is calculated in moments. If
a certain moment passes, it cannot return or be made up for in years of presence and hugs. Don‘t
count their absence in days; count it in moments. And there are moments that seem to consume
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Human rights activist and co-founder of No to Military Trials for Civilians group.
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an entire lifetime.173 Indeed, the parents of many detainees die throughout the wait, leaving other
family members to have to deal with their deaths, atop of everything else. When Mohamed
Youssef‘s father died, his wife Lobna had to handle all the preparations for his death. She was
also stuck in the position of not knowing whether or not to tell him the news: what would make
him suffer more, knowing he didn‘t get the chance to bury his father, or continuing to wait for
him to come visit?

I don‘t know what Lobna eventually decided. What I do know is what she, like so many
others, does out of hope. Along with their continued, persistent follow up of the cases with
lawyers, they also appeal to the state. That is, they make the trip to Cairo just to file and submit
requests at the National Council for Human Rights and the Parliamentary Human Rights
Committee in case—in hope—that their imprisoned husbands are liable for presidential pardon.
Part of them must be aware that this hope is unrealistic, because the Presidential Pardon
Committee ‗is only concerned with protest and freedom of expression cases. Everyone who
serves time on charges of joining a terrorist group, or any terrorism-related case, is excluded.‘174
Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee itself pretends as if prisons are ideal living places. At
the same time when families complained of the utter maltreatment in the Borg El Arab and
Damanhour prisons, the committee conducted a tour orchestrated by the Minister of Interior. In
173

In an article by Samia Jahin, available at
https://www.madamasr.com/ar/2017/09/29/opinion/u/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D
8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%B6%D8%AD%D9%83-%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%9F/
174
The list of 5 steps towards a presidential pardon is available (in Arabic) at
https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/9/23/%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%89-5%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89/3425022
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this make-believe visit, prisoners praised the immediate medical treatment and supposedly high
wages that they receive. The visitors also ‗coincidentally‘ came across a football match at the
time of the visit. The make-believe was so ironic that one of the food trays on display actually
read ‗welcome‘ (photo below).175 Faced with this tragic farce, Ramy—EIPR lawyer—could only
joke, ‗this is to welcome the new prisoners, of course!‘

The hopeful, yet unrealistic endeavors by the families is reminiscent of Kafka‘s (2010)
―Vor Dem Gesetz,‖ or, as we know it, ―Before the Law.‖ In this parable, a man of humble
origins comes to seek the Law. He is stopped at the gate by the gatekeeper, who cannot let him in
175

Visit photos available at
https://www.tahrirnews.com/posts/845189/%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86+%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AC+%
D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8+%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9+%D8%AD%D9%8
2%D9%88%D9%82+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86+%D8%A8%D8
%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D
8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%
D8%A9+%D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1+%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%84
%D8%A7%D8%A1+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%86
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‗now.‘ In similar hope and waiting, the man waits for years, basically until his death, trying all
possible tactics to gain entry, and failing every time. As the man dies, he wonders why nobody
else came to seek the law throughout his lifetime, and, with(out) a sense of closure, the keeper
closes the gate, which was specifically made for the man who was never to access it. In
Glendinning‘s (2016, p.201) translation:

The man, who has equipped himself with many things for his journey,
spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the gatekeeper.
The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, ‘I am taking this only
so that you do not think you have failed to do anything.’ During the
many years the man observes the gatekeeper almost continuously. He
forgets the other gatekeepers, and this first one seems to him the only
obstacle for entry into the law. He curses the unlucky circumstance, in
the first years thoughtlessly and out loud; later, as he grows old, he
only mumbles to himself. He becomes childish and, since in the long
years studying the gatekeeper he has also come to know the fleas in his
fur collar, he even asks the fleas to help him persuade the gatekeeper
(emphasis added).

In this light, the families too speak with the fleas on the state‘s collar. They ultimately
know that the state will never pardon the people it has (unjustly) condemned in the first place,
yet they play along some make-believe lines out of despair and hope. And the employee who
receives the requests doesn‘t care what happens after he files them; he takes them because he is
required to do so, and he is perhaps required to do so such that they do not think they have failed
to do anything. Eventually, however, just like the man waiting for a door that never opens,
everything dies, the pardon requests included.

We now move, with the families, to another spatio-temporal site where/when the wait
and the ownership of the bodies are intertwined: the visit. This was the central theme of all the
conversations with family members, resurfacing again and again. Although there is no legal
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stipulation to specify death row ward visits, they don‘t get a weekly visit like all other detainees.
Instead, it has become a common practice to schedule visits once a month for detainees on death
row. This means that family labor is centered around this monthly visit: in fact, the visit sets the
rhythm of the temporal existence of these families throughout the hope-wait. First, they
communicate with family members of the other detainees (on the case) to make a schedule
whereby each family visits on an alternating basis. The point is to provide the prisoned family
members with fresh food on a rotating basis, since the death row cells do not have refrigerators
or cabinets (or toilets or running water). So if the families visit all at once, the detainees will only
have food once throughout the month.176 In this configuration, however, they get fresh food at
least once a week. But this means that extra food needs to be bought and prepared, since each
family cooks for all the people on the case, if not on similar cases in other cells. Given their
relatively low income status, cooking for a bunch of people once a month is relatively costly,
especially because the families maneuver around the fact that the prison staff takes some of the
food before sending the rest to the ward by cooking even more food. As the Arab Sharkas
detainees‘ families remembered, a ziyāra [literal for visit] costed around 5,000 EGP.

The monetary cost is not the only thing the families spend on the ziyāra. In fact, it
requires preparatory emotional, physical, and temporal labor, with its preparations starting at
least two days in advance. Once the food is cooked, two days before the visit, it is packed in
foam plates or plastic bags (in case the guards refuse any other containers, which happens quite
often. Even foam plates and plastic bags are sometimes refused at the gate). Then, it spends an
entire day in freezers before it is taken out and forced to endure the trip to the prison, along with
176

The alternative is the taʿīn [prison food], which has acquired a decade-long reputation as utterly
inedible. In the words of Gameel Khamis and his co-inmates in their SOS letter, „it is neither enough nor
good enough for an animal, let alone a human.‟
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its cooks. The journey to the prison is indeed a voyage, with family members moving a bit before
dawn so that they reach the facility by sunrise. Then they wait. They sometimes actually wait
until all the other visits to all the other wards end. In the Arab Sharkas family accounts, this
meant waiting until after the ʿisha prayer; in other cases, like in the Abu El Matameer
experience, they wait for about two hours before being allowed in—that is, if they are allowed to
enter. As if they aren‘t tormented enough, the general rule is that family visits are never
guaranteed. Even after ʿisha, they may be told to turn back at any point, no matter how long
they—and the food—wait.

To contemplate on this experience of the ziyāra, I would like to build upon Megan
Comfort‘s (2009) exploration of ―the Tube‖ in a US-prison ethnography. In her Doing Time
Together, Comfort tells the story of women whose lovers are imprisoned in San Quentin,
exploring how their sense of home and intimacy is shaped, and disfigured, by the penitentiary.
―The Tube,‖ in Comfort‘s description, is the tunnel-like waiting area leading to the visitation
room. This is where visitors are searched—by placing their belongings on an x-ray machine—
and told whether or not they may enter. This precariousness, along with the unknown duration of
the wait, the crowdedness, and the absence of seating areas make the tube a spatio-temporal site
in which hope is enmeshed with angst, excitement with exhaustion, and waiting with the arrest of
temporality. As such, the tube is ―a liminal space, the boundary between ―outside‖ and ―inside,‖
where visitors convert from legally free people into imprisoned bodies for the duration of their
stay in the facility‖ (p.27).
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Because of the contextual differences (yes I maintain that Egyptian prison facilities are
much less humane than San Quentin‘s), I only use Comfort‘s analysis of the tube as an entry
point to the experiences of family members of death row detainees in Egypt. What I actually
propose is the (Egyptian) tube not just as a site of precarity, but as an arena in which the struggle
over the body is highly tense. Aside from the court, this is the only platform of direct contact
between the state, in its prison staff costume, and the families. As such, mechanisms of discipline
and punish extend to the families—whose bodies become temporarily imprisoned—and the
things they bring along. In other words, everything that passes through the tube, mind, body, and
soul, is a target of humiliation, especially if connected to prisoners in ‗political‘ cases. The ziyāra
feast that the families prepare is basically ruined: if it does not go stale and actually makes it
through the tube, the state-staff tear it apart, ‗searching‘ through it with their hands. Mothers in
the Kafr El Sheikh case waited so long once that when the food was finally delivered, they told
their sons not to eat it because it had definitely become stale. At times, perhaps that coincide
with the presence of the basha [the chief officer], certain food containers are not allowed in. ‗We
used to bring lots of food in aluminum plates,‘ Safiya, the sister of one of the six men who were
executed in the Arab Sharkas case, said, ‗but near the end they only allowed less than a handful
of rice to pass through, only if it is in a plastic bag.‘ This food-frisk site has more to it than the
type of randomly-approved containers. For starters, prison staff decide to take the food they like
best, and/may allow the rest to enter. Family members in the Kafr El Sheikh case used this in
attempt to make good relationships with the prison staff, in hope that their imprisoned loved ones
won‘t be executed (at least in the near future). In their reasoning, if the prison staff gain a
maslaḥa [benefit] out of the incarceration of these people in particular, they wouldn‘t want their
stay to be terminated. Little did they know. At other instances, the food precarity is entangled
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within wider structures of humiliation. When Mervat brought five apples in a visit to the Abu El
Matameer detainees, the officer refused their entry. Angry, she asked him why he did that, to
hear him say ‗so that his [her husband‘s] body is light when he dangles from the noose like this‘
while dropping his hand to gesture her husband‘s execution.

Clothes, medicine, and other things are randomly allowed entry as well. When Gameel
and the rest were sentenced to death, their wives brought them red training suits in the following
visit. They were refused to pass through; so were new pairs of underwear on the justification that
their color was white. Yet the tagrīdāt [cell searches and acquisitions] that the prison staff
usually orchestrate constantly means the inmates need new clothes, which then mostly get
rejected in a bizarre cycle of precariousness.177 In similar vein, detainees are not allowed
tarayyod [getting out of the cell in all its different forms] on holidays and weekends. For the
death row detainees in political cases, this means overflowing shit buckets.178 When asked, the
prison staff suggested they ask their families for plastic bags to use as containers when the
bucket is full. Yet the bags are still confiscated at the tube, along with the white underwear and
antibiotics and whatever else the bashas aren‘t in the mood for today. Speaking of medicine,
allergy and stomach-ache medications are also mostly confiscated on the basis that they contain
‗stress-relief elements.‘

Interestingly, in each act of bringing something, whether food,

medicine, clothes, plastic bags, pens and paper—anything, the families are making a statement
beyond the materiality of the objects. It is a statement about the bodies of their loved ones, the
bodies that belong to them, the bodies they must feed, dress, cure, and care for. This is perhaps
177

Sometime in 2017, I was told a pair of pants in the Al Aqrab prison cost 500 EGP, which would make
some sense out of the refusal of non-prison clothes for the sake of the penitentiary profit-making.
178
This is another form of discrimination against „political‟-case prisoners, since ordinary-crime inmates
on the death row ward get to leave the cells to empty the buckets. They also wear red training suits, like
the ones that weren‟t allowed entry for their politically-brandee neighbors.
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why the stocks never run out; despite every rejection, confiscation, and insult, the families still
bring the food and the clothes and the medicine again and again and again.

This intangible yet highly tense struggle over the body is carried beyond the tube to the
visitation room. In the visit following the Arab Sharkas death sentences, the female family
members all wore red t-shirts under their ʿabāyas. When the inmates were dragged in by the
officers, cursed and shoved in front of their mothers and sisters, the latter held themselves back
from committing what they described as the stupid act of talking back to an officer: otherwise
‗they would take it out on them after we leave.‘ Instead, in an exhibit of stretched skin, they
waited for the officer to look away and showed the men their hidden red shirts. The mother of
Abdelrahman, the youngest man executed in the case, celebrated him as the ʿarīs bel badla al
ḥamra [groom in red suit] for the officers to hear. They responded by more curse words, which
accompanied the family after the visit and back into the tube. To this mother, the fact that one of
the officers was diagnosed with cancer a few months later was a direct consequence of this
encounter in particular. Of course, curse words aren‘t the only type of humiliation that the
family-visitors encounter. In attempt to perhaps extend control over their bodies as well, visitors
are harassed by degrading body frisks. After all, the Egyptian tube is not at all an airport-like
place where visitors are required to pass their bodies through x-ray machines. Rather, it is as if
they actually ―do time in the Tube,‖ to use Comfort‘s (2009, p.33) words.

The what next after they go through the tube is unpredictable, yet similarly intertwined
with intangible statements over body ownership. Visits with the Abu El Matameer detainees, for
example, stopped happening in the visitation rooms. Instead, the family members are taken
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further inside the prison to a room behind the canteen, before their husbands and sons are
brought in to meet them, after disparate infinities of waiting. Mervat, Gameel‘s wife, had taken
their seven- and 11-year old boys to visit their father, who entered the room in handcuffs and a
smile that didn‘t match them. She stood in front of the kids to block the view, and told the officer
that had brought him to uncuff him in front of his children, only for the 30-minute duration of the
visit. Unsurprisingly, the officer refused, justifying his refusal on the basis that he ‗forgot the
keys back in the cell.‘

The significance of this particular visit is apparent in its aftermath, when all this
confusion about bodies and body ownership was projected quite simply by the children. When
they were playing the day after, the eldest son—the 11-year old—tied his younger brother‘s
hands using a piece of thread and held an imaginary gun to his head, cursing and kicking him
until he falls to the ground. The young boy falls, then laughs and stands back up again for
another round of this game. Using the game as an allegory, it says much about the state‘s
perceived hegemony over the bodies, and the utter equation of violence with a game. From the
state‘s perspective, the children‘s enactment of violence and body ownership means it has
successfully engraved its status as winner in this body fight for generations to come; the game in
this sense is an installation of state-respect and fear among the children of those who think their
bodies belong to God (the ‗political‘ perpetrators who believe in an afterlife revenge). Yet this
scenario has so much more to it: the game is actually a replication of the state‘s injustice towards
someone who is after all their father. The fact that the injustices are being acted out means that
they have sunk in, and the dangers that this entails are unpredictable. Rather than growing up
into docile bodies, these boys—as figures, not as persons per se—could very well grow to
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avenge the father that the state has held its gun to, backfiring all the violences of expected
docility towards the state. Whatever the future carries, these children are nevertheless direct
extensions and proliferations of a father who might be executed (pending the Court of Cassation
verdict, which is scheduled for 20 February 2019). And so he lives on through them, their names,
their features, always present in their memories and/of childhood games, always ‗there,‘ just like
the state.
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Where do they go?
On Dead Inmates, Living Cadavers, and Fractured Closures179

Alas! What does death do with our soul?
Will it sometimes lend it eyes of flesh with which to look down upon the earth and weep?
—Victor Hugo, The Last Day of a Condemned Man

According to Article 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ‗the government shall bury the
body of whoever is sentenced to death unless he has relatives who ask to do that. And the burial
should be without iḥtifāl.180‘ The term iḥtifāl is a bit odd, because it translates to celebration,
ceremony, and even festival or feast.181 While a more suitable phrase might be marāsim dafn
[burial procedures/formalities], I choose to maintain the oddity of the legal articulation iḥtifāl,
and therefore translate it to the equally odd ‗celebration.‘

Before pondering on the fate of bodies at the government‘s disposal, it is important to
wonder why some families wouldn‘t want to receive the bodies, as implied by the article above.
A previous prisoner told me her speculation that families in Upper Egypt refrain from claiming
the bodies of people who were tried (and not killed by the victims‘ families instead), or else they
risk the continuation of tār [or thaʾr, blood revenge].182 In this narrative, claiming bodies post
execution means the revenge cycle continues. Interestingly, however, the necessity of retrieving
their beloved‘s executed bodies makes them maneuver around this: they do claim the bodies, but
in secret. At other instances, like much that has been happening in contemporary times, the
families are mostly not notified. When they are, as in the case of the Gamasa executees, the
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Parts of this chapter featured in a paper by the author as part of the Cairo Papers in Social Science
26th Annual Symposium
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Available (in Arabic) through manshurat.org, at https://manshurat.org/node/14419
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As per the translation of Al Maʿāny Dictionary, available at https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/aren/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84/
182
More on this is found in the work of El-Menoufi (1982)
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families are at a literal risk of having the government take over—it might be too late to actually
find them. Had it not been for the persistence, and perhaps luck, of Misbah‘s mother, she would
have never known where her son‘s body ended up.

This persistence, this taking of bodies in secret, is not just integral to understand the
significance of a decent burial; more so, it problematizes the legal stipulation of burial ‗without
celebration.‘ The denial of celebration in this sense, as in the families‘ interpretation, is the
absence of funeral prayers, a ganāza march, and at least a 2-hour stay in the cemetery after
burial. In some cases the families are also threatened not to hold ʿaza for receiving condolences.
As for the ghosl [a ritual body-wash before burial], it is also improperly carried out in whatever
morgue the bodies are to be claimed from. When 15 people were executed on 26 December
2017, police parades escorted/surrounded the bodies until they were buried, before making
everyone leave immediately. This speaks to the importance of the state not leaving any room for
‗celebration;‘ which raises questions around the familial necessity of this particular form thereof.

In her Between Worlds and Thresholds, Sabry (2015) addresses the significance of
mortuary rituals, primarily because they ―restore the rupture caused by death‖ (p.7). If this is true
for non-state-induced deaths, the rupture is definitely massive in the deaths caused by executionkills. Furthermore, as Lock (2001) opines, these rituals function to provide some closure to the
families, in restoration of a social order whereby ―death rituals frequently seek to negate the
alegatory character of physical death‖ (p.195), especially since death itself is not just individual
but social (p.193). In terms of proliferation, the sociability of death through these significant
rituals is palpable through bodily communication, a literal stretch of skin whose magnitude
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results from its being the last chance of tangible bodily communication. That is, before a lifetime
of waiting for the next chance to meet, in person, in an afterlife.

Building upon the significance of mortuary rituals, this chapter wonders what happens
when they don‘t exist, not in a sense of families not being allowed to conduct their ideal burial,
but in that some bodies that are not even buried. To do so, I turn to another legal clause found in
Article 72 of the Prisons Regulation Act that says ‗the body of him who is sentenced to death is
handed over to his family if they so request and the administration agrees. Burial must be
without celebration; if none of them comes forward to receive it within 24 hours, it is dispensed
to the nearest place to prison prepared to preserve bodies. If none of them comes forward to
receive it within seven days of the deposit date, it is dispensed to one of the university entities‘
(emphasis added). As such, this chapter follows unclaimed bodies to a Cairo medical school—
the last stage in the chronology of bodies of the condemned, keeping in mind how some bodies
might have ended up there just because families weren‘t informed about the execution date and
came in time for their monthly visit (after the 8-day deadline passed). Unfortunately, and as will
follow, there isn‘t much closure or solace to be offered to these families in particular; instead, I
hope they make peace with what the prison staff must have told them: that their relatives were
buried by the government, in realization of Article 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

After a brief description of the morgue and the four people who work there, the chapter
proposes a reading of the morgue in terms of Goffman‘s (1961) characteristics of total
institutions. It then highlights the mechanisms that the workers deploy to constantly render the
bodies dead, how this status as dead is potentially profitable, and how this ‗death‘ is very much
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problematic because the bodies are simultaneously perceived to be conscious. This
attribution/realization of consciousness is an entry point to wider dynamics of punishment and
mechanisms of its evasion, which undermine the notion of death as an end. To unpack this
further, the smell of formaldehyde is then explored as mediator between the breathing and nonbreathing bodies: as an intermediary between life and death, a promise of punishment, and an
eventual killer.

A. The Place as Peculiar Total Institution

The place is a must go-to for first and second year medical students.183 In addition to the
anatomy lectures that take place in halls with air conditioners, projectors, and microphones,
student ‗sections‘ are scheduled in the morgue for purposes of practical demonstrations. Unlike
Mansoura medical school, for example, where the demonstrations include plastic maquettes, the
demonstrations in this particular configuration are very real; that is, real bodies and body parts
are on display for the sections. To exhibit them, the morgue contains a number of marble slabs,
some broken, where the relevant body parts are laid. Each slab with body part is called a
‗station,‘ and students crowd around the doctors explaining the structures on each station before
rotating to the next. Conveniently, this is also where the body tanks are.

It never occurred to me to imagine humans in fish tanks before, but this is very much
what the tanks, and their names [aḥwāḍ], resemble—only they‘re much bigger and made of
wood, not glass. There are at least five tanks distributed near the walls of this part of the morgue,
183

The schedules of all students during the first two years include four subjects, one of which is anatomy.
First year students study the thorax, and upper and lower limbs. Second year students mainly study the
head and neck region.
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each wide enough to fit bodies laterally. The bodies and separate parts sink and swim in the (at
times overflowing) formaldehyde solution, in which the workers fish for the relevant structures
prior to each anatomy section. I don‘t know much about the drainage system; there are pipe
connections to the walls, yet the formalin is always near the top of the tank lids, covering all the
immersed bodies and parts within. When a body/part just won‘t sink, white salt-like precipitates
form around the floating segments, and so the workers must drown the entire bodies/parts in the
formaldehyde, which they refer to as formalin. To do that, they either fish for something heavier
to drown the floating structure—in one case it was an entire leg to sink a woman‘s head—or they
grab a wooden stool to keep the bodies down. The most relevant analogy I have came across is
Pachirat‘s (2011) description of the coolers at the slaughterhouse. ―The cooler is an unsettling
land of in-between where bodies and body parts, neither whole nor completely disassembled, are
recognizable as individual entities—this tail, this carcass, that tongue, that liver—but arranged in
rows and lines of sufficient mass that the mind struggles to imagine the sheer scale of the overall
puzzle of which they are the pieces‖ (p.33). Except in this case the puzzle pieces are not so
neatly arranged in rows and lines, but messily (and freely) swimming in human fish tanks.

A few months after my encounter with the morgue, I read Goffman‘s (1961) ―On the
Characteristics of Total Institutions,‖ as a required reading in a Prisons, Factories, and Asylums
class. In so many weird ways, the morgue fits Goffman‘s characteristics of these institutions, yet
as a peculiar entity—the peculiarity arises first and foremost from the physiological status of an
inmate population that is declared ‗dead.‘ To go beyond such status and extend a totalisticinterpretation of the morgue in a Goffmanian sense, I co-walk with him (yet another dead man)
in the morgue to explore its peculiar totality. His first observed characteristic of a total institution
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is it‘s barriers to the outside. An institution‘s ―total character is symbolized by the barrier to
social intercourse with the outside and departure that is often built right into the physical plant‖
(p.4). In this regard, descriptions of both the position and architecture of the morgue within
campus are due. The morgue is not at all visible (and perhaps intentionally excluded) from the
main school façade, which holds the main entrance, student affairs offices, the cashier, a library
built for accreditation and never open, and other administrative offices. In fact, one has to walk
about 40-50 feet behind this portal to reach the morgue, through at least two narrow corridors.
On this journey, there are three significant markers of the architectural disruption between the
morgue and the rest of campus. The first is a blunt contrast in color. The main portal overlooks
green gardens and flowery walkways, and the newest building (literally referred to as ‗the new
building‘) is painted entirely in red. However, once one approaches the morgue, the color is
predominantly grey. Additionally, there is contrast in the space design: whereas the façade has
Islamic-architectural elements, such as ornaments and huge decorated pillars, the morgue is
empty, starting from its entryways. Quite like Comfort‘s (2009) description of ―the Tube,‖ the
predominantly grey, empty space is composed of long, narrow corridors, connecting large,
square spaces. The third distinctive physical feature, perhaps more important for Goffman, is in
the morgue‘s ―locked doors, high walls, barbed wire‖ (p.15-6). The wire, along with metal bars,
seals several small windows located at the very top of the morgue walls. All three features are
noticeable from the outside.

Upon examination of the inside, it is interesting to consider what Goffman calls the
―central feature of total institutions,‖ namely the ―breakdown of the barriers ordinarily
separating‖ spheres of life. This has four components: first, all aspects of life are conducted in
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the same place, ―under the same single authority‖ (p.6). Second, each phase is within the
immediate company of a large batch of others; third, there is a tight schedule controlled from
above by a system of explicit formal rulings and body of officials; and fourth, ―activities are
brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the
institution‖ (p.6). It would be absurd to think of the exact spheres of life Goffman discussed, as
in sleep, play, and work per se, although it would be interesting to consider the dead inmates to
exist within one such sphere: sleep. By exploring the four components Goffman proposed,
however, these features emerge within the morgue despite—or perhaps because of—the
transformation of all spheres of life into one that is realized through contact with the living.

First, the hierarchy of one single authority places the morgue workers as its ‗low-level
staff,‘ in direct contact with the inmates. Hence, they are responsible for all activities on a daily
basis, which are to be determined by the authority above (in metaphorical and literal sense). As
with low-level positions in numerous governmental entities, this hierarchy is so powerful that it
is the compelling justification when morality is in question—they would frequently tell me ‗I‘m
just doing my job, just following orders.‘ So, upon receiving orders, the range of activities here
includes the reception and mummification of bodies, shaving and chopping them up into parts, at
times de-skinning them, filling tanks with formaldehyde and placing them there, extracting them
in time for student demonstrations, putting them back in, and finally ‗dumping‘ them in the soil
below the morgue when they are too worn out. To address the relevant third point as well, the
inmates‘ arrival, stay, and departure are decided on by the medical school authority, which also
notifies the workers of the required activities through a signed and stamped timetable of the
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weekly student demonstration schedule, for which the most frequent activities are required:
extraction from and return to the tanks.

Second, the immediate company of a large batch of others is hurtfully literal. It goes
beyond Goffman‘s conceptualization of adjacent cells or beds. One look at a formaldehyde tank
is more than enough to observe the closeness of such company of inmates. This ―mixing of‖ age
and gender in formalin tanks, noting the naked state of all inmates, embodies Goffman‘s
―contamination by contact‖ with other inmates (p.29), particularly since cross-gender physical
contact, not to mention nakedness, is a taboo. The fourth point is also a partial justification for
following orders. As an educational institution, the official aims of the school include using
cadavers for educative purposes, and so, the morgue workers‘ orders makes sense within this
rational plan towards producing medical practitioners. It is interesting that Hafez, one of the
workers, actually wishes to have his (two-year old) daughter become a medical student where he
works, because his access to the inmates will give her privileged access to them, particularly the
fresh ones.

This brings us to the divide between the staff and inmates, which also means that inmates
live in the institution and have restricted contact with outside world. Going beyond the
physiological ‗living‘ connotation, inmates do exist within the morgue-institution. Some inmates
have been in tanks for over 35 years, and some fresher ones are still being mummified. Even
after the parts are depreciated beyond use, they are thrown/dumped in a soil area below, and
hence still within, the morgue. As such, the remains of the remains are forever imprisoned within
the morgue, creating an uncanny air of a haunted space.
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On restricted contact, it is interesting to think of the only contact—with students and
professors during anatomy classes—as visitations. Their public character, in addition to their
―sadistic kind of arrangement‖ through which students fight over the ‗fresh bodies‘ and poke
them around, is definitely a form of contaminative exposure (p.31), not to mention the physical
nakedness of the inmates during all visitations—in fact, all the time, and not just during
visitations. This is contrary to the duration of the workers‘ stay in the institution. Upon
completing their 8-hour shift, they can leave to be integrated in the outside world. This means a
family life, a positionality that ―often permits staff members to remain integrated with the
outside community and to escape the encompassing tendency of the total institution‖ (p.11-12).
The family is central to the workers, because it is their only defining status that separates them
from the possibility of being inmates in the institution.

As for the workers, there are four of them. The oldest is Ali, who first came to the morgue
eight years ago. This was not his first experience with dead bodies, since he had previously
worked at a hospital morgue, yet it was different primarily because of the absence of formalin.
The bodies he saw and handled then were put in freezers, and he would assist the mortuary
rituals by performing ghosl upon the families‘ requests. Ali only came to visit the morgue once
throughout the fieldwork for this ethnography, with his distinctive unforgettable limp. He was
usually referred to as ostāz taqṭīʿ[chopping master] by Sayed and Hafez, who were friends and
neighbors even before they came to work together at the morgue five years ago. Their first day
was their first experience with dead bodies, and both of them freaked out. They were relocated
upon their request to other jobs in the same medical school, yet they were assigned back to the
morgue a year and a half later, when the dean saw a picture of garbage piles in the morgue that a
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student posted on Facebook. The last and youngest worker is Karim, who is a morgue-worker by
day and a DJ by night. This is his first experience with bodies as well, but he puts on a macho
attitude to show how indifferent, and untroubled, he is by the bodies and the larger structures
within which life and death, humans and ʿafarīt, right and wrong are intertwined.

B. The ‘Things’ are Dead

My first day in this field-site was accompanied by a checklist of questions, at the top of which
were: how many bodies of people who were executed make up the population of bodies in the
morgue? Who brings them here, when, and how? What are their names, who were they, what do
you know about them as more-than-bodies? To the surprise of my naivety, however, these
questions are all irrelevant; it is much messier than to provide simple answers to these simpleseeming questions. What all three workers knew for sure is that the bodies are the physical
remains of three types of people: those who died on the street, in mental health facilities, and in
execution chambers. In all cases, ‗el ḥokūma w amn el dawla’ [the government and state
security] bring the bodies to the morgue. This is a bit complicated by a movie-like scene wherein
two young men in military uniform carrying a long and apparently heavy bag on their shoulders
interrupted an anatomy section I attended. They walked to one of the tanks and dumped the bag
there before nonchalantly leaving. It turns out that this is exclusive to the Egyptian bodies,
whereas ‗el mashraḥa maliāna khawagāt’ [the morgue is full of foreigners]. Up till five years
ago, in the workers‘ narrative, the morgue received khawagāt who were usually flown to the
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country and welcomed at the morgue around 2 or 3 am,184 before the dean stopped this
transaction for no apparent reason. Within the spirit of a total institution, there is an element of
secrecy to the transactions, the parties involved, and the regulating conditions of this process of
khawagāt acquisition. Apart from this, everything else does not yield consensus. Regarding the
number of bodies that were executed, the narratives differ: Sayed doesn‘t even know that the
morgue has bodies of the condemned, Hafez knows for sure that such bodies do exist, and Karim
figures, ‗they‘ve been here for 30 years, they must have rotted.‘ It seems that any identification
of the bodies or their sources does not make its way to the morgue. Instead, the chair of the
anatomy department keeps records in his office, and makes the workers sign over a ʿohda
[custody/guardianship] specifying a certain number of bodies that they can neither remember nor
identify. This is because of three things: first, that formalin homogenizes all bodies, turning them
all brown; second, because it is impossible, practically speaking, to keep track of body parts; and
third, because Karim was right: bodies do rot, despite the formalin.

On my first encounter with the workers, there was a skull on the desk in their room. To
pave the way for my remaining questions (who are these people?), I asked them about the skull.
The question why it was there didn‘t make sense, because boxes of bones were everywhere in
the same room, some of them under the benches we were sitting on. So I asked whose is it, to get
a similar response to my previous questions: we don‘t know. In what follows, I argue that this
not-knowing is somewhat deliberate, in efforts to maintain the status of these bodies as dead.
Questions around the (dead) bodies‘ names, origins, genders, age—anything would generate the
responses: we don‘t know and it doesn‘t really matter. In further (flirtatious) deflection, Hafez
184

I was very doubtful of this statement until I asked medical school students at even other universities
whether they have seen any khawagāt-looking bodies at the morgue. This was confirmed, with some
students identifying Asian-seeming bodies at a private medical school in Cairo.
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once responded to an inquiry about the name of somebody smiling, ‗why do you want us to focus
on the dead while the living are so much prettier?‘ In some ways his question is compelling.
Why indeed would they focus on the dead, when it makes so much sense for them not to? I mean
to say that for the people dealing with bodies on a daily basis, co-immersed in the smell of
formalin, feeling stuck in a disgusting job, not humanizing the bodies is a must.

Therefore, conducting gards [inventory checks] is important. Doctors come down to the
morgue for the checks, which are really conducted by the workers, whose job is to put
everything—body and part—on display. To demonstrate, I was given the following example: ‗if
we have 100 legs, 50 of which are depleted, we write everything in a paper, and the dean writes
100 minus 50 (to be thrown).‘ As the inventory count implies, the bodies and parts in the morgue
are very much dehumanized; in fact, they are considered objects and things. And it also brings to
question the euphemisms of language. ‗Things‘ is the literal translation of the workers‘ reference
to body parts as ḥagāt. While specific structures are identified through names, like sternum,
skull, or brain, body parts, technically ―upper‖ and ―lower limbs,‖ are called ḥagāt. As
interesting as this articulation seems, Roach (2004) suggests it is a normal manifestation ―for
those who must deal with corpses regularly … to think of them as objects, not people‖ (p.12).
Abdalla (2015) also observed similar abstracting expressions among medical students, who
render ―the dead body as an object, a machine‖ in effort to make sense of the fact that it is
mutilated, fragmented, brown (and reeking) (p.419). For Roach (2004), the analogy is not with a
machine; rather, she interprets this abstracting reference for ―the same reason we say ‗pork‘ and
‗beef‘ instead of ‗pig‘ and ‗cow‘‖ (p.12). That is, realizing the human aspects of a sunken arm is
as seemingly traumatizing as putting a face to a steak.
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The reference to body parts as ḥagāt is quite telling, and so is the reference to bodies as
guthath. While it is the translated equivalent of ‗dead/corporeal bodies,‘ guthath is not how
Sayed referred to his own body: as getta [same word, different use from fuṣḥ to ʿammiy ].
Perhaps this linguistic alterity reveals a deeper mechanism of separating the morgue bodies from
the workers‘. In this view, the morgue bodies are bad bodies, who somehow deserved to be left
in formalin tanks. That is, they were unclaimed, which means that their families did not want
them, indicating they must have led socially unacceptable lives to have ended up in the morgue‘s
tanks, wet and unclaimed. With Sayed and Hafez‘s appeal to their Upper Egyptian origins, they
highlight the importance of their ʿezwa [sense of belonging/safety associated with their people].
‗If my family ever finds out I ended up here [in the tanks],‘ Hafez once said, ‗they will burn this
entire place down.‘ Whereas this act of finding out goes against their joking statements—that
nobody could possibly identify someone inside—Hafez‘s certainty adds to the mechanisms of
alterity by which the workers‘ bodies are entirely different than the ones in the tanks, thereby
strengthening the retrospective claim that the tank bodies must have led socially unacceptable
lives.

The ḥagāt are then potentially profitable. This comes from the workers‘ realization that,
aside from routine inventory checks, only they know what‘s inside the morgue. And this is
twofold; on the one hand, it means they can kill people and scatter their body parts among the
tanks. As Hafez once ‗joked,‘ speaking of a neighbor of his that he doesn‘t like, ‗ if anyone
comes asking, we‘ll tell him to go look inside [the morgue] and see if he finds anything.‘ And
just as it is easy to add to the body pile without triggering suspicion, they can easily take away
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from it. As I walked to the workers‘ room one time, Hafez was outside in the corridor, speaking
with a man I haven‘t seen before. Karim was sitting on the chair, watching them. There was a
sense of secrecy to the meeting with this man, whom I later understood was a liver doctor asking
to buy a liver. When Hafez came back to the room and saw all our curious eyes, he addressed the
three men saying, ‗he wants a very particular ṭalab185 [order]: a liver with the attached tubes
uncut.‘ Sayed immediately responded, ‗go check whether we have his ṭalab inside.‘ Karim then
joked that following this transaction, we‘d divide the money among all four of us (myself
included), and so I joked back, ‗well, since you said all four of us, I‘m in.‘ A moment of silence
and glances preceded Sayed‘s ‗no, we‘re joking; if we do so for real, we‘d be arrested.‘
Intrigued, I asked how much a liver would cost, and the answer is a staggering 100,000 Egyptian
pounds—a very tempting figure in this specific and very much precarious work configuration. Of
course, it would be impossible to use the liver in a transplant; instead, the doctor wants it for
educational purposes to display to the students. I never saw the liver man again, but the last thing
I heard was Hafez telling the others that he told him to come back in an hour to yeshīl ṭalaboh
[carry/collect his order].

The reluctance to ‗give the doctor his order‘ is not just because of the potential arrest, though.
It quite possibly emanates from worries about accountability. At these moments, the workers‘
job is paradoxical: the automaticity functions to strip the bodies of their last traces of humanity,
both metaphoric and literal; however, thinking through accountability is an inevitable attempt at
their rehumanization. Since day one, both Sayed and Hafez didn‘t want to work at the morgue;
Hafez didn‘t even touch a body part until Ali decided to throw one at him during the inventory
185

I use the word ṭalab because it resonated with fast food orders: ṭalab/ṭalabīa are commonly associated
with food delivery. The use of both ṭalab and liver [an arguably popular street-cart meal] helped form this
association.
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check, knowing he must catch it in front of the doctors and the dean. ‗I suddenly found a leg in
my hands,‘ Hafez remembers, ‗and eventually I got used to it.‘ This is from the man who
couldn‘t eat meat for months after his first day on the job, before he decided to stop coming to
work altogether for 40 days, although all he did was sweep the floor. The dean called for him
afterwards, and agreed to relocate him somewhere else until, of course, the garbage-picture
‗scandal.‘ All these indicators of disgust also speak to fear and/of accountability. This triggers
loads of interesting questions on the reasons and nature of this fear, and, more so, the inquiry into
the bodies: are they really dead?

C. Living Cadavers and Waking Up Dead

The linguistic maneuvers in the morgue are undoubtedly euphemisms, but they are also so much
more. Ḥagāt implies something more than thing/object; they are objects that cannot be named. In
this sense, the dehumanization of these ḥagāt might have more to do than make this kind of work
bearable. In fact, dehumanization is at the very core of the morgue workers‘ job: to make the
sub-bodies and not-just-dead non-objects unburiable. As explored in the previous chapter, the
family makes sense of the bodies as indicators of shahāda [martyrdom], through bodily signifiers
(like the smiles) and the necessity of mortuary rituals after which they continue to live on. In the
morgue, however, it is not just that the bodies are not buriable, but they cease to exist as bodies
in the first place. Instead, the ḥagāt signify a process by which the possibilities of living on
beyond the body is twofold: the segregation of the body and its unburiability makes it impossible
to retain a status of martyrdom; meanwhile, the horrid, dismembered ḥagāt-corpses give rise to
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the possibility of existence as ʿafarīt, as a constant presence that is entangled with notions of
punishment and accountability.186

There seems to be an intertwining perception of punishment, whereby the most
indifferent workers are (therefore) susceptible to some form of retaliation (for their indifference).
This predominantly concerns Ali the chopping master, who walked out of the workers‘ room in a
distinctive limp, before Hafez asked me to notice how he walked. I asked if he had a back
problem, to which Hafez whispered, ‗no, he had a stroke. He woke up one day with a stroke, and
when his wife asked him what was wrong, the only thing he said was: I never want to enter this
morgue again.‘

Considered a very obvious form of punishment, Ali‘s stroke—and limp—leaves (at least)
Hafez187 in the very precarious position of awaiting his seemingly imminent punishment. To live
with that, or perhaps to avoid it, there are certain strategies that he employs. The most basic is a
rule never to stay in the morgue at night. This decision came after an encounter with a perceived
ʿafrīt during one horrid night, when students were allowed to stay late in order to study for their
upcoming tests—something which they pay the workers to do. When Hafez was closing up after
they had left, he narrates, ‗the doors suddenly bang shut, although I was still in the room [away
from them]. I looked towards the doors, but no one was there. Frightened, I ran, smashing them
open, and was startled to see a black cat in the corridor. It appeared out of nowhere and almost

186

It is difficult to translate the term, because it is not exactly meant as ghosts, spirits, or djinns as in the
western understanding of them.
187
I say at least Hafez because he is the only one who explicitly spoke to me about this. Karim makes fun
of such fears in a „macho‟ fashion—which speaks to the insecurities that he must constantly mock and
joke about. Sayed is usually silent when such discussions come up.
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tripped me! Of course it was a ʿafrīt; what else could it have been?‘ A bit folklorish,188 Hafez‘s
tale nevertheless speaks to his sense of accountability and precarity concerning the job
requirements and perceived punishment.

To evade punishment, at least in principle, Hafez utilizes a set of distancing/othering
techniques to deflect liability upon others, including his co-worker Sayed. When asked what he
would do if he ‗woke up‘ inside the formalin tanks with the bodies, Hafez immediately
responded that ‗Sayed does bad things to the bodies. If he wakes up inside, they‘ll probably rape
him.‘ This statement is insightful on so many levels. First, there is an obvious mechanism of
alterity at work, whereby the person who treats the bodies ‗badly‘ is (most) liable to punishment.
Second, the phrase ‗waking up inside‘ ultimately blurs the normalized association of death with
sleeping. In other words, how is it possible to wake up in a formalin tank, after one has been
chopped up, and not just dead? This certainly points to the in-betweens within the morgue,
whereby cadavers are very much conscious. In fact, they are conscious enough that they, in the
hypothetical scenario above, would actually avenge themselves if/when they find the perpetrator
among them. And while it is too grim, this statement also invites imaginaries about the ‗bad
things‘ that only rape would counter: exactly what can one do to piss off a cadaver this much?

Whatever the answer might be, it is something much less worse than what the turabi
does. To Hafez, in another act of deflection, it is the turabi who will definitely be punished in the
afterlife for committing the worst sin of all: grave-digging. ‗I asked a Sheikh whether what I do
is ḥarām, you know,‘ he said, ‗and he told me the only thing ḥarām is grave-digging.‘ Looking

188

Black cats are considered bad omens in Egyptian folklore culture, perceived to be embodiments of
ʿafarīt.
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at the skull on the desk, Karim announced that ‗if students buy it from the turba [graves], they
can get it for 50 pounds. The turabi sells them here, too, at the beginning of each school year for
600 to 700 pounds each.‘ Within this framework, the turabi is not just a sinner, he also profits
from his ḥarām work, which is then used to make the workers‘ jobs a bit holier: they seem to be
unfortunate, facing grave injustices on a daily basis, for the sake of education, health, and
possibly even humanity. However, the problem with this romanticizing perception is a memory
that meeting Ali triggered. It was September 2012, when I went to the morgue among the herd of
students looking to buy the material (photocopied notes and bones). In an adjacent room to the
workers‘, Ali was sitting behind a wooden desk, with boxes full of bones around him. He handed
me a humerus and femur, saying that if I want him to, he could get me a ‗sternum that was lissa
ṭāza189‘ for an extra hundred pounds. I declined his offer, but I still remember his uncanny
smile—as if offering to do me a service. Later on, I was told that the ṭāza element of the sternum
was because this bony structure in particular dissolves shortly after death, which means someone
must have been digging recently-buried bodies. So ultimately, this turabi could in fact be Ali the
chopping master.

In addition to Hafez‘s deflection, perceptions around the tank bodies as conscious and
revengeful comes along with several religious shield-strategies to evade potential
revenge/punishment. Since his black cat ʿafrīt encounter, Hafez salutes the cadavers with as
salāmu ʿalaykom [Islamic salute translating to peace be upon you] every morning as he reaches
the morgue. When picking up or handling body-part ḥagāt, he made it routine to say bismillah,
sameḥni ya ḥaj [in the name of Allah, forgive me, ḥaj]. If the ḥagāt are just ḥagāt, it is weird
189

Because ṭāza is associated with food, I choose to use his original phrase to indicate the nuances of
articulation at the morgue. Specifically, I point to the use of food-related phrases within a space of
formalin and cadavers—something I find highly perplexing.
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that he identifies and speaks to them as ḥaj. His choice of ḥaj also problematizes the distancing
mechanism of ‗bad bodies;‘ instead, this is very much a precarious and perhaps not-fullyconscious attempt at the rehumanization of the non-object ḥagāt. I understand this partly in terms
of the notorious cultural use of ḥaj, and partly in terms of the contradictory affects of handling
this particular line of work. Bodies that somehow deserved ending up here must simultaneously
be handled with care; they are revengeful, yet will forgive when asked; the job is ultimately for
good cause, yet it doesn‘t feel right.

Among the attempts to make the job feel more right, the workers perform the Islamic funeral
prayer over ḥagāt that have rotted to the point of depletion. In such cases, their job is to put them
in a small garden behind the morgue, ultimately knowing that the turabi will dig the bones up in
a matter of time. Whether or not the turabi is in fact one of them, all the men stand and pray right
before dumping them. This routine started when an anatomy doctor instructed them to call him
before burying the depleted body parts. When he then told them we‘ll pray over them first, Hafez
asked, ‗why? They‘ve already been dead for so long,‘ to which the doctor responded, ‗because
when he asks you on judgment day, why have you done this to me? You can say, I‘ve prayed
over you, so you don‘t have anything on me.‘ These moments bring to light Lock‘s (2001) notion
of ―living cadavers‖ (p.192). Although used by her to denote the stage preceding organ
transplant—that is, when the body is at least biologically alive yet about to have its vital organs
removed—it also speaks to the contradictory mechanisms around the not-so-dead bodies in the
morgue, where ‗living‘ and ‗cadavers‘ resonate very differently.
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D. Breathing-Towards-Death

All these attempts to make peace with the job assume/anticipate a form of afterlife punishment.
There is, however, a more pressing form of punishment: the smell of formalin. Needless to say,
the stench destroys the body upon long exposure. A study by Elokda, Abdelaziz, and Samaha
(2009) focused on the short-term exposure of students to formalin in a Cairo medical school
morgue. In the 3-hour per week exposure, they identified these symptoms: ―unpleasant smell, dry
or sore nose, running or congested nose, unusual thirst, itching in the eyes, redness of eyes,
excessive lacrimation, disturbance of sight, nausea, headache, syncope (fainting episode),
unusual tiredness or dizziness, dry or sore throat, gastrointestinal disturbances, itching of the
hands, skin eruptions on the face or neck, respiratory distress and disturbed nocturnal sleep‖
(p.145). If the students‘ 3-hour exposure yielded 18 immediate symptoms, then the bodily
effects of a 40-hour weekly exposure over the years (five for Sayed and Hafez‘s and two for
Karim) on the job might be unimaginable. It is too present to disregard, too invasive to make one
forget ‗the soccer matches we used to play zamān,190‘ remembers Sayed, who cannot even run a
few feet now because of the immediate shortness of breath. So even if, by some measure, their
noses got desensitized to the stench over the years, their bodies did not. And this is not only a
matter of breath; apparently, the effects of such smell extend beyond the digestive tract and
nervous system to affect sexual functions as well. This was disclosed to me privately, away from
the joint sexual boasting conversations. Perhaps these conversations make sense now, in terms of
a wider context of masculinity in which sexual dysfunction is a stigma. In other words, ―male
sexual dysfunction is profoundly threatening to Egyptian notions of hegemonic masculinity‖

190

I choose to keep the phrase as is to maintain the nostalgic elements without identifying a certain
number of years, as he chose to articulate it..
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(Inhorn, 2002, p.344). Therefore, maybe as a sort of projective lies, proud sexual capacities
constantly intruded on conversations on the ‗job,‘ or on extended periods of silence.

As such, the smell mediates between the bodies that breathe and the ones that don‘t. The
workers have to keep smelling formalin everytime they breathe, and it eventually kills them with
every breath. Elokda and his fellow doctors warned about long-term exposure to formalin
because of its ―mutagenicity or carcinogenicity,‖ (p.145) and of its ability ―to cross [the] blood
brain barrier freely‖ (p.152). Therefore, its effects are not just psychological or bodily, but
neurological as well. On a broader level, the smell in this sense is a mediator between life and
death, and a constant reminder of the precariousness of death. Not only does it signify the
absence of mortuary rituals, an integral component of death as such, but it also opens up the
category of cadavers that are alive, conscious, and revengeful. It is a potential mechanism by
which ―the dead could also have direct agency over the living … since they too are social,
political, religious, economic, and ethical subjects‖ (Sabry, 2015, p.6). And so death is neither
an end nor a form of closure. In this configuration within the morgue as total institution, death is
disfiguring, subjectified, and very much precarious. As in the 35-year old body parts, bodies that
enter the morgue never leave, but continue to be imprisoned even after they are declared dead.
Even when/if they rot, they get to be dumped under the morgue, only to be dug up again and
recycled as study material for a never ending influx of medical students. Perhaps the sternum is
the only thing that escapes the morgue, only to dissolve within it, into the fluid, and through the
workers‘ noses, before asserting its presence along with other ʿafarīt.
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Concluding Without ‘Them’

Writing is undoubtedly a part of hell. It puts you in constant doubt: Was I able
to express what I wanted to? Did my words succeed? Is the text appealing? How
do I end the story? And then comes along the worst moment: Is there another
story after this one?
— Ahmed Khaled Tawfik, al Lughz Warāʾ al Suṭūr (2017, p.29)

A. The Stories of a Haunting

In his kalimatī lel tārīkh [my word for history], Egypt‘s first president Mohamed Naguib narrates
the aftermath of the 1952 Officers revolution. Early on in his journal, he cites an incident that, in
his description, ‗shook me at my depths and left a black shadow on this bright page‘ of history.
What started as a workers‘ strike in Kafr el Dawwar to demand better salaries on the backdrop of
this revolution reached him as news of ‗an assault by workers on policemen that left some
officers dead while they attempted to stop the spread of protests and fire.‘ Naguib agreed to form
a military council, to find himself ‗in a whirlpool of bafflement‘ after the council sentenced the
workers Mostafa Khamis and Mohamed El Baqary to death within one week of trial. ‗The
verdict came to me to for ratification … and I stopped. I will not ratify a death sentence within
10 days of our movement,‘ Naguib remembers (2011, p.52). Yet after receiving security reports
that triggered affects of fear and insecurity, this is eventually what he did. He still remembers
meeting with Mostafa Khamis before his execution, and his words ‗I did not commit anything to
justify the ʾiʿdām‘ (p.53).
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That was in 1952. The weight of the ratification of these two death sentences haunted
Naguib for the rest of his life. In 1984, 32 years after, he could not handle speaking about the
sentences in an interview.191 After narrating how he met with the two men at his office and asked
if they would like to have some tea, he started crying and was so uncomfortable that the
interviewer said kifāya [enough] only for him to start shouting ālām, ālām [pains, pains]. To
interpret this in terms of this work is to open up possibilities of haunting. That is, ʿafarīt exist
beyond the morgue; they are very much present precisely where/when their eradication is
intended: in the everyday, the traces, the stories of history. In this sense, the perceived
eradication via death penalty is an illusion. Instead, shahīds and ʿafarīts have a more profound
existence once they are executed. Otherwise, Naguib wouldn‘t have been haunted by two out of
500+ workers who were arrested, some of whom were 9-year olds.192

In a similar way, the execution of prominent figures actually backfired, increasing the
profundity of their existence after they had been killed. Such was the case with Saddam Hussein,
whose execution ‗immortalized him even among people who had wished him a much worse
future,‘ as Saad (2010) interprets.193 ‗He was lucky that his execution was a spectacle; it turned
him into a tragic character,‘ she explains: ‗when he was executed he became human.‘ This
transformation-by-execution into a tragic, human character was also the case with Sayed Qutb,
albeit on a more palpable level given its relevance to the current political executions in Egypt. A
shahīd to the movement, Qutb‘s execution fed into the ʿafrīt of the Muslim Brotherhood, actually

191

Interview segment available (in Arabic) at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcSXmQZnkkQ
As featured in a narration of the events by Safinaz Kazem in 2012. Available (in Arabic) at
http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Issues-Views/News/165663.aspx
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In a seminar on the death penalty held at the Center for Socialist Studies in 2014. Video segment
available (in Arabic) at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJ8CIaZTg08
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fueling the movement more, and more violently, in similar resonances with the current, ongoing
executions and revengeful ʿafarīts they create.

B. Beyond the Haunts: On After-Bodies

There is definitely something Shakespearean about the proposition that shahīds of the death
penalty are in effect ʿafarīts. If anything, the death penalty does not eradicate but constantly
humanizes, creating ‗black shadows‘ on the pages of history, to use Naguib‘s (2011) words. The
death penalty indeed haunts history, and the stories of the penalty in contemporary Egypt are
horrifying, to say the least. Yet imagining how things could be otherwise is not that radical. In an
attempt at ―hope without optimism‖ (Eagleton, 2015), it makes sense to realize the fact that the
stories here resonated with most countries at one point or another. This does not necessarily
reflect a linear teleology towards an unattainable utopia (Trouillot, 2003); on the contrary, it is
more towards a holistic view of how things may be different, some day when the shahīd-ʿafarīts
find some closure; when the future is no longer built on bodies that leave the execution
chambers.

5,421 km from Borg El Arab prison, where Lotfy and his co-inmates were executed, is
Kenya‘s Kamiti Maximum Security Prison, where death row is drastically different. Not only is
it possible to conduct in-prison interviews,194 but several MA degrees have also been based on
inmate interviews at Kamiti (Omboto, 2010; Ogeto, 2009; Kanyanya, 2006; Ochieng, 2014). As
for the death row ward, it is not identifiably different than the other wards. In fact, there is no
architecturally specific ‗death row ward,‘ but inmates are placed in cells based on their
194

Short film featuring interviews available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZN9nr-hs8Zs
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availability. So it is possible to find people sentenced to death in the same cells with others who
are imprisoned for a week. In addition to this demographic undifferentiation, death row detainees
are not differentiated against in terms of opportunities; they have equal access to everything,
including the African Prisons Project‘s195 ―Justice Changemaker Training,‖ which enrolls and
sponsors prisoners and prison staff in the University of London‘s distance-learning law program.
Among the extra-curricular activities of this program is an annual ―mock court,‖ in which ―law
students at the University of Nairobi are brought to prison and compete with the inmatestudents,‖ John from AFP explained, ―and guess what? Our students win.‖

Pete Ouko, who was on death row for 18 years after being charged with killing his wife,
has just graduated this program. Although he received a presidential pardon in 2017, he is now
his own lawyer, and continues to defend himself in court until he is marked ‗innocent.‘ While on
death row, Pete founded the charity Crime Si Poa196 [crime is bad] in 2011. Apparently, it was
registered and even started receiving funding while he was still sentenced to death. Surprised
about my utter shock and disbelief (I honestly thought he was joking), Pete went on about the
possibilities arising from the banality of death row: ―I was bored once so I told a friend to get me
some paint and we painted over the prison walls,‖ he said while showing me pictures of painted
lions, elephants, giraffes, birds, and trees on a fence with barbed wire on top—very much like a
primary school in Cairo, not a maximum security prison. He also showed me videos of hundreds
of inmates in a tent, watching six dancers on stage; he had organized the show ―because the
inmates get bored so we thought let‘s entertain them, it‘s good for them you know.‖ I was glad I
asked him the stupid question where is the tent? when he responded that it‘s inside the prison, in
195
196

More about AFP and their programs is available at https://africanprisons.org
http://www.crimesipoa.org/
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the same place where he and some fellow inmates planted trees in 2012. Still in my shock, I
could hear him offer to take me on a prison visit to see the art gallery that showcases the
inmates‘ work.197 ―We make animals out of all sorts of things, like flip-flops that are found in the
river. We have to think about putting aside some money for when we get out,‖ he explained.

Pete wasn‘t the only one who got out. In 2016, the president commuted 2,747 death row
detainees to life in prison, reportedly after a day-long hunger strike.198 This followed a similar
move by the former Kenyan president, who in 2009 commuted the death sentences of 4,000
people on death row. As Pete described it, ―if you‘re going to kill us just do it. Otherwise, if it‘s
not going to happen then let us out, give us hope.‖ The potential reluctance to kill, in Pete‘s
statement, reflects some positive changes in Kenyan history. First of all, the last execution
happened in 1987, when one man was hanged after a military trial. Throughout the past years,
politicians and human rights activists have worked to slowly abolish the penalty through the
introduction of reforms and, perhaps more importantly, the change in constitution. Prior to 2010,
death sentences were mandatory in cases of treason, murder, and armed robbery. This meant that
if someone was caught stealing a chicken with a knife in his pocket, the judge wouldn‘t have the
authority to give him another sentence. Lawyers, academics and civil society members took a
murder case to the Constitutional Court and, in November 2017, the court revoked the mandatory
death sentence for murder cases. Currently, cases for the two other crimes are also being taken to
the same court, with the hope that ―we can abolish the death penalty in five years,‖ as Amina
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This became the motive behind the rest of my trip, but I was unfortunately unable to visit because of
his schedule. Nevertheless, I still have this on my to-do list and highly encourage interested parties to do
the same.
198
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from Amnesty International199 told me. This was echoed by Wallace from the International
Commission of Jurists,200 who said ―it‘s about time that we, as a country, had some closure.‖

This is not to romanticize the penal system in Kenya, though. Since 6,000+ death row
detainees have been commuted to life, life in the current constitutional definition is the end of a
person‘s natural life. Furthermore, the fact that a batch of detainees was pardoned does not at all
mean that people are not sentenced to death following this pardon-batch. People still receive
death sentences by courts for the remaining mandatory crimes. There are, however, ongoing
efforts to define what ‗life‘ in prison means, particularly by the Power of Mercy Committee, with
the attempts to have a definition-spectrum of life: 10 years, 15 years, and up to 25 years,
depending on the case and the inmate behavior. It is also interesting that there are no red suits for
death row detainees in Kenya. In fact, there are only two suit colors: blue for everyone, and
striped black and white for the inmates who display positively changed behavior. ―They can have
two more hours on the break to watch the sunset as a reward for their behavior,‖ Pete clarified.

There is so much to learn from Kenya. In fact, there is so much to learn from the majority
of abolitionist countries around the world, especially those whose ‗circumstances‘ or
‗experiences‘ sound very much like our current times. The Politics of the Death Penalty in
Countries in Transition (2014) is one such avenue that brings together the experiences of diverse
countries in ‗transition.‘ Co-editor Futamura, who also works at the United Nations University
Institute for Sustainability and Peace, shared some insights on the book in an interview. Whereas
the unprecedented use of the penalty in Egypt is justified under the war on terror and political
199
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https://www.amnestykenya.org/
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instability, similar pretexts actually led to the abolition of the penalty in countries, ―as a way to
enhance their legitimacy … expecting it to serve as a symbolic demarcation from the evil and
authoritarian past regime‖ (Schmidt, 2014). By doing so, and in similar efforts to Kenya‘s,
abolition is a statement to highlight the state‘s commitment to human rights. Such was the case
in the Republic of Korea and in South Africa, for example. Needless to say, this might be at the
core of the agenda once a new regime is in power in Egypt.

Post-communist countries also went down the abolitionist path during the 1980s and
1990s, in order to benefit in political and economic terms from the international community, as
manifest in their membership in the European Union. Cambodia also reminds us that the state
should not hide behind ‗the people want the penalty‘ as an excuse to retain it. On a comparative
level, the military atrocities in Cambodia are horribly worse than those in Egypt, yet victims and
their families do not support the death penalty, even 30 years after the horrible crimes. An
arguably similar trend is in Latin American countries in general, from which there is so much to
learn.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that abolition is not the end of the story, just
like the story is not solely reducible to a human rights issue. As in Argentina, abolition is not an
easy short-term project; it was a two-step process whereby the abolition for ordinary crimes
happened in the middle of the democratization process, while abolishing the penalty for all
crimes came to strengthen civilian control after decades. With too much emphasis on abolition as
an end, like the Bosnian experience, post-abolition is not thought through, thereby generating
―confusion over alternative punishments … as the country was dealing with a number of war
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crime trials‖ (Schmidt, 2013). Similarly, emphasis on the importance of abolition should not
come at the expense of prison reforms in general.

One last thing that could teach us something is the Japanese experience. Although Japan still
retains the death penalty, a jury system was introduced in 2009 (Schmidt, 2013). So for almost
ten years, ‗the people‘ have actively taken part in trials, which means greater scale access to the
details, court proceedings, and, more importantly, the creation of a space to allow for public
debate over the penalty.

C. The Limits, the Pretense, the End

Ultimately, there is something wrong about concluding this because seeing it come to an end is
realizing why it started in the first place. It started because they have been killed again and again,
and now that I conclude without them I realize this cannot be an end; despite this and everything
else, the killings go on as usual. This banality by which the killings continue and are ignored as
such is partly why I have ventured along this depressive path, in a labor of stretched skin and
with a promise to tell the details. And so in some ways, this remains a trace that might exist
beyond the physicality of the body, as a multitude of narratives, scenes, stamps, torture marks
and frozen foods that are no longer there now that the bodies are not. Their existence on these
pages is an attempt to keep them somewhere, and somewhere close. But this is where it gets
complicated: what can words keep? How can they convey all this pain, all this misery? How is it
at all possible to express when one can no longer understand, when still in shock?
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With a swallow, I end the end at the limits, admitting first and foremost to the
impossibility of doing the very thing I attempted to do: to write this. Of course, everything is
distorted, messed up, and missing. Yes, the numbers exist, but these are even more disfiguring,
just like all the abstractions and silences. There aren‘t words to describe the tiniest degree of pain
in this ethnography, and so its job as a storyteller is also highly misleading. If anything, the
‗field‘ is trapped in my own body, trapping me along in it. This is why I had to write: to make
any sense, to get some closure (whatever that is), and eventually to move on. This is partially
why I was fascinated with the as if, now that I realize my own pretentiousness as the only reason
how this work was actually written: as if it didn‘t happen, as if it‘s not still happening, as if it is a
make-believe reality, as if this is actually writeable.

Even if words don‘t fail, this work is also limited because of the relative absence of
things that words would then convey. That is, the access to death row wards, the official
publication of anything really, the genuine opportunity to speak to state figures (other than allover-the-news fetishized Hussein ʿAshm wy), along with enough material to allow for
comparative analyses, and a state-led initiative to debate the penalty (like it had promised in
HRC‘s 36th meeting). In Egypt, like someone once wrote, ‗anthropology is everything and
nothing.‘ Venturing to the ‗field‘ is dangerously precarious, and so I had to maneuver around
these absences yet not trigger any alerts, which is why I have bits and pieces, what we might call
flashes, to start working from the margins. And the margins are not just the state‘s here; I had to
work through, across, and around the margins of some family members who doubted the young,
inexperienced girl that I am, preferring instead to contact older male researchers at EIPR to
campaign for their incarcerated loved ones. Similarly, and on similar terms, I was expelled to the
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margins by some forensic medicine specialists, lawyers, and established human rights activists
who wondered what this kid possibly thought she could add. The only site where my margins
proved helpful was the morgue, where all the above actually reassured the workers that I am not
at all affiliated with the administration; on the contrary, the stereotype that had sent me to the
margins was enough to allow my presence there.

If I didn‘t have to work from the (state‘s) margins, this wouldn‘t have been written. I
mean to say that if these limits had not existed in the first place, this would have been an entirely
different work, not just because of the potential access to death row wards then, but perhaps
because our constitution might not have had the death penalty altogether. If the limits were
different, we would have had a different state, judiciary, penal system, and a whole different set
of stories.

Pachirat (2011) began his Every Twelve Seconds by narrating the crisis caused by the
escape of six cows from the Omaha slaughterhouse. Like the cows, the details that have made
their way out of the death row wards and into this work are ―conceptually dangerous [as] their
escape threatened to surface power relations that work precisely through confinement,
segregation, and invisibility … thus breaching the zone of confinement‖ (p.5). If anything, the
breach of confinement zones is not the end of this story, but a beginning in medias res.
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